

POLITICS AND MORALITY

Other works by

DON LUIGI STURZO

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Italy and Fascismo, translated by Barbara Barclay Carter, Lic. ès L. (Paris), with a Preface by Gilbert Murray, D.Litt. London, Faber and Gwyer, 1926.

The International Community and the Right of War, translated by Barbara Barclay Carter, Lic. ès L. (Paris), with a Foreword by G. P. Gooch, D.Litt., F.B.A. London, George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1929.

Il Ciclo della Creazione—Tetralogia Cristiana—Poema Drammatico in un Prologo e Quattro Azioni. Paris, Librairie Bloud et Gay, 1932.

Essai de Sociologie, traduit de l'italien par Juliette Bertrand. Paris, Librairie Bloud et Gay, 1935.

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Politics and Morality

BY
LUIGI STURZO

Translated by
BARBARA BARCLAY CARTER, LIC. ÈS L. (PARIS)

'Only there is a good estate of the commonalty, where justice and honesty have free execution whether it be by a king, by nobles, or by the whole people.'

St. Augustine's *City of God*, Part II, Bk. xxi.

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TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE

THOUGH many of the chapters of the present book were written (in their original form) at different times, for different periodicals,¹ they form a unity—a unity, indeed, to be found in all Don Sturzo's work, which springs from a coherent social philosophy tried and tempered by the practical experience of political life.

For Don Sturzo, the essential fact of all human societies is a fact of consciousness, to which all material causes are tributary, the consciousness of each individual that he is part of a whole.² Moral factors in collective life have no less reality and greater efficacy than material factors. A society, be it Church or State or family, in the measure in which it concentrates on purely material ends, is doomed to disintegrate in egotistic individualism, and without freedom, morality, and justice, as ideals perceived beyond the concrete of daily existence (where their realization is never complete), no society can flourish.

It was the need for the assertion of the principles of Christian morality in the public life of Italy that first led him into politics. His experiences had taught him the educative value of a democratic system and the aptitude of the masses to profit by it. But democracy does not mean mass rule. In every system those who play an active part in political life are a minority, forming a ruling class which may or may not coincide with a social class or classes, and which in a democracy is most widely recruited and freely formed.

The more a man takes conscious part in social life the greater his social freedom: authority is no longer an alien

¹ Several have appeared in the *Dublin Review*, others in the *Hibbert Journal*, *Quarterly Review*, *Blackfriars*, *La Cité Chrétienne*, *La Vie Intellectuelle*, etc.

² See *Essai de Sociologie*, Bloud and Gay, 1936.

power, but something in which he has a share, active or passive as the case may be. Freedom and Authority are the essential poles of every society, each implying the other. Authority, which is the guarantor of order, must have intrinsic moral limits and rest on a measure of free consent, or it ceases to be authority and becomes tyranny. Freedom can only exist where there is order, and political liberties are precious as a means for defending the more essential liberties of human personality.

By the 'law of individuality-sociality,'¹ the richer the personality of an individual or group, the greater the faculty of forming associations with others, and conversely, such association brings enrichment of personality. A community is most surely knit together and has the widest radius of relationships when not only individuals, but every social form, the family, the Church, townships, regions, economic and professional groups, political parties, and the rest, have their own vigorous personality, and as full autonomy as is compatible with the welfare of the whole.

To-day, on the contrary, even in democratic countries, the power of the State threatens to become a stranglehold. In the totalitarian States it has so become. All spontaneous activity is arrested, the voice of the Church is stifled, the family loses essential rights over its children, consciences are perverted or silenced. As a result, the whole of Western civilisation is in danger ; if it is to be saved it can be saved only by full vindication of the principles of Christian morality (violation of which brings a sure nemesis), justice, freedom, and inviolability of conscience.

These are some of the underlying themes of the present book, which deals turn by turn with the main practical problems of the day, struggles in many of which Don Sturzel himself has played a leading part.

B. B. C.

¹ See *The International Community and the Right of War*, Chap. I.

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POLITICS AND MORALITY

I

POSSESSION AND POWER

IN the first centuries of Christianity the theory came into being that both possession of earthly goods and the coercive power of the political authority were consequences of Original Sin. Although not sinful in themselves, they were considered now as a penalty of the Fall, now as a remote or proximate cause of sin. Possession and power thus conceived were classed as the World (in the Gospel sense of the word), especially when possession turned into wealth and power into dominion. The other social evils, such as slavery, polygamy, revolt, and war, were traced to these two causes. The psychological source of such evils was the threefold concupiscence defined by St. John : 'concupiscence of the eyes, concupiscence of the flesh, and the pride of life.' But their social origin was to be sought in possession and power.

These two institutions were originally so closely connected that power was merely a consequence of wealth, or, vice versa, power in its turn became a source of wealth and a title to ownership. The historical phases that ensued have been many, but the patrimonial basis of political power survived all the variations in the State till the advent of the great democracies. In feudal times, the king had a paramount right over all landed property, as feudal overlord. In the time of Pope Boniface VIII, it was debated whether the papal rights over the whole world included also a paramount title of ownership.

Christianity, where it did not lead to a complete renunciation of riches and dominion, sought to render their use

moral, to temper the lust for them, procuring that the surplus should be passed on to the poor, directed towards religious and charitable works, and insisting on moral detachment from earthly things and on the vanity of the pomp and flattery that surround the mighty. Hence an ascetic moral teaching acting personally on those on whom fortune had bestowed riches and power. The presence of great saints among the lords and ladies, kings and queens of the Middle Ages, in the period of most violent passions and great social disturbances, is the fruit of Christianity ascetically conceived. In spite of this, Gregory VII could with reason declare in terrible words that every kingdom owed its origin to violence, lechery, murder, brigandage, rebellion, and war, which often accompanied it as a pursuing nemesis till it collapsed. This was repeated by the great preachers in speaking of riches, made and unmade by a series of misdeeds. The silver coins broken by St. Francis di Paola oozed blood.

Since the clergy shared in riches and dominion and fell into the same faults as the laity, the problem arose in the various epochs whether possession and power were not antithetical to the religious spirit of the Church. All the movements for reform, whether orthodox or heretical, sought a maximum and almost complete liberation from what the world necessarily carried in its train, riches and dominion. In every age, however, only a small fraction of men was called to follow the evangelical counsels of perfection. Society always benefited immensely by them, directly or indirectly, in the religious and social fields and in that of culture. But society taken as a whole could not abolish the various forms of possession and use of earthly goods, nor the various structures of social power, without ceasing to be a human society. Thus the problem of how possession of goods and power over other men could be rendered moral remained a fundamental one, for these attributes of earthly life were often accompanied by personal offences and social evils.

The problem passed from the plane of personal spirituality, which offered a solution only for a small nucleus of men,

few in comparison with all the rest of the world, to that of sociology. It became a question of how to stop possession and power from being a cause of social evils and disturbances and of individual offences, and thus to transmute them into instruments for good, in a word to render them moral.

Granted that possession and power are co-natural to the structure of society, at least as we see it in history, in order to render them moral it is first of all necessary to limit them. Unlimited possession and unlimited power are bound to be a source of evils. Morality, that is the right use of both, offers an ideal limit ; sociologically this limit must become an effectual value, a reality. Is it possible that when possession and power are combined one may limit the other from within ? And if not, can they ever be so separated that their autonomy will lead to mutual limitation from without ? Indeed, the first question for sociology is that of setting bounds to social forces, in their material aspect, in order to make them fulfil specific and ordered functions. The communism attempted in Jerusalem and Alexandria by the apostolic Church, and the Jesuit 'Reductions' of Paraguay, appear sociologically as attempts to separate possession from power, through a partial or total community of goods and the establishment of a moral authority, which, although concerned with the management and disposal of the wealth of the community, was not its personal possessor. These small and transient efforts of a religious and moral character in the social field, appear like fleeting rays of a dream-like beauty.

In the ancient world property was extended to cover men the selves, who were enslaved and treated as cattle or worse. There was no power that would protect the slave when his master held over him the right of life and death. Limitations of property by power came into being in order to guarantee the co-existence of the property-rights of members of the possessing classes. An elementary form of commutative justice, on a basis of *do ut des* and *facio ut facias*,

appears at the same time as a punitive justice directed against fraud, damage, and robbery. The limits, however, set by power to property became the more uncertain the more closely property was united to power or identified with it. On the other hand, where property was dissociated from power or in conflict with it, it became limited and controlled. The type of justice varied according to the class concerned (privileged, proprietary, artisan, or servile), that is to say, according to the greater or less union of possession with power.¹

Morality, considered as the natural (and hence rational) law of human conduct, entered into the practical endeavour to regulate the relationships of property with the growth of the idea of justice. But it was wanting on the very frequent occasions when such relationships, in actual fact, trespassed on the rights of a large portion of mankind which was left at the mercy of the privileged and powerful classes. In the evolution of the right of property, with its guarantees and limits, we may note a fairly marked trend towards its moralization. The point we have reached to-day may be defined as follows: recognition of a potential right of property to all; abolition of the political privileges of property; increase in the number of small property-owners; a nobler conception of labour, which is guaranteed against certain oppressions, vexations, and injustices; limitation of excess wealth through the share demanded by the State; an increase in contributions to the community in order to promote a higher level of culture, morality, hygiene, and social status among all.

We might seem to have reached a golden age of morality in economic matters, in view of the positive limits imposed by the political power, but the other side of the picture is anything but golden. The potential right to own does not correspond to an actual possibility, because of the pressure of capitalism and the tendency towards economic monopoly. The abolition of the political privileges of wealth has been

¹ The principle that a man must be tried by his peers, and hence the right of a peer to be tried by the House of Lords, is a survival of this social differentiation in the administration of justice.—*Translator's Note.*

followed by the increased influence of the big banks and trusts over politics, so that they form almost a State within the State. The increase in the number of small owners coincides with a devaluation of property, through a load of debts and taxes. The higher status of the worker and his protection against oppression does not remove the fact that the position of the proletariat is precarious, that unemployment is prolonged and grievous, and wages often insufficient for supporting a family, so that families go to pieces, leading to a profound moral crisis and opening the door to revolutionary propaganda. Finally, the greater share of the State in the capital and revenues of its citizens has increased its power to excess. And this diagnosis is not complete.

Let us consider the other side of the problem : the limitation of power by the possession of goods. In the feudal system the vassals, co-owners of fiefs and companions or co-mates with the king, had by this title a share in power and controlled it in the general assizes of the kingdom. Since the vassals were an aristocracy, the limits to power were more or less in favour of their class. Hence a dualism between the king and the great houses, which ended to the advantage of the absolute power of the monarchy.

The Church, rich and powerful for many centuries on the strength either of a religious or feudal title, shared in the limitation and control of power, whether this were royal or imperial. Hence another dualism, other contests which ended to the advantage of the absolute monarchies, both schismatic and Catholic. Yet other struggles occurred with the free communes, the emancipated municipalities, the urban burgesses. They too were rich and powerful, and withstood now the kings and their vassals, now the Pope and bishops. These contests too ended to the advantage of the absolute monarchies.

The triumph of established power over every form of property which might have a political character and set limits to power, would have been complete under the *ancien régime* if the kings had had a sound financial system and a

standing army of their own. These they lacked and they had from time to time to turn to the nobles, to the clergy, to the parliaments, to obtain their money and their approval. There thus came to be a control of forces, but never an inward harmony of relations ; a State of unstable construction, rather than a compact politico-economic organism, which ended in falling to pieces and becoming the prey of revolutionary movements.

The long process of the forming and un-forming of the limitations to power imposed by the three great social and economic forces, nobility, clergy, and municipal *bourgeoisie*, was not without profound effects on the complex tenor of ethical and social life, both practically and in relation to the growth of theory. The great discussion of the moral principles of collective life, though posed in religious and philosophical terms, could not evade the fact of the union of possession with power. Thus the trend of thought that came into being with the crisis of the *ancien régime* coincided with the contrary conception, their disentanglement. The limits set by power to the wealthy could not work because the wealthy classes shared in power ; the limits set by the wealthy classes to power did not work, because the political power sought to assume their functions in an effort of centralization and absolutism.

There was thus, with the French Revolution, a swing over to a conception of property as individual and power as universal, based on the Sovereignty of the People. The new trend of thought held more moral elements than the old one, inasmuch as the limits of power became inward and autonomous, and the limits of property were determined by functions of general utility and no longer by the particular advantage of the wealthy classes. But in practice three factors combined to weaken the ethical implications of this conception, which therefore appeared as aprioristic, which it was not.

The first factor was the individualization of property. This led to an excessive splitting up of wealth, which came to be widely represented by bonds, shares, and the like, with an extreme facility of credit. The result was the creation

of limited companies, of industrial and commercial trusts, to face the risks of vast undertakings. These companies and trusts became ultra-powerful; they controlled public politics and finance, no longer in an organic and responsible form, but in a private, irresponsible one which was therefore far more dangerous and harmful.

A second factor was the sovereignty of the people, individualistically conceived. This remained at the mercy of agitators and under the influence of capitalism, since it lacked organic forms, responsible leaders, and institutions of its own such as could give moral and decisive value to elections and plebiscites.¹ On the contrary, corruption crept in which, over a long period and especially in certain countries, degraded all popular manifestations. The parties which should have canalized electoral forces were often *bourgeois* cliques and the instruments of secret societies.

Power, universalized in name, was centralized in fact in order to become strong. In order to face the masses, to consolidate itself and to reinforce the structure of the State, it leaned on the one hand on private finance, that is to say on anonymous property, and on the other on the army, which, once temporary and recruited as occasion demanded, had become national and stable. The oscillations between a popular or semi-popular democracy and a national and *bourgeois* State were the phases of the last century, in which the two conceptions, that of the separation of power from possession and that of their union (in fact if not in law), alternated and blended.

A third factor was the elimination of the Church as an organism contributing to the limitation of power. The Church's contribution in this respect is not necessarily bound up with the system of property and the structure of

¹ For the particular case of England, see Chap. III, *The Crisis of Democracy*. In England, for good or evil, the persistence of primogeniture and entail continued to reflect the old conception of property as not individual but belonging to the family as represented by its head. At the same time British democracy owes much of its strength to the persistence of certain organic forms, such as stable parties, local administrations, the tradition of the Universities, and even the House of Lords, itself a shadow of the former organic union of possessions with power, though both possessions and power have now become rather mythical.—*Translator's Note*.

the State ; by nature it is transcendental, ethical, religious. In spite of this, in the social conditions of the past (and this not only in Western Christendom but among all peoples), a positive and organized religion has always had a wide use of goods and an effective share in power. With the secularist revolution, the first phases of separation occurred. These were followed by the modern system of Concordats, with greater or less convergence towards the policy of the possessing classes, but with the organic and juridical elimination of the Church from any kind of control in politics, whether national or international. The ecclesiastico-moral limits, theoretically suppressed, reappeared later and made themselves felt as political currents among the people, in parliament, and in the Press. The fluctuating relations between Church and State for the past century follow the oscillations of value of these new currents which are now clerical, now social, now reactionary, now democratic, according to the men, countries, and circumstances involved.

The limits set to power by property and vice versa, when they function in a normal manner, translate themselves into organic limits to the State. Thus it was in the days of the paternalist, patrimonial, and feudal State. But organic limits are not necessarily bound up with the union of power with possession. They may be conceived otherwise, as in the modern democracies, where the attempt has been made to deprive ownership of all public political character and function, and to give a bureaucratic position to the clergy by paying it from State funds.

In substance, limitations to power, whatever their nature, should come from the structural organs of the State, which have a certain share in sovereignty, directly or indirectly. This sharing of sovereignty, if it is to be truly organic, must not hamper the workings of government nor create a dualism, but should be specific and co-ordinated, just as, if it is to be a real and not merely nominal influence, it must be final. No power can be effective unless it is transmuted

into authority, and this in its turn, in order to be authority, that is to say final, must assume the character of sovereignty.

Let us consider the most characteristic type of organic limitations to power in a democratic State. Here sovereignty appertains specifically to five constitutional organs: the Head of the State, the People, Parliament, the Judiciary, the Government. These five organs limit one another reciprocally; here is organic limitation within the State without the interference of any external power whatever. The Head of the State (King or President) represents power in its symbolic and eminent form, unifies the other powers and guarantees them, sanctions the laws and causes them to be carried out in his name. But his position is limited, for he did not constitute it of himself but with the tacit or explicit consent of the people. He does not make the laws, which are debated and passed by Parliament. He does not create Parliament, though he may co-operate in its creation by nominating members of the Upper Chamber. He can only refuse to sanction laws (subject to given conditions and formalities), dissolve Parliament and call elections.

The People, according to the most fashionable theory, is the true sovereign, but it too is limited in its specific activity. It appoints its representatives but without an imperative mandate, without limitation of powers, without right to recall them. In the countries where there is a referendum, the people decides on concrete proposals submitted to it, while leaving to Parliament or the Government the form of enforcement of its decision. The people has a means of influencing the constituted powers through the Press, meetings and other forms of expression of public opinion, but this means is rather a moral limit than one of the organic ones.

Parliament makes the law, but does not enforce it, nor does it take part in government. The enforcement of the laws, which all are bound to obey, is the task of two other authorities with decisive though limited powers: the Judiciary for their juridical enforcement, in both civil and criminal cases, the Government for their political and administrative enforcement. A limit is set to the Judiciary

by the laws which it enforces but does not make, and by the disciplinary and administrative supervision of the central power. And in the same way limits are set to the Government by the laws, by the will of the Head of the State, by the policy determined by the parliamentary majority. These organic limits aim, *inter alia*, at three results. First, that power should not be bound to wealth, either as springing from the wealthy classes, or as protection of the special interests of wealth, or as a means of making fortunes. Secondly, that the law should have a uniformity and efficacy independently of the will of the men invested with power. In fact the limited periods of office, organic control, public discussion, the renewal of parliament, the political responsibility of the Government, are so many means for avoiding abuses of power. Thirdly, the establishment of an ethical criterion in politics, inasmuch as in the people that shares in public life there comes to be a feeling of general, national, social values, which have their own *ethos*, over and above private interests.

If in practice democracy has not produced the results hoped for by thinkers, moralists, and legislators, this is due not to unsoundness of the organic conception of the limits of power, but to its incomplete realization, to the lack of sufficient education of the people, to the individualistic system that has been set as foundation. The more the organic limits of power are whittled away, the less can the results we have mentioned be obtained, till they vanish altogether. Thus from time to time there is a relapse to absolute power, more or less tyrannical. When power asserts itself as above the law, *solutus a lege hominum*, it comes easily to consider itself as above morals, *solutus a lege Dei*. In such cases the problem of morality in politics can no longer be raised, since on the one hand all collective public life is at an end, and on the other the law transforms itself into the illimitable will of the tyrant. Between the two extremes of individualistic democracy and tyrannical absolutism, there will be many and various combinations of organic limits to power, such as to produce diverse results according to the prevalence of one element or the other.

If we make a parenthesis and consider the economic field, we find there the same sociological factors. Wealth without organic limitations soon becomes tyrannical. So long as the workers were not organized in trade unions and leagues, and had no political voice (directly or indirectly), they suffered phases of oppression that touch the borders of slavery. It is not a century ago that workers in the big industries were forced to work sixteen or eighteen hours a day at exhausting tasks, with inadequate pay, and were crowded into insanitary hovels. Boys and girls of tender age knew long hours of hard, painful work, and even worked underground in the mines, with disastrous effects, morally and physically. As little by little an organic control became established through workers' leagues (which were forbidden by the laws, but which ended by being tolerated), there came about social and economic improvements corresponding to the most elementary moral law. If to-day the Christian Social school persists in denouncing capitalism, as the cause of a system of economic exploitation, and in advocating workers' co-partnership in the capital of undertakings, it is in order to create a still better system of limitation to the enterprises of wealth, based on personal responsibility.

All power, whether political or economic or of another nature, which has no organic limits, easily becomes immoral power. Such organic limits are necessary as a prelude to the moralization of power (independently of the form of the State, democratic or aristocratic, republican or monarchic, liberal or paternal), inasmuch as such limits create a sense of right and duty in the exercise of power, increase the value of public control and of political responsibility, and hinder, in so far as possible, the too easy identification of power with the person invested with it.

The organic limits are not enough. There must also be ideal limits accepted with conviction by all. The ethical character of society colours all others, and forms the substance of what we call civilization. Civilization consists

of a complex of feelings, ideas, trends, and convictions among a people, assuming concrete form in its customs, its legal institutions, its traditions, its history, all of which form its actual patrimony and its living consciousness.

Not all in this complex is unimpeachable, from the point of view of strict morality. *Reality always needs to be purified. The divergence between the ideal and the real is striking, but it gives the impulse to progress, creating currents of reform and renewal.* Taken as a whole every civilization, from the most primitive to the most advanced, has a constant rational and ethical content of its own, by which every human society lives.

This ethical content, inasmuch as it is a spiritual value, is in itself a limit to power, considered as a material force, for it is rooted in the tradition of the people and finds expression in the collective conscience. The organic limits to power, if they are not consolidated and have not become a traditional value worthy of respect and respected, may be ignored and set aside, and then can no longer fulfil their function. But the moral limit that springs from the complex whole of a civilization has a wider range than mere formalities of procedure or the equilibrium of social organs. It is this limit that produces those wholesome reactions in the public conscience that restore equilibrium when it has chanced to be disturbed.

A very recent example of traditional values and of the collective conscience of a people on the moral plane was the crisis of the British monarchy, when in December 1936 King Edward VIII wished to marry a divorced woman, and was obliged by Parliament and by the country to choose between the throne and his marriage. That this limit to the King's power was set spontaneously and as it were naturally was due to the high stage of political and moral civilization reached by the British people. That this came about without a jar to the constitution was due to the good working of the constitutional organs, to the swift formation of a collective conscience on the delicate question involved, and to the sense of the limits of their own competence in the actors in the drama. Undoubtedly if the King had wished

he could have broken through those limits and disturbed the Constitution. The crisis would have been a profounder one, but its issue would have been no different.

For the ethical limit imposed on power by a civilization to be real and effectual, and not merely formal, is the work of two main factors: a general convergence of the public conscience and a religious conviction by which this conscience is sustained. Without this the limit loses its moral value, for it ceases to be inward and compelling.

General convergence of the public conscience is wanting when one system of civilization is undermined by another that seeks to take its place, and thus brings about the most acute conflict that can be had. Thus, to quote an example, Christianity created a conflict with pagan civilization, the Protestant Reformation with Catholicism, the liberal revolution with the *ancien régime*. In periods of conflict, many moral elements of the past are questioned, and as every conflict of ideas soon turns into a conflict of forces, the element power is for a time freed from the normal limits that hold it in check, precisely through the lack of a general convergence on the moral value of such limits.

The moral convergence of a people is shaped by its religious consciousness. Those who have ruthlessly promoted the dechristianization of modern society in the name of positivism and secularism, have not realized that they were attempting to rob our civilization of one of its mainstays, thus changing the ethical tradition of the West. What would they put in its place? Humanitarianism? Scientism? Ethical idealism? Historical materialism? Etatism? Nationalism? Racism? Bolshevism? So many and varied have been the attempts to create a new ethical basis for society, with such vain results.

In actual fact there have been two serious consequences. On the one hand the basis of a collective morality, which cannot be other than religious, has been shaken. On the other, the ethical consciousness of the nation as a whole has been split up into a number of particular conceptions, thus losing its proper physiognomy. The result is the present lack of a common ethical orientation, and hence the weakening

of an ethical limit to power, to all power, in whatever field it may be exercised, but chiefly to political power. The endeavour to find a way out of this state is the sign of a wholesome reaction. A better appreciation of Christian morality and a profounder realization of its implications mark a revival of indisputable value, but still inadequate in view of the gravity of the evil.

This promising revival finds a formidable obstacle in the new conceptions that grew up after the Great War, from seeds that had been long ripening, such as Bolshevism, Fascism, and Nazism, which seek to resolve ethics into the political power. They seek to obliterate the true basis of morality, which is human personality; or rather, they transfer the ethical values of the individual personality into the collective personality (considered as nation, race, people or class), which is a collectivity not only unified but hypostatized, as though it had a soul and will of its own. All differences and all discrepancies must be composed in such a collective personality, in it all minds, activities and efforts must be at one. According to such conceptions, individual persons no longer have rights to be vindicated in the face of the whole, but only the obligation of a most absolute conformity. This in consequence becomes for many a necessity of life, and through collectivized education it is transformed into unquestioning conviction and fanatical fervour.

Such enforced unification of the social whole would not be easy if at the centre there were not a strong individuality to whom submission is demanded, and if this individuality were not at the same time invested with all powers, becoming the sole effective power. If there were a real limit to the power of the head, there would be a specification of wills, and another ethical trend would come into being. But when every attempt at limitation, even ideal, is inexorably suppressed, there will be no possible means for individual persons to express themselves, according to their own consciences, as realities distinct from the whole. Thus the union and fusion of ethics with power creates in the collec-

tivity a state of mind peculiar to it, genuine though artificial and based on the sense of the intrinsic, final, and absolute value to be attributed to the social whole. This value is expressed by the head, but it is felt by an ever-increasing number of followers as being the spirit of the people, in a state of exaltation the more contagious the more it is ephemeral.

In the expression 'spirit of the people' or *Volksgeist* the idea of good is concentrated, so that all that conflicts with it is evil. This is asserted in the explanatory introduction to the new Penal Code of Nazi Germany, to the point of saying that the task of the judge is not to protect the individual against arbitrary acts, but to give practical effect to the *Volksgeist*; thus any individual who opposes the conception of good and evil professed by the people may be punished, even if his action is not covered by any legal provision. It is plain that the resolution of individual personality into the social whole, though it cannot stamp out the real individuality of each man, alters his character, weakens his moral sense, if it does not wholly darken it, and perverts his conscience.

Moreover, a power that is conceived as ethical in itself, which claims to give effectual and authoritative expression to the soul of the people, cannot fail to be presented as a religious value, as something sacred. All that conflicts with it is evil and must be suppressed. The persecution of adversaries, the killing of the refractory, become part of the task of defence of a new religious consciousness. If a new religion is not created (which, in general, is something repugnant to the modern mind), everything will be done to suppress the Christian churches, which are based on principles and dogmas antithetical to the fusion of power and ethics and to the sanctification of such fusion.

It is natural that with a social structure of this nature economic life will eventually be collectivized and swallowed up in the State. The process is irrelevant. It may come about late or soon, with violent methods or insinuating ones, totally or step by step and partially, according to the conditions of the country. Once power has identified itself

with ethics and become total, it cannot stop short before individualistic economy, which would limit it ; it cannot but seek to gain complete control of the whole economy of the country, in order to subordinate it to political ends. When a nation reaches this stage (as Russia, Germany, and Italy have to-day), it is forced into a frenzied defence of its new position in contrast to the past. For its very existence it must avoid those contacts with traditional civilization that might corrode it. Necessary consequences are petrification at home and propaganda abroad. Whether such propaganda is accompanied by revolutions and wars carried into other countries depends on the military strength of the country and on political circumstances. This happened with the France of the Revolution.

No great social conflict can remain for long enclosed within a State. It will overflow into the international field and undermine its structure, since there is the tendency in all fields to suppress organic and juridical limits and to substitute force for established moral values. This is no new phenomenon, but it became accentuated during and after the war. The material force of the various States, accumulated during a century of comparative peace and raised to a high potential by scientific inventions, the big industrial transformations and the storing up of wealth, in the Great War was loosed on the world. It was then that there was melancholy proof of the inefficacy of the moral and juridical limits created by international law and by written agreements. It was sought to remedy this by the institution of the League of Nations, by the Kellogg Pact and by other international agreements limiting armaments and the use of poison gas and aerial bombardments, and so forth. It seemed that a way had been found to make force return to its place as the servant of law, but hardly did the League of Nations show itself wavering, weak or partial, than the respect for written treaties, the rules of international law, the conventions of a moral order drawn up between States, came to an end.

To the general faults of weakness, insincerity, and selfishness in international relations (ancient faults to be found in

every period of history) there has been added the conflict of ethical conceptions, which aggravate international uneasiness. It is not that there are no salutary voices, no guiding lights in the darkness of the present. Christianity, though attacked in the domains of culture, politics, and law, or considered as merely a personal religion, or worse, as an enemy to the claims of labour or national claims, is still alive and able to restore to Western civilization its moral values, which are founded precisely on the Christian conception of society. Unhappily, politico-social passions are to-day so blinding that even a number of faithful Christians do not see the abyss into which society has fallen. To save it they invoke authority, a strong, absolute authority, and they do not perceive that the power vested in the authority of the State has become unlimited, without checks, set outside any responsibility and any ethical concern. In this way authority loses its naturally and religiously paternal character, moves the boundaries of law founded on natural morality, and offends against Christianity, either by persecuting it or exploiting it.

The error is here twofold : that of seeing in society only power, conceived under the aspect of authority, thus confusing the two terms and resolving authority into power ; and that of considering the moral problem only as one of teaching and doctrinal precept, without carrying it into the sociological domain of historical realization and intrinsic relationships. These relationships present themselves as inward limits between the two factors of the social structure, possession and power ; as organic limits of the political system (liberty and authority), as moral limits established by the public conscience of any civilization, if this is taken as a whole, religious, juridical, and cultural. Our civilization is a Christian civilization.

II

THE TOTALITARIAN STATE

THE name is newly coined, but its significance carries us back to the Assyrian and Babylonian empires. Fascism reinaugurated the totalitarian State defined in the famous phrase : ' Nothing outside or above the State, nothing against the State, everything within the State, everything for the State.'¹ Formulas apart, there have been similar conceptions in the past, both in theory and practice. *Leviathan* has two and a half centuries of history. None the less, there is a difference between to-day and yesterday ; a comparison of the more or less totalitarian States of the past with those of the present reveals so many signs of diversity as to force us to conclude that modern experiences of the totalitarian State have peculiar features all their own. This is the case because the historic process is not reversible ; consciously or unconsciously, the experiences of the past are transformed in the present into new, with the succession of new generations of men and of the personalities in whom history finds realization.

We must therefore avoid abstract formulas. These are necessary to the student in the same way as poles and planks and scaffolding are necessary in the building of a house or the painting of a ceiling. But having served their purpose, they must be put aside, if we are to inhabit the house or enjoy the painting. Reality refuses to fit into formulas. To-day, in speaking of the totalitarian State, we think at once of Bolshevik Russia, Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, Kemalist Turkey, and of Mexico, half-Socialist,

¹ See also the signed article by Mussolini in the *Enciclopedia Italiana* (Milan, 1932, Vol. XIV, p. 847) on Fascism : ' For Fascism, everything is in the State, and nothing human or spiritual exists, far less has value, outside the State.'—*Translator's Note*.

half-brigand. Other States have imitated these: Austria, Poland, Portugal. And since we are obliged, for the sake of convenience of language, to seek the general and typical, we speak readily of a totalitarianism that may be Bolshevik, Fascist, or Nazi. We might even have given Pilsudski the honour of an 'ism' and spoken of *Pilsudskism*—an ugly word, but what it stood for was not pretty.

The idea of the State is peculiar to modern times. The Middle Ages did not speak of States, but of kingdoms and kings, empire and emperor, lords and vassals, cities and republics. When men wished to define the nature of power, they spoke of Temporal Power to distinguish it from or oppose it to the Spiritual Power. Peoples were called nations; classes, corporations or guilds; the principle of social life was the community or *universitas*. Every social group had a life of its own, its own liberties, privileges, and immunities. The social whole functioned like a world of living monads, in a kind of pre-established harmony *à la* Leibnitz—a harmony undoubtedly pre-established though not always established in reality. The juridical basis of this mediæval world was a system of mutual obligations, private and personal in character. Even the relations between people or nation and king or emperor were envisaged as a contract, a mutual obligation of faith and loyalty. The king was bound to respect the Common Law and the individual privileges of groups or persons; the latter owed fealty and support to the king's person.

The idea of the State, as an entity based on public law, over and above the Community, had then no currency. We must reach the Renaissance, with the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, before the idea of the State achieves consistency and so imposes itself on the mental habits of the age as to be spoken of as though it were an effective reality. In England, where a sense of the concrete prevails over habits of abstract thought and where the legacies of the past have been preserved better than in other countries, there is far less mention of the State and far more of the Crown, of Parliament, or the House of Commons and House of Lords, or the Empire and the Commonwealth.

Here something of the mediæval mind has survived ! Only in speaking of Church and State is the term State of frequent use, but the position implied by *Church and State* is wholly modern. In the Middle Ages people spoke of Kingdom and Priesthood, Papacy and Empire, Temporal Power and Spiritual Power.

Created by a need, as all words are, the word State arose in Italy to indicate *stability*, precisely at that moment of the Renaissance when in those petty principalities, dukedoms, marquisates, and pseudo-republics, save in Venice, stability of power, certitude of boundaries, and surety of independence were conspicuous by their absence. But on the same principle as *lucus a non lucendo*, it was then that men in Italy began to speak of a *State*. All had to be made anew, when the old republics were collapsing, the peoples in ferment, and Spaniards and French warred for mastery in Lombardy, Rome, Naples, and Sicily. The idea of power as force, to be used against the very powerful Church, or against jealous neighbours or foreign invaders, or against rebellious subjects, imposed itself as the sole means that would give stability to both the State and its ruler, especially when the said ruler was a usurper. The identification of the State with the prince was the first manifestation of the idea of the State, and found its theorist in Machiavelli.

Machiavelli in politics invented 'working truth' (*verità effettuale*), which later became the *raison d'Etat*, just as the last century produced the term *Realpolitik*, or realist politics. The meaning is in each case the same. The ends of the ruler demand the subordination of the ends of subjects. Means are indifferent ; so much the better if they are honourable, but even unscrupulous means, if useful, are not to be excluded. Religion is good inasmuch as it keeps the people quiet ; morality is useful inasmuch as it furthers the general well-being ; but above religion and morality stand politics understood as the art of domination and of maintaining strength. Machiavelli had no liking for crime, but when it proved a path to success he admired its results.

Many yesterday, as to-day, agree with Machiavelli without owning to it, cloaking their immoral outlook by

such pretexts as historical necessity, choice of a lesser evil, national advantage, and even service of religion. Machiavelli tore aside such hypocritical veils and by his theory sought to justify the triumph of the useful as the prevailing necessity of the State. From Machiavelli to Luther is but a step. Luther gave all powers, even ecclesiastical powers, into the hands of the prince, who became free from check or control from either Church or people. Machiavelli had subordinated the ends of religion to the ends of the State as personified in the prince. Luther went further; his theory of the servile will separated morals from faith, and left the whole of moral life and religious organization in the hands of the sole temporal authority. It pleased the German princes greatly to unite all powers in their persons, all the more since ecclesiastical powers were then very wide and financially remunerative. All the Reformed princes did so. The others, who had remained faithful to Rome, while respecting the Pope's authority—up to a point—took such liberties in respect of ecclesiastical rights and fiscal systems as to compete with the Protestant princes. Such tendencies were in accordance with the spirit of the age.

The experience of nearly a century of Machiavellism on the one hand and of Cesaro-Papism on the other, in its Reformed and non-Reformed varieties—the latter later bore such names as Gallicanism, Febronianism, Josephism,¹ and Jurisdictionalism—created a need for a corresponding theory, more adequate than either Machiavelli's empiricism or Luther's servile will. The theory of *sovereignty* made its appearance in systematic form with Jean Bodin's *Six Livres de la République* (1575). For Jean Bodin, sovereignty is 'the absolute and perpetual power of a polity (*république*)'; something self-subsistent that forms the foundation of the State. It is the power to make laws without being bound by them, contrary to the mediæval view that the law was

¹ *Febronianism*, from Febronius, the pseudonym of Nikolaus von Hontheim, who in the eighteenth century upheld the Gallican theories in matters of ecclesiastical law, giving them wider range and more systematic expression. *Josephism* takes its name from Joseph II, Emperor of Austria, who applied the Febronian principles in an exaggerated form.—*Translator's Note.*

greater than the power that made the law, and binding upon both sovereigns and peoples. It must not be thought that the doctrine of sovereignty, by whatever name it might be called, had not tempted legists and canonists of the Middle Ages, or that kings and emperors before Machiavelli and Luther had not believed themselves above the law. But it is one thing when a theory makes a tentative appearance, adapting itself to the historical circumstances and atmosphere of an age, and another when it has become an interpretation accepted by the majority, and the basis of social life.

In modern times, the theory of sovereignty became general, in spite of the fact that various currents, acting from various standpoints—Monarcomarchi,¹ Dominicans, Jesuits, and Calvinists—met its emergence with hostility. By the second half of the seventeenth century it was more or less accepted by all. Invested with a divine character, sovereignty had become the Divine Right of Kings. Bossuet, as a theologian, expressed it in Gallican form. Protestant and Anglican theologians upheld it as a twofold absolutism, civil and religious. Rome opposed both attitudes, in order to safeguard the rights of the Church; she thus, implicitly, protected also the rights of the people when these had been forgotten by nearly all.

Meanwhile, the Natural Law school had made its appearance. It posited abstract Nature rather than God as the basis of society. A tendency towards pantheistic naturalism was already perceptible. The absolutism of the kings was, so to say, secularized. Divine Right, repudiated by Catholic doctrine, could find no adequate expression in the naturalistic culture of the age and was on the point of vanishing. The Natural Law theory came in time to save it. In a pre-social, almost animal stage of civilization—so it was said—men were not such as to be able to form a society or give themselves laws. They therefore ceded their potential sovereignty to a chief, or were forcibly compelled by him to do so, in a total and irrevocable manner. Thus the

¹ *Monarcomarchi* was the name given to those who in the sixteenth century maintained in France the rights of the people against the hereditary monarchy.—*Translator's Note.*

absolute sovereignty of monarchs was saved, even though it might ultimately derive from the sovereignty of the people. Here Hobbes is the chief authority.

But a contrary current among the Natural Law theorists, starting from a pre-social human nature that was good and happy, found neither essential reasons nor political convenience in such total and irrevocable cession of the sovereignty of the people. On the contrary, according to Rousseau, the monarchs had usurped the inalienable and indivisible sovereign rights of the people. Between the two conceptions a third developed, maintaining that the sovereignty of the people was absolute, but that it had to be delegated to representatives who could be recalled or re-elected at fixed periods. It was not the type of government that was novel. Antiquity and the Middle Ages were aware that power might be held by one, as monarchy ; by a few, as oligarchy ; or by the people, as democracy. The specific feature of the new political conception was above all that such power was unlimited, a sovereignty knowing no limits outside itself.

The sovereignty of kings by Divine Right found its limits in the personal relationship between the monarch and God. If the monarch inverted the terms and believed himself a demi-god, no one could prevent what for him was only too easy a transition. The monarchic sovereignty by Right of Nature should have found its limits in Natural Law. But since the monarch was sole interpreter of this law, the people, the original source of such sovereignty in virtue of their single, never-to-be-renewed act of surrender, had no means of recalling the sovereign to a less arbitrary interpretation. Rousseau's Sovereignty of the People had no limits beyond the collective will, which would be a law to itself. That this would resolve itself into the law of the majority, or the law of representatives or delegates, according to the various practical forms of democratic organization, does not affect the absolutism of a sovereignty with no limits outside itself.

But this was not all. Bossuet's Sovereignty by Divine Right, Hobbes's Sovereignty by Natural Right, Rousseau's Sovereignty of the People, inasmuch as they were unlimited,

presupposed, encouraged and consolidated an impersonal, objective entity, superior to men : the State. In saying this, we are not objecting to the idea of the State. In thinking and speaking of collective things we have to reduce them to formal or abstract ideas, in the light of which we may return to concrete realities and identify them in their reality and in their effective unity. All the same, such ideas as community, *universitas*, *res publica*, kingdom, retain the fundamental idea of a society, of an association of several individuals for a common end. Even church, from the Greek *ecclesia*—assembly, gathering—originally and primarily means a society : whereas in the idea of the State the concept of society is forgotten, its place being taken by the concept of an objective, stable reality, sovereign and powerful. Hence also the expressions Sovereignty and Power.

Little by little, in order to conserve and increase its power, the State came to be regarded as an origin, the origin of all rights, and as an end, the end of all public activity. This was what was meant by *raison d'Etat* : the subordination of everything to the greatness of the State. Botero's efforts to 'Catholicize' the *raison d'Etat* served merely to cast a shadow on Catholicism ; by admitting the *raison d'Etat* if the State were Catholic, he appeared to justify by religious ends the political, worldly, utilitarian, and at bottom immoral means employed by Catholic sovereigns of his time. All came to envisage the State as a reality superior to men, and sovereignty as a higher will, realizing the ends of the State. When Louis XIV said, '*L'Etat, c'est moi !*' he did not set himself above the State, but implied that he summed up the interests of the State in himself and expressed them by his will. H. J. Laski was right, when, in the *Daily Herald*, on the four hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the birth of Luther, he wrote that without Luther there could have been no Louis XIV.

The idea of the State cannot be an ultimate ; it calls for a reality to substantiate it. In the days of the Divine Right, behind the State, for good or evil, there was the idea of God, and this idea carried with it, at least implicitly, the idea of the people. The clergy sought to emphasize

now the one, now the other, though they were not always able to do so, as in the case of the Gallican or Josephist clergy. With the advent of the Encyclopedists, the State was made to rest on the idea of Nature or Humanity, both excellent ideas, for nature and humanity are God's creatures. But, detached from God, they remained abstractions, with no real consistency. In the quest for stable foundations three conceptions arose, which have guided political life from the beginning of the last century up to our own time.

The first is Hegel's. The State is nothing but a manifestation of the Spirit ; it is indeed the most perfect of such manifestations. The State is in itself ethics, right, and power. It is a kind of divine incarnation, in which the idea of power becomes one with the idea of God. But what State in the Germany of Hegel's time could seriously be described as ' a manifestation of the absolute Spirit of the world and the will to power ' ? Outside Prussia, all the other States and statelets could be said to be manifestations of the mediocrity of their petty despots and of the intrigues of their courts. It needed the Napoleonic wars to bring to birth a national spirit in Germany. Fichte became its philosopher and prophet. According to Fichte, it is only in the Nation that the eternal becomes visible. It possesses a moral greatness that aspires to the lordship of the spirit. The State as nation, as the outcome of the whole culture of a people, is for Fichte the *self-representation of God*. We are still on the same lines as Hegel, but the State has become the Nation. When Bismarck achieved the unity of Germany, Belgium had already regained a personality of her own, Italy had found unity, and the Balkan peoples were on the way to win independence. The principle of nationality, the of independence and that of unity, thus provided a political basis for the idea of the nation as power and culture, and of which the State was merely the juridical and military instrument.

In France the idea of the nation, as opposed to the humanitarianism of the Enlightenment, developed less through theories than through the rise of the Third Estate or middle classes, through military conscription and the

Napoleonic wars, through democracy and the reactionary upheavals of Bonapartists and Clericals. France never repudiated the idea of the State, because the State coincided with the nation. And behind the State stood now the people, now the nation. But people and nation had no need of a myth to give them consistency ; the idea of fatherland was one with which they had been long acquainted, and it was quickened by spontaneous feeling. Maurras' nationalism sufficed to bring some Frenchmen to the extreme limit of a positivist mysticism.

England never lost her pragmatical common sense, even when her philosophers introduced the gospel of Hegel and Fichte's exalted theories. Theoretically, and often in practice, what prevailed was utilitarianism, tempered by a moralism that was not wholly discernible. On the sea, the British flag was enough ; in the colonies, the Crown ; at home, everyone felt himself free and his own master, without wanting to lean upon the State or to create the myth of the nation as divinity. For the Englishman the nation was something living less through theories than through its history and empire.

While the national idea was coming to the fore, another current was everywhere developing, which repudiated State and nation in the name of Class—the Socialist current, which was raised to a theory by Karl Marx. The proletariat was to destroy the *bourgeois* State and the militarist nation, through the advent of collectivist economy. Here historical materialism took the place of Hegel's historical process of the Idea. Class war took the place of national dynamism. Economy as organized labour took the place of the State as power. The Marxist-Socialist movement destroyed the unity of national feeling, and in each separate nation created the zone of the International. Hegel, Fichte, Marx—these three Germans express the efforts of nineteenth-century Europe to give a meaning, a content, an absolute and all but divine finality, to the State, to the nation, to the class.

In the course of the nineteenth century two systems grew up round the conception of the national State : the liberal system and the authoritarian. The former was either

conservative or democratic, the latter either absolute or paternalist. These words must not be taken literally as indicating fixed types, but merely the prevailing tendencies in either case. The important fact for the purposes of our investigation is that behind democracy on the French pattern, and behind the authoritarianism of Bismarck or William II, we find the national State. Only the Austro-Hungarian Empire, because of the diverse nationalities of which it was composed, could not be described as a true national State and bore within itself the seeds of disintegration.

Wherever it may be found, the national State has certain predominant features—an ever increasing centralization, a militarism based on conscription and standing armies, and State education employed as a means of creating national conformity. In France these features were a legacy from the Revolution and the Napoleonic Empire. In Germany they were the legacy of the Prussia of Frederick II. In Italy they were necessities of the achievement of unity, and were copied from France. In Spain they represented an attempt to overcome dynastic particularism, autonomist movements, and the influence of the Church. In Austria they were conditions of the dominance of the House of Habsburg and of the Austrian and Magyar peoples. Other European countries existed in a like atmosphere, when they did not experience similar needs.

Liberal economic systems and working-class internationalism should have fostered a far keener cosmopolitan sense in opposition to nationalism; and to this, facility of trade, scientific collaboration, the diffusion of the Press, and the organization of labour gave an impetus. But free trade was a ~~l~~se soon left behind for protective tariffs, which were at first tentative, then extremely comprehensive, to the advantage of so-called national economy. The daily Press soon lost its free and individual character, to become a more or less capitalistic enterprise, or a dependency on industrial undertakings. The workers' international was always undermined by local particularism, save for the extremist and semi-anarchist sections, which were always

poor in men and means. And if the various brands of Socialism repudiated the national State as *bourgeois*, they would not have repudiated a national State that was proletarian.

The Church, without concealing the preference she then felt for authoritarian States, fought from the religious standpoint against political centralization, which implied limitations to her authority and mission ; against compulsory conscription and the armaments race, which brought in its train the danger of wars ; and above all against State education, which revealed itself as a threatening monopoly and a means of dechristianizing the people in the name of the State. The Church accentuated the struggle against Liberalism from theoretical motives and because of the practical positions she would defend, but her main struggle was against the national State, by which she was oppressed.

The Great War was the trial by fire of the political conceptions and systems of the nineteenth century. Empires fell and forms of government were changed, but in all the changes and upheavals of the war and after, the four factors of the national State remained—centralization, militarism, State schools, and protective tariffs. The Germany of Weimar had reduced her army to the minimum allowed by the Peace Treaties, but her militarism remained and developed in clandestine ways till it could reappear in broad daylight. From the new Baltic States to the Balkans, all were seized by a frenzy of military spirit, and where there were no regular armies there were armed bands, militarized youth movements, political militia, black, red, blue, and orange. In order to remedy their weakness of structure, the new States imitated the centralization of the old, which have not ceased to create new officials and to increase their Civil Services at the expense of their budgets. The school has become even more a field of political conquest than it was before the war, and protective tariffs have risen to dizzy heights. Even England has ended by throwing free trade overboard. Finally, in the sixteen years between 1917 and 1933, among many bitter experiences, Europe has seen the emergence of a Bolshevist Russia, a Fascist Italy,

and a Nazi Germany—three great totalitarian States, differing in character, but all three of a national type and based on administrative and political centralization, militarism, a monopoly of education, and closed economic systems.

What are the differences and what the substantial similarities between these totalitarian States and the other national States that exist to-day? By confining ourselves to the four main common factors, we can determine the differences.

(a) In the totalitarian State administrative centralization is carried to extremes—the suppression of all local autonomy, whether municipal or provincial, with that of the autonomy of all public or semi-public institutions, charitable organizations, cultural associations, universities. Centralization in the totalitarian State invades the political field, which, for good or evil, in the national States that still fly the flag of democracy is a disputed field. The executive has become *de jure* and *de facto* the sum of all powers, even those of the head of the State (in Russia and in Germany the head of the State and the head of the Government are one and the same). The independence of the legislature and judiciary has completely disappeared, and even the Government is reduced to a body subordinate to a leader, who has become dictator under the euphemisms of *Duce*, Marshal, or *Führer*. These dictators control a political police with an immense system of espionage, such as even Napoleon did not possess. The Russian OGPU and the Italian OVRA have a terrible reputation.

In order to work the machinery of a central, absolute power, unlimited and personal, it was necessary to suppress all political and civil liberty and freedom of organization, individual and collective. A convenient means was the single party (the words do not sound logical), a dominant armed faction, Communist, or Fascist or Nazi. Every other party has been suppressed, any independent movement is forbidden, all adversaries are outlawed. In Russia the *bourgeois* class has been suppressed; in Italy dissenting parties; in Germany even other races, for it becomes a political offence to marry a Jew and a cause of civil dis-

qualification to have a Jewish ancestor, while a whole category of citizens will be left without rights, in the position of helots. Political passion has led to the creation of special tribunals, concentration camps, deportation centres; the prisons are filled to overflowing; exiles may be numbered in hundreds of thousands, deportees cannot be counted, those arbitrarily killed are without number, and so are those of whose fate nothing is known. Nor are these exceptional measures confined to the moment of revolution. The totalitarian State does not admit the existence of opponents. For twenty years the Soviets have continued to shoot them, to send them to forced labour camps, or to deport them to Siberia. In Italy the Supreme Tribunal for the Defence of the State still functions, while deportations continue. And, last but not least, we have Germany, where the 'clean-up' of June 30, 1934, was a significant episode, showing the terroristic methods employed by modern dictatorships to retain their hold on power against friends and enemies. In short, the administrative and political centralization of the totalitarian States is necessarily bound up with the suppression of all autonomies, civil and political liberties, and the *habeas corpus*; with a police régime and a vast spy system, with violent and bloody repression, with the destruction of opponents and dissentients, and with the refusal to tolerate any failing in political conformity either at home or abroad.

(b) All this is possible when the dictatorial power has control of the army and is able to militarize the country. Even so-called democratic States are militarized inasmuch as they have conscription and powerful armies and navies. But normally these are professional bodies which do not interfere in politics. They are non-party, and co-operate with any Cabinet in the interests of national defence. In the past there have certainly been moments when army chiefs have displayed political tendencies. The Boulangist movement, the Dreyfus case in France, and the various *pronunciamentos* in Spain are well known. But such tendencies found an outlet in the free play of opposing political and social forces.

In totalitarian States the position is different. The Party is militarized. Either it dominates the army, or the army allies itself with the prevailing power and the two armed forces co-operate or amalgamate. The youth of the country is militarized, from both the moral and disciplinary standpoint ; collective life is felt to be military life ; dreams of *revanche* or of empire, conflicts at home and abroad, civil wars, penetrate the whole social structure. In Italy children of six are enrolled as Sons of the She-Wolf, to become Balilla, Young Italians, militia-men, and so on, till they are fifty-four. The Party is a militia. Schoolmasters have military rank and wear military uniform. Training in the use of arms extends over the whole of life ; the rifle becomes a constant companion ; military parades, camp-training, and manœuvres occupy a good part of the activity of both youths and adults. Germany to-day is armed to the teeth, not only so as to assert her parity *de jure* and *de facto* with other nations, but by a morbid and mystical exaltation of force and of the destiny of the Nordic Teutonic race. Every German is a soldier. Russia identifies the task of defending the State with that of defending the revolution and Bolshevik ideology, and of spreading it through the world. Communism is the word of salvation for Russia, just as Fascism is for the Italians, and National Socialism for the Germans—a word of salvation to be spread by propaganda and by force.

(c) To this end it is necessary that State education should become a rigorous monopoly. For over a century and even to-day the monopoly of education has been of the first importance for the national State. Napoleon was the first to organize education, from the university down to the primary school, for the benefit of the State, and to make the State its direct end. Nevertheless, the attempt has nearly always been made to combine educational monopoly with freedom of thought, even in respect of politics. As a rule the struggle was openly or secretly against the Church, and the Church fought for the complete freedom of the school.

The totalitarian State is obliged by its very nature to

go beyond the limits that have hitherto been respected. All must have faith in the new State and learn to love it. Not a single contrary idea, not a single dissentient voice can be permitted. From the elementary schools up to the universities, conformity of feeling is not enough; there must be an absolute intellectual and moral surrender, a trusting enthusiasm, a religious mysticism where the new State is concerned. Communism, Fascism, Nazism have become religions.

To create such a mentality, the school is not enough; a whole mental environment must be created. Hence the official textbook, the State-inspired and standardized newspaper, the cinema, the wireless, sport, school societies, the grant of prizes are not only controlled but directed towards an end, the worship of the totalitarian State, whether its banner be the nation or the race or the class. In order to provoke public assent, to excite this collective spirit of exaltation, the whole of social life is continually mobilized in parades, festivals, pageants, plebiscites, sporting events, such as to capture the mind, the imagination, the feeling of the populace.

The worship of the State, or of the class or race, would be something too vague in itself. It needs the Man, the hero, the demi-god. Lenin to-day has one of the largest of mausoleums, and has become for the Russians their lay Mahomet. Mussolini and Hitler are still alive, and are protected by a host of police and bodyguards. They act and speak so as to strike the feelings of the crowd. Their persons are sacred, their words the words of prophets. Hitler passes processionally between two dense columns, who march at a distance, so that his person emerges alone. He walks as though in a trance, his eyes raised to heaven, his hands spread out on either side like those of a redeemer. Mussolini has invented what is almost a magic rite. His appearance is preluded by invocation from the crowd, that goes on and on—*Duce! Duce! Duce!* . . . at first slow and soft, growing louder and louder, faster and faster, till it reaches frenzy, then sinking again to a murmur, and again rising, a rhythmic roar . . . *Duce! Duce! Duce!*

Duce! . . . till, thus invoked, he appears, amid a thunder of applause.

(*d*) Such a system demands on the one hand a vast expenditure of money, luxury finance, and on the other necessitates an ever harsher and more strictly controlled economic policy. Just as all moral energies must serve the power of the State, so must the forces of economy. Democratic States have held a middle course. On the one hand they have sought to strengthen national industries by tariffs, and on the other to leave private initiative full freedom. The totalitarian State either forces private capital to submit to it, as in Germany, or enters into a close alliance with it in order to maintain a political equilibrium between the classes, as in Italy, or else the State itself turns capitalist, as in Russia. It is impossible for the totalitarian State to allow economic freedom to either capitalists or workers. There is no room for free trade unions or free employers' associations. Instead there are State syndicates or corporations, with no freedom of action, controlled and organized within the State and for the State. Hence a controlled economy, which is the first stage in a radical transformation of the economic system in the direction of autarchy.

Whether a controlled and closed economy is or is not an advantage is a problem that not only cannot be studied apart from that of the State régime involved, but is closely connected with it. Bolshevism presented itself as simultaneously Communist in economy and totalitarian in politics. Fascism has evolved gradually, by successive experiments both political and economic, and has stopped short at a controlled, State economy, masked by a corporatism that so far exists only in words. Germany, at the height of a financial crisis, and weighed down by foreign debts, has installed at once a totalitarian régime and State Socialism. It would require a study as long as the present one to enter adequately into the question of the economy of the totalitarian State. We are now only at the first steps. The present experiments will bring many surprises.

These aspects of the totalitarian State lead us to three problems of the highest importance for our civilization.

The first is that of liberty, considered not only as a complex of political rights and the share to be taken by a citizen in the life of his country, but more especially as implying the autonomy of the individual personality, the security of personal rights, the guarantee of personal activity both temporal and spiritual. Totalitarian States abolish political liberties and restrict personal liberties by State interference in thought, ethics, and religion. This fact involves the very grave problem of the supremacy of the spiritual over the temporal, of ethical ends over political ends, and, for us Christians, of religious and supernatural ends over the natural ends of the State. The solution of this problem was provided by Pius XI in his Consistorial Allocution of December 1926, and repeated in his Encyclical *Non abbiamo bisogno* of 1931, and again in the Encyclical *Mit brennender Sorge* of March 14, 1937, when, dealing with the Fascist totalitarian State, he declared that *the State is not the end of man, but man is the end of the State*.¹ The relations between Church and State may be legally regulated as in Italy since February 11, 1929; or they may be agitated and disputed as in Germany, in spite of the Concordat of 1933; or they may be definitely broken and non-existent as in Russia. All this belongs to the series of politico-historical vicissitudes that began nineteen centuries ago with the advent of Christ and the slaughter of the Innocents. Apart from this, the incompatibility between Christianity and the totalitarian State is plain from the historical premises of the conception of the State, which has always tended towards a social and political monism, at the expense of human personality and the laws of the spirit. It is still plainer in the logical premises of *totalitarismo*, which expresses this tendency as the mystical exaltation of a superhuman principle; the absolutism of a class, or of the nation, or of

¹ The Sacred Congregation of Seminaries and Universities has condemned a list of eight propositions concerned with Racialism and Totalitarianism, urging 'Catholic Universities and Faculties to direct all their efforts and activities to defending the truth against the invasion of error.' The eighth Proposition condemned runs as follows:

'Each man exists only by the State and for the State. Any right he possesses springs solely from a concession by the State.'—*Translator's Note*.

the race. This leads to a perversion of Christian civilization, for it does away with the morality that is the foundation of relationships of justice, private and public, domestic and international ; it provides instead the principle of the State as the intrinsic source of ethics, and expression and end of the nation or class or race. Single individuals, no longer either subjects or citizens, but followers, units in a rigid collectivity, are held to act morally if their action conforms to the ends of the State. Individuality is lost in collectivity, and collectivity finds itself only in the State.

Every code of ethics demands a religion. Subjectivist ethics turn the 'I' into a divinity. Naturalistic ethics may go so far as to deify the totem and lead to the development of magic. State ethics make a divinity of the State or of the ideas that appear as hypostatized in the State, like the Race or the Nation. Christian ethics alone affirm and make us sharers in the divinity of Christ. From Machiavelli and Luther onwards, the State has steadily followed the path that leads to its becoming a divinity. The totalitarian State is the clearest and most explicit present form of the pantheistic State.

III

THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRACY

THERE is scarcely anyone who does not speak of the crisis of democracy, but it would be hard to find two people who agree on the nature either of democracy or of the crisis or of the remedies that might usefully be applied. What is of greater moment is that public opinion is divided between those who want to resolve the crisis in favour of democracy, and those who, believing democracy to be on its death-bed, would like to give it the *coup de grâce*. We are not among the latter. But neither do we wish to count among those doctors who take their stand beside the sick-bed, proclaiming the virtues of miraculous panaceas and elixirs of life. We are among those who want to understand the case. If, after all, the disease proves to be incurable, then democracy will have to die, to be laid in the cemetery where history has buried many other institutions, such as feudalism, monarchy by divine right, paternalist government, the Holy Alliance, and so on.

But before speaking of the dying, let us consider those things that are still alive. Democracy as something generic and abstract does not exist. Democracies exist, in the concrete : the British, the French, the American, the Belgian, the Swiss, the Dutch, and those of the Scandinavian countries, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway. The improvised democracies that sprang up after the war are another matter. Did anyone ever really believe in the democracy of Germany? Behind Ebert there was always the *Reichswehr*, as it is behind Hitler ; the change was a change of practical methods, not of political substance. Who believed in Austrian democracy? It was rather social demagoguery, on the quicksands of a State devoid of either economic or

political structure. The error of the peace treaties remains ; post-war Austria was never a living unity, but a divided people overshadowed by the Germanic myth. Its fate is a mournful one, but it was to be foreseen from the disastrous day of the anti-Socialist repression (February, 1934). It would be going too far to speak of democracy or autocracy in the States that came into being after the war, or were so enlarged that we must consider them as new, such as Poland and the countries of the Little Entente, and also the other Balkan States, Czechoslovakia excepted. We will leave these to the political writers of A.D. 1950 or 2000.

There remain Spain and Italy. No one ever thought of Spain as a democratic country, not even during the short-lived Republic of the last century. The constitutional monarchy passed through liberal phases and reactionary phases ; the people's part lay rather in disturbances and civil wars than in normal political life. The Republic of 1931 had no real consistency and resulted in the civil war. Italy was liberal but not democratic up till 1912. Universal suffrage was adopted for the first time in 1913. With the war, political liberties were curtailed. With the resumption of constitutional life after the war, and the general elections of 1919, came the advent of armed factions (1920-21), ending in the triumph of Fascism in October 1922. Italian democracy was stifled in its cradle.

First of all, what do we mean by democracy ? Before saying it is in a crisis, we must know what it is. In the literal sense, the Greek word means government by the people. But for the Greeks neither slaves nor helots counted as *demos*, only citizens—that is, a minority of free men, organized in clans, gathered together in cities of no great size, and forming a conscious unity that governed itself directly by means of its assemblies. That is to say, when it did not fall into the hands of the tyrants. The modern *demos* widened to include first the middle classes, then the artisans, then the working classes as a whole, and finally women. In Great Britain to-day there are 29,000,000

electors out of a population of 46,000,000. In France women are still kept at a respectful distance ; out of 41,000,000 citizens, 12,000,000 are electors. Similar proportions hold good for the other countries under democratic régimes, whether women are on an equality with men, as in the Baltic countries, or whether they are still excluded, as in Belgium. The difference between the 35,000 citizens of Athens at its height, and the 29,000,000 electors of Great Britain in 1934, is not only a numerical difference, but also specific. The British *demos* is different in spirit, structure, value, importance, responsibility, economic consistency, and class variety. For government, this enormous *demos* had, therefore, to be organized. The representative system, implying, not an imperative mandate as in the private law conception dominant in the Middle Ages, but a fiduciary representation, with its own autonomy and responsibility, arose out of the special character of modern democracy. With this the parliamentary system is so closely linked that the crisis, mainly a crisis in parliamentary government, has extended to democracy itself.

Another distinctive element in modern democracy is its individualistic basis. Direct relations have been established between the individual and the State ; all intermediary organisms have been abolished or reduced to a point where they have neither importance nor significance. In countries like Great Britain, where tradition, a sense of hierarchy, class differences, and local autonomies have an effective value, democratic individualism has been tempered by the definite and constant formation of two parties, alternating in power, and regimenting the active forces of militant political life so as to leave little margin for isolated groups and individual assertion. In England the third party has been looked upon as a spoil-sport, or reduced to a particular role, like the old Irish Party ; or else it has hung in the wake of a bigger party, like early Labour, which the Liberal-Radicals sheltered under their wings. Thus to-day Labour, as the stronger Party, has supplanted the Liberals, who have become in their turn a third party in process of liquidation. Another corrective to individualistic democracy has

been the nature of the Upper Chamber, the House of Lords, based upon a titled class, most of them being landed and conservative, with privileges elsewhere abolished, and a tradition of equilibrium which did not prevent the daring conquests of Labour. And Labour, organized in the Trade Unions, has enrolled the working classes in powerful economic associations, which form the base of the political organization of Labour.

In France the individualism of political democracy has been tempered neither by a caste Senate nor by stable parties, nor by well-constructed labour organizations with a personality of their own. Hence the passion of French public life, the fluidity of parties, the rapid succession of Governments. All this has not prevented the democracy of the Third Republic, born in the bloody convulsions of the Commune and after defeat and the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, from establishing itself and reconstituting a strong State, possessed of a first-class colonial empire, and politically able to face the Great War, to regain the lost provinces, to increase its colonies by mandates, and to become, at least till 1936, the chief Power of the Continent. All this has been possible for two reasons. The first, that during the nineteenth century France maintained and reconstituted her moral, political, and religious *élites* from among the middle classes, through a rigorous intellectual selection, a strong family tradition, and the soundness of the provinces. What Great Britain has achieved through the Public School system, the rather artificial selection on a class basis of Eton and Harrow, the political formation at Oxford, and the Scottish tradition in public affairs, France has achieved, not by the *esprit de corps* of a particular class, but by the emergence from the various social strata of individuals able to assert themselves, in spite of the uniform middle-class level, in virtue of their intellectual, moral, and political capacity. A second factor in France has been the keen sense of nationality, which makes the Frenchman, not a fanatic in the vulgar sense of the word (we may find such fanatics in France as elsewhere, but they are not representative), but a man who feels himself superior to others because he is a Frenchman,

and as such united in national solidarity with other Frenchmen. French democracy has been individualistic, middle-class, and militarist. British democracy has been more or less organic, traditionalist, and made up of *élites*.

Between the end of the last century and the beginning of this a new factor was growing up: political Socialism. The Great War immensely increased its forces, out of all proportion to its political maturity. As a result, in other countries there were attempts at Socialist or quasi-Socialist republics, precocious demagogies, and serious working-class agitation, all of which ended in repression. In France and in Great Britain such phenomena were at once canalized by the parliamentary régime, or else remained on its fringes, leading to more complex disturbances and penetrating the old democratic organism. In Great Britain Labour has never been definitely Socialist. It may be so now, but in the past the Labour Cabinets have been able to go on their way like *bourgeois* Cabinets. Ramsay MacDonald ended as head of the National Government, more or less in the same way that the ex-Socialist Briand in France was Foreign Secretary and three times Prime Minister during a period of over thirty years, as representing the *bourgeoisie* of the Left.

But apart from such adaptations, not only on the part of individuals, but extending to the special currents on the margin of the main bulk of parties, the working classes entered the middle-class democratic organization of the nineteenth century as a disturbing element leading to disorder. It does not seem possible for them to amalgamate with the other classes which up till now have made up the *bourgeois* structure of the democratic State. For this there are two reasons. First, the Socialists represent an economic class, that of Labour, and tend to engage in class politics, to identify the State with a class. Ultimately, whether they confess it or no, they seek the suppression or elimination of other classes through the so-called dictatorship of the proletariat. The experiences of Socialist Cabinets, such as those

of Great Britain, or of coalition with Socialists at which there was a brief attempt in Belgium (not to speak of the National Union in France and Belgium during the war, which had a quite different significance), are experiments without a future. The second reason why Socialism cannot find a place for itself in the democratic State lies in the question of method. Once Socialism has seized power, it will use authoritarian methods to impose its programme on other classes. Such developments are recent in Great Britain, nor are they shared by all Socialists, but they are regarded as implicit in the very nature of the integral Socialist programme, since its economic solutions could not be imposed save by an authoritarian government.

There are those who believe that gradual, collaborational, and evolutionary Socialism, like that of the German Social Democrats or British Labour, de Man's following in Belgium, a fraction of the S.F.T.O. in France, and the forms of Socialism in the Scandinavian countries, will gain the ascendancy over the classical, authoritarian, and revolutionary Socialism. This conception, which was supported in the first post-war period by Radicals, Liberals, and Popolari, is at the bottom of recent experiences of Socialism, but it is being undermined by the advance of Communism among the working classes. To-day there is a new psychology both in Great Britain and France and in those other countries where the parliamentary system and a residuum of democracy still exist. The Socialists and Communists, whether united in a common front, as in France, or divided and distinct, as in England, have openly taken up their position against Fascism, seeing Fascism in every authoritarian move among the parties of the Right or Conservatives, and declaring themselves ready to resist even by force. On the other hand, among the Conservative classes the idea is gaining ground that to prevent the advent of the Socialists, whether alone or allied with the Radicals, it may be necessary to use force, and, maybe, to have recourse to a dictatorship.

This state of mind is more widespread in France, but it cannot be denied that it is creeping into England, and that not a few who have always believed in the free British

tradition must now regretfully admit that their faith is shaken. In England Communism has no serious basis or organization, but either as anti-Fascism or as an ideal of greater social justice, a certain Communist sentiment is growing up among the middle classes and among university students. Discontent with the Government's policy towards the dictatorship countries has led to an increase in Communist sympathies. On the other hand the mismanagement of the anti-Communist campaign of the Conservative and reactionary parties and Press—which are pro-Fascist for their own ends and make a show of supporting the Church in order to identify it with their own cause—has driven the working masses into the arms of the Communist and Socialist Parties, as the only means of making good their claims. Save in Belgium, Holland, and Switzerland, the Christian Trade Unions count for little.

The attempts of the dictatorships to suppress the so-called proletarian or popular parties and all propaganda in their favour will have no better success than those of the Governments of the Holy Alliance to suppress Liberalism, in the first half of the nineteenth century. Nor will Switzerland be more fortunate in her attempt to declare the Communist Party illegal. Such measures, in the long run, provoke very grave reactions.

To all this must be added the weakness of policy of the great democracies (British and French) towards the dictatorships; the abstention of the great American democracy from European conflicts rather than run risks or assume responsibilities; rearmament instead of the promised disarmament; the rekindling of war, which is still unquenched, with the three latest wars: the Italo-Abyssinian War (1935–36), the war in Spain (1936–), and the Sino-Japanese War (1937–). The blame is not laid on the dictatorships, but on democracy, since democracy is in a crisis.

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The crisis of democracy can be considered under three aspects, social, political, moral. But these are so closely connected and interdependent as to render any analysis

difficult and incomplete. The social crisis springs principally from the entry of the working classes into active politics within the framework of democratic institutions. For nearly the whole of the nineteenth century the working classes were organized as Socialism or Communism, or else tended towards Anarchism, and their policy was revolutionary. The middle classes, which had created the parliamentary State and controlled it, had reason to defend themselves now by coercion, now by concessions ; at the same time they were defending the State and nation against the movements of social revolution. But when the experiments of legal, electoral, and parliamentary Socialism began, the middle classes, divided into Right and Left, fell apart and the organized forces of the workers became so powerful that it was no longer possible to govern either against them or without them. The Socialist Parties, while calling themselves revolutionary, functioned now as ' His Majesty's Opposition,' now as parties in a coalition Government, and now as the Party in power in alternation with the *bourgeois* parties.

Socialists call themselves revolutionary, but often they assert their love of legality (do they not speak of defending the legitimate Government in Spain ?) and maintain the principles of freedom and democracy, in which indeed they think to hold a monopoly. But again, forgetful of all this, they proclaim the dictatorship of a class ; thus they are a factor of political instability in the democratic States. Economic conditions during the war and after gave a strong impulse to the proletarianization of the middle classes, both professional people and *rentiers* ; a considerable portion of private property lost its value, was loaded with debts and rendered useless to the community at large, and was eventually taken over by the State. These phenomena, which are more accentuated in the dictatorship countries such as Germany and Italy (without speaking of Russia), are extending even to countries where there is a sounder economic structure and a more stable democracy.

The governing classes should have been ready with more adequate and speedier remedies ; they should have faced the problems of finance and taxation, encouraged the small

owner, given legal form to professional organization, and improved the conditions of the worker. Instead they have been hypnotized by the political problem, as the main cause of the crisis. In many countries to accuse Parliament of incapacity of bringing a real solution to a single problem has been the trump card of the reactionaries, the self-styled 'national' parties. In reality they saw that the electoral and parliamentary machinery was turning against themselves and they wanted to be rid of it, or at least, by legal manœuvres, to ensure that they should control it, so as to change it (by a skilful *coup d'état*, bloodless, if possible) into a quasi-dictatorial régime. The dictators suppressed at one blow the free workers' organizations and gathered all forces, even those of the proletariat, into the hands of the central power. This consolidated the adversaries of parliamentary democracy. Only when the free middle classes perceived that the Fascist dictatorships were laying hands on private property and newly won fortunes (though without impeding the enrichment of their own partisans), did they begin to turn a friendly eye on the political experiments of an intermediate character, in Vienna and Lisbon, made in the name of Social Catholicism.

The wish to solve the social crisis by aggravating the political crisis was not only due to the blindness and egotism of the *bourgeoisie*; it was also an error caused by the individualistic basis of modern democracy. The individualism of the revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was a reaction against the 'tied systems' of the *ancien régime*. As a movement of liberation from the bonds restricting every form of life, economic, political, and religious, it was historically logical and natural. The mistake lay in wishing to base the new social structure on two factors only, the citizen and the State.

If life is to be an articulated whole it must have certain necessary organs. To deprive property of its organic character and to make it purely individualistic leads, on the one hand, to its break-up into sterile fractions, and hence to its concentration in a few hands, often in an anonymous form. On the other hand, property shorn of all social

function loses its organic role in political life. The family, which should find in domestic economy a means of consolidation and in politics a guarantee of its stability, has been broken up through individualized property and the loss of its politico-social character. The working classes have had to reconquer the right of free organization through half a century of struggles, and they still find it hard to achieve a legal status and a recognized political scope. In many countries town councils, without true autonomy, provinces or counties with no organic character, and other bodies without sufficient personality, are in a lamentable condition ; all are at the mercy of the central power, all are either part of a bureaucracy or swallowed up in the State. Individualistic levelling and State centralization have prevented the rebirth of any and every organic group-personality.

To-day people speak of a Corporative State as of a revelation, contrasting it with the democratic State as the best means of solving the social and political crisis. What is the Corporative State ? When there were true corporations, in the Middle Ages, there was no State, in the modern sense of the word. When the modern State began to come into being, from the fifteenth century onwards, the Corporations or Guilds fell into decadence. Since then history has seen the absolute, paternalist State, the representative, constitutional State, the liberal, democratic State, but never a Corporative State. To qualify the State in this manner is quite a modern invention. The first to do so were the Italian Fascists. Then the Portuguese began to murmur something to the same effect. There was a moment when the Nazis hinted at the Corporative State, but soon after, by the law of January 12, 1934, they hastened to destroy all professional and trade unions, which form the basis of any modern corporative system. The Corporative State vanished and the Racial State took its place. And though Austria was declared to be a Corporative State, this never became a reality.

In the abstract, a Corporative State would mean that the State was simply a sum of corporations. The political

power represented by the State would have as its main or sole basis the economic order represented by the corporations. Such a system presupposes that the corporations should enjoy an autonomy of their own and be free in their choice of leaders, and that, either directly or by delegation of representatives, they should control the legislative and executive power. Neither Italy nor Portugal dreams of such a political organization, as was possessed by Florence in the Middle Ages. The principle of election and of either direct or delegated representation is ruled out by the totalitarian conception of the State.

Another manner of envisaging a Corporative State would be the exact reverse. Instead of the economic order becoming the political expression of the State, it is the State that becomes the absolute representative of national economy, and bestows on the corporations a political character and a share in political life. This might seem to be the Fascist ideal, but, considered attentively, it is plain that this is not and will never be the case.¹

To our mind, a genuine Corporative State cannot exist. The first type which we considered, and which is the only true Corporative State, is impossible by this very fact, because it would base the whole life of the country on the economic factor, and this would be a mistake, an absurdity. Political life is a synthesis of many values, domestic, economic, legal, cultural, moral, transported to the national plane and thence to the international plane. The economic factor can neither be preponderant nor represent the rest. The second, or false type of Corporative State, is merely the authoritarian, centralizing, totalitarian State, seeking

¹ In the Italian general elections of 1929 and 1934, the syndicates (trade unions and employers' unions) put forward a certain number of names of proposed candidates, among which the Fascist Grand Council made a selection. From these the Duce drew up a list of candidates, ratified by him and not by the electors, who could only vote 'yes' or 'no' on the list *en bloc*. The Chamber thus elected has been a phantom, without power and without efficacy. It is said that to-morrow the Chamber of Deputies will be the General Council of Corporations itself. But under whatever name, and whatever the origin of such a Chamber, the results will be the same. The Fascist Council itself serves to make a show on great occasions, but it is the Government that calls the tune.—*Translator's Note.*

to mask its unpleasant features by creating advisory bodies and appealing to mob plebiscites, sham referenda without discussion and without freedom. To-day, when the corporation is coming to the fore, it is useful to speak of the Corporative State. It sounds much better than the totalitarian, absolute, authoritarian State. But it is the reality and not the name that matters.

It is said that Parliament is no longer able to fulfil its task, and that the whole organization of the State must be radically changed. This is a common opinion in France among the middle classes, but not yet in England. Perhaps it will become so in a few years' time. Ideas from the Continent take a certain time to reach England, and this is not always to be regretted.

An illustrious professor of Italian constitutional law, Giorgio Arcoleo, said once that a *bad Chamber was preferable to any anti-chamber*. What can be set in place of Parliament? Either the populace—and this would be useful for neither the Government nor the governed; or else some other assembly, appointed in some other way, with other powers—that is to say, a *reformed* Parliament. Here is the crux: reform of Parliament.

Reform of Parliament must assume different aspects for France and for England. Countries such as Belgium and Holland will have yet another manner of envisaging such reform. Switzerland has its own type of parliamentary government, different from that of every other country, and it stands in no need of reform to-day. There is no single recipe for parliamentary reform, nor would sweeping theories here serve any useful purpose. Reforms are born out of necessities and evolve naturally under the pressure of events. The mistake would lie in refusing any and every reform in the name of the past.

In England the reform of the House of Lords is debated from time to time, in France, that of the Constitution of 1875, so as to strengthen the power of the executive (of

authority, as some would call it, as if the other powers, legislative and judiciary, were not also authority). In both countries the time for such reforms is truly ripe. But their effectuation is slow, and sometimes, as to-day in France, public opinion grows impatient. Parliamentary procedure needs to be simplified and the political ground to be cleared of a lot of technical matters which could well be entrusted to special commissions. But it would be an exaggeration to judge the slowness of parliaments too severely. Sometimes parliaments do more service by the Bills they reject, or cause to be delayed and revised, than by those that are rushed through.

The public to-day is no longer interested in great speeches, and parliaments rarely listen to them. Great speeches, if they are necessary, should be reserved for great occasions ; deputies to parliament would do well to talk less and study more. Here would be an excellent reform ! But customs are only modified by some stronger impulse. And to-day this impulse comes from the athletic and practical education of youth, from the post-war crisis, and from the impatience of the parties and the masses. Let parliaments and governments keep in close touch with the spirit of the people, and they will not fail to make the just reforms required. Revolutions come about through a divorce between the authorities and the people.

Above all, two measures are needful, and to-day more needful than ever. The first, that armed groups and parties should be forbidden and rigorously repressed. Armed bands in the hands of the Fascists and Nazis have been the ruin of Italy and Germany ; if such arise in France, whether their shirts be red or black or blue, they will be the ruin of France, and in the same way they would be the ruin of England. Democracies cannot survive if free opinion and the ballot are undermined by threats, violence, and the open use of arms by private persons. Mussolini extolled violence and knew what he was saying. To-day he forbids his adversaries even to think. Another remedy is an independent criminal justice, swift, rigorous, and equal for all. In England such justice is a glorious tradition. Yet even here a certain

reform would do no harm, in order that political violence should be prosecuted without hesitation, and punished by severer penalties, if necessary, than those to-day in force. In France procedure should be simplified, and the Ministry of Justice reformed, for to-day the magistracy is not independent of the Government, and, as a whole, is liable to political influence. Here is one of the reforms that are most urgent and necessary for France.

One of the gravest difficulties for the great democracies of to-day consists in how to give the electorate an organic structure without infringing on its liberty, and a moral orientation without hampering personal initiative. In England the tradition of the alternation in power of two parties, both with a wide electoral basis and a sound economic basis, both educated to open public discussion, gives a certain organic consistency to the electorate, while the single member constituencies still preserve, as far as possible, an individualistic value in the choice of candidates. In the United States of America there is more or less a like tradition, though here organization and education are very different. The vastness of the country and the forms of publicity used in electoral contests demand immense expenditure, so that big finance predominates, profiteering creeps in, and the contests often represent the play of big business. Only recently has the working class begun to carry weight.

There is more of an electoral tradition and more stability in the small democratic countries, such as Switzerland, Belgium, Holland, the Scandinavian States, than in France, where the parties of the Right have never had either a consecutive policy or stability, oscillating between loyalty to the régime and a wish for *coups d'état*. The only *bourgeois* party which has formed a tradition of its own and which, in the provinces, is based on certain stable economic classes, is that of the Radicals. But its positivist laicism and its political anti-clericalism have turned it aside from truly constructive work into perilous and disturbing conflicts. The Socialists, since their unification, have come to play an important part among the working classes, but their class platform prevents the creation of an organic party con-

sciousness, since it is not easy to transpose economic problems to the political plane.

If the democracy of a great nation is to outgrow the old electoral individualism the parties must acquire an organic force. In democracy, parties are a necessity. Their suppression implies a dictatorship. That is why Fascism and Bolshevism begin by suppressing their rivals and declaring themselves the sole party. So long, however, as parties are made and unmade according to the inconstant passions of the mob, or the self-interest of electoral cliques, not only do they fail in their purpose, but they become factors of disturbance and instability. If they are to represent the complex consciousness of the people, with its various attitudes and requirements, some constant, some transient, they must be true and stable organisms, founded on real interests, political, social, economic, and their expression must be unhampered by hidden forces, secret societies or foreign agents. Undoubtedly the political education of the people is at the basis of the life of a party, and by people we do not mean the masses or a class but all, including the aristocracy and the financial *bourgeoisie*, which to-day in certain countries are the least educated politically and the least teachable. Another necessary factor if a party is to contribute to the stability of a democratic régime is that it must be loyal to that régime, accepting it as a political fact, declaring clearly the reforms sought for, and accepting as sole means, common to all parties, the legal methods of free régimes and never the method of armed bands and mob violence.

The system known as Proportional Representation does much to give organic consistency to parties. It does away with the electoral monopoly of family groups or groups of interests, which comes about so readily in a single member constituency. It diminishes electoral corruption. It gives value to parties of ideas, gives voice to minorities, and creates a real party consciousness. This system is wrongly interpreted where it has been turned into a means of multiplying parties, which have brought instability into parliaments and impeded the formation of governments, and where

the will of the electors has been summed up in the leaders of the parties. Here the remedy has been worse than the evil.

Every system must be adapted to its environment and to stages of development. Concrete measures must be introduced to avoid abuses. The method in practice in Ireland, of Proportional Representation with a single vote, is the best fitted to preserve the elector's liberty and his personal contact with his candidate, with all the organic advantages of the Proportional Representation system. Proportional Representation is certainly not a panacea for all ills. It is a system that must be tried, adapted, developed, in order to solve some of the problems of political elections, making them correspond to the will of the people and giving them organic efficacy in a democratic régime. What must be understood is that only through a balance between the individual and the group, between freedom and organism, between initiative and control, can the soundness of political life be assured and such life given an orientation responding to collective needs and aspirations.

The social and political aspects of the crisis of democracy do not wholly or truly explain it. Nor can the remedies suggested, to lessen the preponderance of individualism by a suitable organic structure suited to our modern world, be valid if the moral aspect of the crisis is not fully considered and heroic efforts made to overcome it. By the moral crisis of democracy we mean the crisis of authority, the crisis of the unity of the collective mind, the crisis of a moral finality transcending politico-social institutions. The crisis of authority is indisputable—not the crisis imagined by the worshippers of authority as force and authority as arbitrary will, but the true crisis of moral authority.

In democracy power is spread over various organs, but each organ has that final, decisive authority that renders the acts of power acceptable and respected. Why is the vote of the electorate not respected? Because the electorate does not give its vote the moral value it should, as an act

of sovereignty and authority. The choice of parliamentary representatives is a moral act, it must be guided by moral considerations, because such men will make the laws and govern the country. There has crept into the electorate a sense rather of victory to be won at any cost than of a choice ; a desire for dominion rather than a readiness for responsibility. This is an original sin weakening the representative system itself. What is worse is the intrusion of 'unbelievers,' of men who do not believe either in the will of the people, or in its right to representatives, but who use them in order to undermine institutions and prepare the way for violent *coups*. How many of the French Right are of this mind ? How many French Catholics have accepted the *ralliement* to the republican régime sincerely, without *arrière pensée* ? How many Rexist Catholics in Belgium have not thought of a *coup de force*, to follow an electoral victory ? The same state of mind is to be found in those Socialists who are democratic on occasion in order to prepare the dictatorship of the proletariat. This infidel element must be fought relentlessly, not by force and violence, but by moral discipline and the organic soundness of an effectual democracy. It can be fought in the moral field inasmuch as such groups lack morality, for they are insincere and exploit the very institutions they would destroy.

What we have said of the electorate holds good for all the other organs of power, in so far as they are invested with authority. Since each is final in its own domain, it shares in sovereignty, and therefore it must be free and responsible. Its authority must be substantially moral or it is not authority—whether it be parliament in making laws, or the Government in causing them to be put into force, or the judiciary in applying them in civil or criminal cases, or the head of the State by his right of intervention or veto, all must either act in a moral sense or they strip their authority of all efficacy.

To-day authority, in a democratic régime, is usually weak, not because of the absence of the gestures, sudden decisions, arbitrary acts, and show of seeming strength, that we find in the dictatorships, but because of a want of courage in

assuming responsibility, of hampering interference between the various organs of the State, of hidden forces that can exercise an influence and become dominant because the sense of duty has been weakened by open violation of laws passed, signed pacts, and agreed decisions. The instability of the cabinets in certain countries is caused by excessive parliamentary interference with the office of the executive power, or of the mob with parliament. It is due also to a lack of political education and a psychological instability caused by the precarious economic conditions and political anxieties since the war. Because of this instability certain men in power evade responsibility, consoling themselves with the temporary span of their office and recoiling selfishly upon themselves. On the other hand, it is healthier for a country when the Government is liable to frequent change, with observance of regular formalities and without grave upheavals, than when it is exposed to mob turbulence and *coups d'état* by those who hold power and will not lose it, cost what it may.

The weakness of authority springs largely from the crisis of the unity of the collective mind in each country. Social life—all social life—tends towards spiritual unification on a higher plane than that of particular interests and aspirations. This higher plane can be symbolized by a word that awakens an idea, a value accepted by all. Such, for example, the words, *country*, *fatherland*, or *nation*, or in other days when the unity of faith was the foundation of Western Christendom, the word *Church*; or, in the last century, the word *Freedom*. To-day, where is the common word that can unite all? It would seem that it should be the word *Peace*, but as yet there is no single sense of the way to peace, which may be understood as armed peace, the peace of Versailles, Geneva peace, disarmed peace—different modes which do not lead to the same peace, nor indeed do all lead to peace. The same may be said of each of the ideas that are still alive. To-day *Country* or *Fatherland* is conceived only in function of defence by arms. *Republic* for

the French is understood in two ways, one for the Right, one for the Left. *Empire* for the British is a reality indeed, but above or beyond any democratic or anti-democratic conception of each single community.

In a liberal-democratic State, when there was no unifying programme or fundamental political idea, there remained a faith in *Freedom*, in the method of liberty, which should be envisaged as a rule of fair play, an honest respect for formal liberties : freedom of association, of meeting, of the Press, of the vote, of Parliament. Hence the moral responsibility of the duties that freedom imposes on each. The day a party uses violence and arms to reach power, and coercion to maintain power when it has achieved it, suppressing freedom of meeting and of the Press, destroying the possibility of forming a majority and the alternation of governments, the last means has been lost for the unification of a country by the method of liberty. There then remain two possibilities : a dictatorship, which is a modern euphemism for the old word tyranny ; or else bloody revolts and civil wars. Since the modern State controls all the most effectual means for keeping its citizens subject and for dominating them even spiritually, as do the Bolsheviks in Russia, the Nazis in Germany, and the Fascists in Italy, once a dictatorship is installed it is hard to be rid of it. Even countries like Great Britain and France would find the experiment of no brief duration.

All are asking, where lies the remedy ? It is easy to reply, unify the country, the nation, the State. It is not easy to do it. Fascism, it cannot be disputed, seeks a unification, but its methods are more hypnotic than persuasive ; it relies more on fear than on conviction, prefers constraint to freedom, and puts forward less an ideal of civil life than a military system. Unification may exist in appearance, on a lower plane, on which all the freshness of spontaneity is lost, and all the fervour of personal initiative. In terms of sociological structure, a Fascist country implies the dominion of a restricted group of men, supported by a vast number of officials of every kind. Society tends to become rigid ; collective life, losing its natural dynamism, tends to

become absorbed in the State. Structural unification is obtained at the cost of all elasticity and all organic growth. For this reason Fascism as such cannot be considered as anything but a transitory régime, a phase that must in some way be surmounted.

The case of the democratic régimes is different. Until to-day, democratic unification from the structural point of view has been the work of the middle classes. These, victorious in their struggle against the upper classes of the old régime—aristocracy, clergy, and army—abolished their privileges, and gave their own imprint, with their own characteristics, to all the interests of the other classes. Will the *bourgeoisie* remain the fundamental element, or will it give place to the working classes, as the old aristocracy gave place to the middle classes of the nineteenth century? And in such an event, will the working classes be able to attempt the unification of all classes, or will they seek to eliminate them, as in Russia? In the first case, by a natural development, a working-class democracy would take the place of a middle-class democracy; in the second case, democracy would disappear, to be replaced by the dictatorship of the proletariat. But as it would not be easy to dispossess the present governing class, which is *bourgeois* and capitalist, there might be a swing to a Fascist dictatorship.

The democracies, if they are to continue to resist defeatist pressure, must seek to restore a spirit of union in each country, and the wider but no less important union of European and Western civilization on both sides of the Atlantic. In every country the watchword, the dynamic ideal that represents a common aspiration, may be different. The countries to-day suffering a semi-dictatorship, and which are still to a certain extent able to express their will, aspire to *freedom*. The peoples that wish to avert war feel most keenly the ideal of *peace*. Those that are troubled by periodical crises ask for *order*. And so on. Yet Europe, willy-nilly, stands for a unity of civilization and history, a community of interests and life. The greater part of the world is bound to Europe, politically and economically;

Europe and the Americas form an indissoluble civil and moral unity. Therefore it is from Europe that the saving word must come, directing all towards an effective spiritual union.

Fortunately Moscow, Berlin, and Fascist Rome do not speak to either the heart or mind. The anti-Christian assault of the first two, together with the calculated support of the Catholic Church by Fascism, leave their propaganda without the ethical basis of Christian tradition. At the same time, it should be realized that secular democracy has had its day. Secularism has borne what fruit it might ; to-day it is without historical coherence and totally barren. To tell the youth of to-day that democracy is an end unto itself, that the secular State is the means of realizing our individuality, that science vanquishes the darkness of theology, is to speak empty words, without actual meaning, and which can rouse them to no enthusiasm. What is worse, if the secular democratic State claims to be an ideal and real end in itself, echoing now Comte, now Hegel, according to philosophies and standpoints, the youth of to-day may well reply that taking one collective entity with another, one ethical State with another, it prefers the Fascist State or the Communist State (according to taste) to the secular democratic State, which has neither the vigour nor the impetus nor the show of the dictatorships. These indeed derive logically and historically from the secular democratic State, inasmuch as this was centralized, monopolist, nationalist, and denied moral and religious liberties to its adversaries in the very name of secularism.

To-day the past counts for little. We must take a new road, leading to the revaluation of human personality, above and beyond individualism, which considers persons as so many numbers, and Etatism, in which they are swallowed up in the whole. The nineteenth century sang the praises of individual liberty because this was denied in the name of authority. The twentieth century is beginning to sing the praises (and will do so more and more) of personality, because this is denied in the name of the State and of the collective entity—race, nation, or class—that each

State strives to express in a most tangible manner. When we say *personality* or *person* we include all that these words represent, spirit and sense, individual life and social life, culture and religion, earthly interests and supernatural life. Secularism had isolated the individual man in his spirituality, culture, and final end ; it had cut off modern society from its Christian and historic civilization. It thus failed to give to the State a finality transcending merely institutional purposes, order, politics, economy. Unhappily, when it adopted a finality of its own, it became anti-Christian and anti-clerical.

The finality of the human person, transcending the organized ends of the State, begins to be felt and understood sooner among those under totalitarian régimes than among those living in a democracy, for free régimes leave margins of individual and social life, culture and religion, that under dictatorial régimes are either lacking or decidedly controlled. But as a fact the domination of the State over the minds and consciences of its citizens is very serious even in present-day democracies. The human person must be freed from subjection to the group, to the State, to the nation, to any collective body as an end in itself. Such bodies are means and not ends. Their end is human personality and all that such personality holds of immanence and transcendence. Thus democracy itself must have an aim transcending its institutions, and that aim is personality, the whole of personality.

The United States of America have celebrated the one hundred and fiftieth anniversary of their democratic constitution. They are the oldest of modern democracies, and have the right to be proud both of their seniority and of a continuous progress in the realization of their democratic ideal. The experience of the Americans has not been the same as that of Europe. They have had to solve other problems. First, that of their independence from a hostile Europe: here they have defended themselves by the Monroe Doctrine. Secondly, the abolition of slavery: it

took nearly half a century to achieve the 13th Amendment to the Constitution. Thirdly, the problem of life in common with the negroes, who were given freedom, and with the European and Japanese emigrants who flocked to the States: this problem is not yet wholly solved. Fourthly and finally, that of State intervention in economico-social matters (which touches the substance of the American constitution) and the participation of the organized working class in political life. Here Roosevelt's experiment marks a first phase.

Great Britain has been democratic only for a century. A beginning was made in 1832 with the Reform Bill, though the suffrage was further widened in 1867 and 1884. Democracy came into being gradually, without upheavals; the spirit of the people was ripe for it. France cannot date her democracy from either the First or the Second Republic (democracies lasting but a few years, revolutionary in character, and both ending in Napoleonic dictatorships), but from the Third Republic. Born in 1871 with the Commune, its existence was made possible by the Constitution of 1875, which did not aim at creating a democratic State, but merely a representative State. What happened indeed was that French democracy, which had been ripening for a century, became a reality. Swiss democracy has historic roots and a popular tradition going back hundreds of years, but it assumed its modern character in the last century, through the various liberal and *bourgeois*, radical and national phases the process implied, influenced by events in other countries. Thus, too, Belgium, Holland, the Scandinavian countries, the British Dominions, the Republics of Latin America and, since the war, Czechoslovakia, the Baltic countries, and Ireland. In all the countries with a democratic régime, universal male suffrage is comparatively recent, Proportional Representation more recent still and not universal, and Switzerland alone has an organized Referendum. Most recent of all is female suffrage, which has not yet reached France and other countries.

The absolute, monarchic régimes had behind them an experience going back thousands of years, with alternations

of tyranny and anarchy ; aristocratic régimes have had their great historical periods, as in ancient Rome and in Venice. But the modern democratic régimes (which have no relationship with the Greek or mediæval types) are young, in some cases in their infancy. Their experiences are recent and incomplete. They have had to face notable difficulties, grave crises, and the solutions adopted have not always been well chosen or always responding to the social structure, being based for the most part on an exaggerated and disorganized individualism. In spite of this, the progress made by mankind in every field during what may be called the *first phases of modern democracy* has been remarkable and incontestable. There has been a continuous striving towards a better future. The democracies have provided a propitious atmosphere for the development of social forces, the raising of the worker, the revaluation of public morality, the reform of law and even of religious life itself, in spite of the secularism and anti-clericalism inherited from the Encyclopedists and from revolutionary Liberalism.

To-day many believe democracy doomed to disappear before the advance of totalitarianism. Here is the great battle before us, in which we shall see if the moral forces of present society will prevail or not over the deification of material force, and if a personalism based on human and religious values will not assert itself in a healthier and more entire democracy.

IV

THE NEMESIS OF POLITICAL IMMORALITY

WHEN in December 1935 the bulk of British public opinion was roused by the Laval-Hoare plan offering over a third of Abyssinia to Italy, and reacted so vigorously as to enforce the resignation of the imprudent Foreign Secretary and the burial of the plan at Geneva, was it moved by a moral impulse or by political policy? Indisputably, by a moral impulse. It did not judge the question of surrender or resistance to Italian claims from the standpoint of British imperial interests, but it revolted against the idea that the violation of the Covenant of the League of Nations and of other public treaties signed by Italy, together with an unjust war against an ill-armed people should be rewarded by Great Britain and France, who at Geneva had denounced Italy as a covenant-breaker. These moral notions, which reach to the roots of our civilization, were not associated with any idea of political advantage; they were taken at their absolute value, regardless of the particular interests of the countries concerned.

The action that followed the Laval-Hoare plan was just as certainly determined not by morality, as a categorical imperative, but by political convenience, as little by little Italy gained ground in Abyssinia (even with the use of poison gas), till the flight of the Negus and the capture of Addis Ababa, and the League of Nations (that is to say, Great Britain and France in the first place, who must bear the full responsibility) gave way, failing in the loyal and entire application of the Covenant. This second phase may be defined as the political phase; the reaction against the Laval-Hoare plan was the *moral* phase. (An Englishman of penetrating but rather paradoxical spirit said at the time that England is on the side of God [the moral Law] when

God is on the side of England [political or economic interests], but when the two conflict, England chooses her own interests rather than God.)

No purpose will be served by attempting to weigh the motives behind public opinion, which, made up of a thousand assents, often instinctive and deeply rooted, cannot be explained in terms of intention. Objectively, it must be recognized that British interests would have been better safeguarded by the acceptance of the Laval-Hoare plan than by its rejection. In any case, the problem did not present itself in such utilitarian fashion to public opinion, but was resolved by instinct and feeling. Under this impulse public opinion was on the side of morality.

What is morality? Can it apply to public life and international relations? And if so, should it take precedence of politics; and where the two conflict, should it have the last and decisive word? This is the problem. It is commonly said that an action is moral if it is demanded or justified by conscience; that morality is good conduct according to the moral or ethical norm grounded on conscience, while the correspondence of individual conduct to law, whether civil law or religious, is termed conformity. All this is correct from one point of view, but not wholly so from another, for it gives only a partial and incomplete idea of morality.

It is correct to base morality on conscience, in the sense that there can be no individual moral action in opposition to conscience, even if this opposition springs from error or prejudice. A man does not act morally if he believes or even fears that he is doing wrong; he must be sure that he is doing right according to his own conscience, and that he is led to act so and not otherwise by a moral choice, or at least by a choice which, even if made in the light of utility, does not conflict with morality. The moral conscience of each individual must be educated, enlightened, formed, till with surety and conviction he can distinguish between what is right and what is not, and till his character is so formed that he can overcome inclinations and the promptings of passion in order to do good and avoid evil.

To this end two factors are necessary : (a) the collective or social formation of custom (which the Romans called *mos*, from which derives the word *moral*), on the assumption that a social custom, a constant norm of society accepted by the collective conscience, must correspond to something natural to man, and therefore be fundamentally good ; (b) the development of the community spirit, that is, of the intimate social bond which the Greeks called *ethos* (hence the word *ethical*), giving an idea of impulse, vitality, conviction, which, though personal, finds a repercussion in the collective conscience. To-day we use the words ethical and moral as synonymous, giving them the comprehensive sense of the morality of individual acts, springing from the ruling of conscience, but rendered collective by a common conviction in a spiritual conception.

An example will make these ideas clear. It is our conviction, as civilized men and as Christians, that it is not lawful for us to use force to vindicate our own rights, but that when occasion arises we must have recourse to the law-courts, and that in a dispute we must treat our adversary with restraint and calm. It is not sufficient for this conviction to be an individual one, it must be collective and customary ; otherwise, if only a few were to observe such a rule they might be overcome by the majority who failed to observe it. The rule of refraining from private violence will be considered moral when it becomes customary ; and for it to become customary there must be an impulsion, a spirit of conviction, an *ethos* that will turn the fact into a deeply felt principle, a moral value common to a group, class, or category of men.

To-day Nazis and Fascists have introduced the use of force to strike down their adversary and reduce him to silence, but the traditional civilized conscience is moved to sincere and instinctive protest. This the Nazis or Fascists no longer feel, for they have introduced a custom (to our mind, an evil custom) resting on a false *ethos* (the idea of the totalitarian State, the predominance of a party, the chosen race), through which they believe they are inaugurating a morality of their own, a Nazi or Fascist morality. This trend

of the collective conscience brings with it a perversion of the individual conscience which finds itself in a diseased environment wherein errors are exalted as principles of truth. This comes about the more rapidly the greater the suppression of freedom, freedom being a necessary condition for the development of morality. There can be no true morality where there is constriction; morality is the more deeply rooted the freer the acceptance of a common norm of behaviour, that is, the more fully the urgency (or *ethos*) of a moral rule is felt. Where there is no freedom, we find there are those who in the name of conscience resist an imposition they repute immoral, and these are the martyrs; or else we find those who give way without conviction, for the sake of material advantage, or of a quiet life, or for domestic reasons, or through weakness and cowardice. These are the many who, in a greater or less degree, fail in their duty, for they act against conscience, which, in the concrete of action, always has and must have the final word.

Why is it usual to speak of *morality* and *politics* as if they were two enemies, or like two individuals who can never come to an understanding? And why are *politics* held in such small consideration that the very word is often made to imply dishonesty?

Here we take the word politics in its best sense: a sharing in the government of a country for the *common good*. As such the aim of politics is the advantage of the state considered as common good, and it falls within the order of morality, for to seek the common good, with appropriate means, is certainly a moral aim. In a free country such as England, all may engage in politics, and many do so in various ways. I am not referring only to members of the Cabinet, of Parliament, of county or borough councils, but also to the journalists, members of political parties, electors, members of unions or leagues with general or specific aims of militant politics, such as the League of Nations Union or the Proportional Representation Society.

From this *concordia discors* of parties and associations,

press and assemblies, comes forth a political mind that expresses the political custom of the nation, and which is translated into public opinion on the one hand and into the government or executive authority on the other. These two forces, government and public opinion, may be in agreement on an ethico-political issue, as over the proposed marriage of King Edward VIII with Mrs. Simpson ; in such case the outcome is a political act imbued with the prevailing moral feeling of the country. Or there may be discordance, in which case either political interests prevail over morality, as exemplified by the raising of sanctions against Italy or the *de facto* recognition of the Italo-Abyssinian Empire, or else morality prevails over politics, as in the case of the rejection of the Hoare-Laval plan. As it is more usual (or seems to be more usual) for political interests to outrun morality, these two deities of collective life are presented as almost irreconcilable adversaries.

Morality in politics is called *idealism*. Politics without concern for morality are known as *Realpolitik*, a term coined in Germany in Bismarck's time. But we need not think that *Realpolitik* had no earlier existence ; it is what was once known as 'Reason of State,' an expression invented by Renaissance Italy and linked up with Machiavelli's theory of 'effectual truth.' What should be noted is that Machiavelli's politics, personified in Cæsar Borgia, and the politics of the Reason of State, which culminated in Louis XIV, and the *Realpolitik* acclaimed by Bismarck are all the politics of absolutism, of a power without limits. Just as absolute power finds no check in the inner kingdom of conscience, for it conceives of politics as pure and without admixture of other elements, so in the outer world it is unchecked by parliaments, public opinion, the Press, or the churches, for it sums up in the executive authority all powers and all rights. When Bethmann-Hollweg in 1914 referred to the Treaty guaranteeing the integrity and neutrality of Belgium as a 'scrap of paper' he gave graphic expression to the implications of *Realpolitik*. Treaties are to be kept when they are useful, to be broken when they are inconvenient. From this standpoint the respect of treaties is not a moral action

and their breach is not an immoral one, for politics take no account of such disturbing categories ; either observance or violation may be useful, and pure politics ask no further.

The specific aim of politics, say the philosophers, is the common advantage or utility ; the schoolmen of the Middle Ages used a more pregnant formula : *bonum commune*, the common good. The whole problem lies in how, in politics, the common good is to be conceived. The absolute monarchies of the *ancien régime* assuredly sought the good of the State and tried to attain it, but this good they saw through the spectacles of the interests of their royal house ; the rights and dignity and glory of the monarch were the primary objects and by these the common good was measured. Hence an estimation of particular advantage which had to coincide with that of general advantage. Where the two conflicted, ninety-nine times out of a hundred the advantage of the reigning house gained the upper hand over that of the nation. Unless, indeed, there were either parliaments, as in England, or a powerful upper clergy and aristocracy, or rebellious masses who put forward their own advantage and often caused it to prevail over that of the monarchs.

The idea of advantage, of utility, is thus at the basis of politics, and indisputably constitutes their specific and predominant aim. This conception of utility may little by little become a moral conception when, from the advantage of an individual, be he monarch or dictator, it is widened to become the advantage of the many ; or from the advantage of a single caste (nobility, clergy, army, or capitalism), it becomes the advantage of the various classes ; or from the advantage of a city or district it becomes the advantage of the various regions making up the nation. In short, the more the advantage sought is general, the more do politics assume the character of morality, that is, the more do they fulfil their true aim.

The basic reason for this transmutation of politics into morals is the fact that while a particular advantage may

violate the right of many, a general advantage rarely violates the right of few. Morality is the foundation of right. Every true right must be moral ; an immoral right is impossible, for if it is immoral it is no right. Can an employer be said to have the right to make his employees work twelve or sixteen hours a day ? (There are such men in certain countries and in certain classes.) Assuredly not. Here is exploitation, not a right. Even if there be a contract between an employer and his employees for sixteen hours' work a day, this contract is immoral and neither confers rights nor imposes duties.

It is the same in politics. When a class exploits a position of political privilege for its own advantage, it commits a gravely immoral act ; as, for instance, in France under the *ancien régime* when a crushing taxation of the peasants served the king to pay innumerable pensions to the courtiers and courtesans who thronged the ante-chambers of Versailles or Paris, or when a king by a simple *lettre de cachet* could imprison without trial anyone who caused inconvenience to him or his favourites. What may be said for the monarchs of the *ancien régime* or of the modern dictators can be equally said of revolutionary committees, ancient and modern. It is too easily said that, after all, revolutions are revolutions and cannot be bound by the moral laws of humanity. The same is said of war : war is war, and allows no room for moral laws. And the same plea is little by little extended to cover every case in which the observance of moral laws is inconvenient, in the interests of king or dictator, of a caste or a class, whether an aristocracy or the people, the *bourgeoisie* or the proletariat. The more general the advantage sought, the greater the morality of politics ; the more particular the advantage, the greater the immorality of politics. Since everything in this world is relative, the point is reached at which a policy to the advantage of a State becomes a particular advantage in respect of the international politics of the various States of a continent, or of a part of a continent, or of the world.

The Law of Nations is as old as civilization. A breach of it was considered even by pagan antiquity as an act of immorality which the gods would punish. It is in the Roman period that we find the ritual phrase *pacta sunt servanda*—‘treaties must be kept.’ A breach of faith between peoples was reputed an act of irreligion, for treaties were consecrated by oaths and propitiatory sacrifices. Modern international law originated with the formation of the independent States, when the Papacy and the Empire ceased to be centres of unification for the West. Vittoria and Alberico Gentili first, then Suarez and Grotius, were the founders of modern international law. Only on a basis of such law could the independent and autonomous States regulate their relations. Plainly, to this end it was necessary that all should agree on the principles of international law, that is, that all should observe the moral laws on which this law was founded. The more so in that there was no higher authority which could vindicate the law (as, in the Middle Ages, the popes and emperors); good faith and the moral bond had to serve as categorical imperative for every monarch and his government.

An international law cannot be built up in a day; moral education is not a matter of a few months. In the course of the centuries that law has come to maturity, with the moral training we call civilization. And therefore, even when governments do not observe international law and fail to respect its moral value, the public conscience is aware of their error and is perturbed. Thus, when war broke out in 1914 all saw the disproportion between the responsibilities of the Serbian Government for the Sarajevo crime and the war declared against Serbia by Austria-Hungary; between the responsibility incurred by Russia’s mobilization and that of Germany in attacking France and violating the neutrality of Belgium which she herself had guaranteed. All the moral motives vindicated by the Allies during the Great War, through four years of bitter struggle, were founded on a violation of international rights and laws based on public trust.

When the war ended it was believed that the fault lay in

the lack of a legal and moral organ which, being an emanation of the various States yet independent of them, would be inspired by the idea of a common good identical for all States, that is, for mankind. The League of Nations thus assumed an aspect at once political, moral, social, and juridical. It was a synthesis of various distinct organs, but forming a unity. The political sphere was to be that of the Council and Assembly of the League and, since its chief aim was peace and the observance of the Covenant with respect for the rights of all and for the general interest, such politics would be essentially moral. The social sphere covered the economic enterprises of the League and the protection of labour entrusted to the I.L.O. Finally, the juridical and litigious sphere was to be the province of the High Court of International Justice at the Hague. It was a magnificent constitution, on which were pinned the hopes of those throughout the world who wanted peace and the triumph of morality in international politics, and especially of the democratic, Christian-democratic and Labour Parties, of the churches, and of all the mystical currents of the present day. The League of Nations was the hope of an international future in a union of politics and morality. Why was this union shattered ?

The chief cause is best defined in the phrase made famous by the promoters of the *Action Française* : *Politique d'abord !* 'Politics first !' Political interests to take precedence of everything, even of morals. Christ had said : 'Seek ye first the Kingdom of God and His justice, and all these things shall be added unto you.' The Kingdom of God and His justice may be translated as the moral law, which rests on love of our neighbour ; love of our neighbour which, according to the Christian conception (the only logical and morally consistent conception), cannot be conceived without love of God. The Kingdom of God is love of God and of our neighbour on earth ; His justice means the works that consecrate this love in relation to God and to men : the synthesis is morality.

'All these things shall be added. . . .' These are the useful goods ; the Gospel speaks of food and clothing, that is, economic life. What are politics other than the organization and guarantee of the production and distribution of wealth, the safeguarding of the country, the means of developing industries, trades, culture, the arts, that is to say, the earthly order and well-being needful to men if they are to live ? But these are not the ends of man, of his personality in his moral relations, of his spiritual elevation. All this belongs to the Kingdom of God and His justice ; that is, moral and spiritual life, from which will come, as a gift of God, as a reflection of the harmony of moral relations on the plane of economic and political reality, all earthly goods. Thus these goods fall into the category of subordinate means, while the moral and spiritual life and personal elevation of each individual (conceived as the Kingdom of God and of justice) is to be considered as the end. And thus 'politics first' must be deemed by all an error, and by Christians a heresy.

Unhappily this heresy has been a guiding principle even for the statesmen who met together first in Paris to draw up the peace treaties, then at Geneva for their application. Let us be clear : they had to frame a political policy, for in the domain of politics they had to defend the interests of the victorious States. But here should have been no case of 'pure politics' or 'politics first.' For them there was also a categorical imperative : that of justice and morality. Every time men fall short of justice in human relations, whether between individuals or between States, they pay the penalty. This never fails ; it is the nemesis that pursues those who rob the poor, defrauding them of their wages, or who refuse a just price : as in the old folk-tale, the Devil's flour turns to ashes. It is the nemesis that pursues a State that will oppress another and refuse it justice. Germany and Austria-Hungary paid the price of the war they began without a proportionate reason ; but the Allies too have had to pay the price of the injustice of the peace treaties. The gravest injustice was the failure to fix the sum of reparations to be paid by Germany, with the idea, unworthy of civilized

peoples, of imposing a state of real economic slavery on a nation which was to be reduced to wretchedness for half a century, and deprived of almost all the means of re-establishing a trade and economy of its own. This card-castle soon collapsed. Not only were reparations suspended or cancelled, and the economic clauses to the exclusive advantage of the victors ceased to work or were abandoned, but the rich nations were led to lend money to Germany and lost it in the freezing of credits.

It is a true saying that 'God does not pay on Saturday,' but sometimes the payment is swift and overwhelming. Those who at Geneva thought they could play with the moral law and the Covenant of the League, and follow an equivocal policy every time there was a chance to choose between the two, to-day feel the full nemesis of the war. Japan's war on China for Manchuria, the war between Bolivia and Paraguay for the Gran Chaco, Italy's war on Abyssinia, the civil war in Spain, the second Sino-Japanese war, are stages of a continual nemesis that weighs on all States, drawing them towards a new war of destruction of European civilization. Why did not Geneva intervene in time? Why did it allow the causes of fresh wars to grow up—wars that might lead to a still greater catastrophe? Certainly no one thinks that the statesmen concerned did so with their eyes open, aware that they were doing what would bring us where we are to-day. But they failed in their moral duty; on them and on the States they represented falls the moral responsibility of their failure, of their fault. Ignorance and incompetence may lessen their responsibility, but the forgetting and shelving of moral values such as the respect for treaties, the protection of the weak, the duty of rendering justice and of withstanding arrogant aggression, are moral faults of which the responsibility cannot be wiped out, and which when the moment comes must be paid for, as all moral faults are paid for, even in this world.

How or when, each man knows in his own heart, if for a moment he reflects on the vicissitudes of his life. But history knows it too, history, which is a chain of causes and effects, in which material determinism plays a lesser part

than the moral value of the actions of men with their personal responsibility and collective influence. Orthodox Marxism maintains that all moral, cultural, and religious values of society are only reflections of economic determinism, a by-product of the material conditions of life. Historical materialism leads to the absurd, for neither would the rich be responsible for their immorality (when they are immoral) nor the poor for their morality (when they are moral), or vice versa, for both would be determined in their morality or immorality by the conditions and economic environment of their actions. Thus we should absolve the France of Laval, which gave Mussolini a free hand in Abyssinia. And we should absolve the England which from January to September, 1935, dragged out discussion of the Negus's appeal to the League, put a ban on the export of armaments which resolved itself into the disarmament of Abyssinia at a time when Italy was pouring troops and armaments into Eritrea and Somaliland, negotiated with Italy for a cession of Abyssinian territory, without reference to Abyssinia herself, on the basis of a tripartite agreement irreconcilable with the Covenant of the League which pledged the defence of the territorial integrity of member States: all these were acts devoid of the most elementary equity or morality. If the premise of historical determinism held good we should concern ourselves only with the clash of material forces rising out of the class war and manifested either in civilized fashion or, ultimately, in civil or international war. According to such a theory, Mussolini, Hitler, and Stalin would be right.

Consider Spain. Morality or politics? Historical materialism or a war of ideals? All must condemn the horrors of the civil war. On both sides massacres and innocent victims. Franco's friends protest against the burning of churches, the murder of priests, monks, and nuns in their thousands. Two thousand religious are said to have been slain. Were all guilty? All responsible for high treason? Had all turned their churches and convents into fortresses?

And where are the proofs? When were they tried and sentenced? People speak of fanatical mobs, of a Government without adequate police force or organized armies. We admit the extenuating circumstances, but the responsibility remains. No one will say that here were moral acts—or even politic acts. On the other side, the friends of the Government of Spain put forward other priests and monks shot or thrown into prison by the insurgents (in fewer numbers, indeed, for the majority of the priests and nuns are on the side of the rebel generals), the massacres of Badajoz, the implacable repression of ‘Red’ villages in which all the men capable of bearing arms have been shot for fear lest they should revolt once the victorious armies have moved on, and the bombardment of Madrid, Durango, Guernica,¹ killing women and children without pity. No one can say that these are moral acts, done in the service of the Catholic religion. We are agreed in deploring in the name of the most elementary principles of morality all the inhuman acts of the Spanish civil war, above all, the execution of hostages by either side.

Those who admit class-war, by any means, approved the revolt of Catalonia and the Asturias in October 1934, because it was promoted by the Socialist ‘Left’ and supported by the proletariat against the radico-clerical Government which represented reaction and the big landowners. But these same men disapproved of the revolt of the generals in July 1936 because it was against the legitimate Government. They must make up their minds. If revolt against a legitimate Government is not lawful because it is immoral, that of 1934 was no less so than that of 1936; but if they hold the former to be lawful and praiseworthy, they have no right to blame the latter in the name of morality or legitimate

¹ Since the fact of these bombardments was denied it may be noted that that of Durango was witnessed by an English party, two of whom, Catholics, are personally known to both author and translator of the present book. That of Guernica was also attested by reliable eye-witnesses, including the Basque priests who, in a letter to the Pope, affirmed that the city had been destroyed by incendiary bombs (a fact, indeed, that had been reported in the *Messagero* of April 28, 1938, by its correspondent with General Franco’s forces). Since then there have been the bombardments of Barcelona, Alicante, Granollers.—*Translator’s Note.*

government. From the political standpoint, the men of the 'Right' disapproved of the revolt of 1934 and approved of that of 1936: the men of the 'Left' approved of that of 1934 and disapproved of that of 1936. The same may be said of those who present the war in Spain as a war of ideologies: Fascism *versus* Communism. We are here in the field of politics, not of morality.

The idea of a compulsory choice between Fascism and Communism is gaining ground in Europe, and takes the fancy of many who do not reflect on the content of names and who are dominated by impulse and over-simplified notions. For such there are no intermediate zones in political ideologies: democracy is worn out, 'labour' has become a bureaucracy of workers' organizations, trade unions, co-operatives, mutual benefit societies and the like, good for the nineteenth century, but not for the present day. While Marxist Socialism is merely a phase of Communism which is more logical and complete, on the other hand Fascism is the concrete product of the national, racial, and imperialist ideologies which ripened in the capitalistic phase of the *bourgeoisie* and reached their climax through the war and post-war crises. The struggle, it is said, is between these two ideologies; the Spanish war is a sample of the war of the future, which will be likewise a war between conflicting ideologies.

We refuse to simplify human ideals, even in the economic and political field, so as to create two myths, the Fascist myth and the Communist myth. As a hundred years ago the peoples were stirred by the word 'liberty,' and the system of liberty grew up, overcoming the absolutism of the states of the Holy Alliance and adapting itself to the various phases of the economics, politics, and culture of each people, so to-day, in the struggle of the dictatorships (all the dictatorships, Russia included) against the democracies, the spirit of liberty will overcome the tyrannies of Right or Left, for it rests on moral values that are perennial in mankind. Therefore, while we do not accept the Marxist thesis of a class-war, proletariat against *bourgeoisie*, neither do we accept the alternative thesis, Fascism against Communism. Both

lead to civil war, whether in the economic and political field through the elimination of all other classes (as in Russia), or through the elimination of all other parties (as in Germany and Italy), or else through the armed destruction of the opposition, as to-day in Spain.

What has happened in Russia, Germany and Italy through the triumph of the totalitarian State if it is not a civil war, real though concealed? If the vanquished side did not fight, or did not continue to fight with arms, this does not prevent the expulsions, concentration camps, executions after mock trials, or murders like that of Matteotti or the Rosselli brothers, or the oppression of the Jews, from being real, unilateral acts of civil war. We refuse to approve of civil war, from whatever quarter it comes, of political, religious, or racial persecution by whatever party, or of armed revolt by whatever section of the community, for we put morality before the political and economic interests of any caste, church, or class. Therefore for us it is absurd to call the war of the Spanish generals a war of ideals, a crusade, a holy war. But this does not mean that we shut ourselves away in an ivory tower, that we content ourselves with a negative attitude. Nothing of the kind. We wish the divergences and conflicts between citizens of the same country to be fought out within the framework of liberal constitutions, of the votes of the people, of living, effectual and progressive democracy. Just as we wish disputes between States to be resolved by methods of conciliation and arbitration, within the framework of a more valid and effective League of Nations. We hold that the method of liberty in politics is more moral than that of coercion by an absolute and uncontrolled government, a totalitarian dictatorship whether of Right or Left, or, still worse, by the anarchy of undisciplined mobs, even if these had reason to revolt against oppression. Thus we carry the rule of morality into the political system, the value of conscience from private life to public life, respect for our neighbour from economic relations to political relations. This is true democracy.

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One of the strongest objections against the predominance of morality over politics is that a choice dictated by moral considerations would be often unilateral, and that an unprincipled adversary would take advantage of it, being bound himself by no moral scruple. It is this objection that leads to the armaments race, to violation of international agreements, and to war. The argument is halting, for it underestimates the power of moral values. Germany invaded Belgium, believing that thus she could more swiftly strike at France and reach Paris in a few days. But the violation of Belgian neutrality roused England (who was hesitating as to whether or not she would enter the war) and undid what it had sought to do. Germany believed she could terrorize the Allies by torpedoing passenger-ships in mid-ocean, but the sinking of the *Lusitania* led to America's entry into the war, and her entry was decisive. Moral values were victorious over the so-called material advantages. It is evident that if moral values are to be victorious they must be validly supported. Pascal wanted the just to be strong and the strong just. When the just are not strong and the strong are not just, the world goes topsy-turvy. Therefore the democracies of to-day must be just and strong, for then the dictatorships, which are strong, will be forced to act justly.

Another objection raised to the primacy of morality is this—individual morality governing private relations between the various categories of citizens is defined by codes, laws, traditions, convictions, is taught in the schools, preached in the churches, inculcated by the law courts, and, in the case of offences and crimes of an anti-social character, there are the judicial authorities to defend the injured party and punish the guilty; whereas public morality is vague, ill-defined, without sanctions to enforce it, and lacking the necessary background of education because conviction is lacking. Is this really true? Men of conscience know that certain actions are unlawful, whether they concern private or public matters. The murder of St. Thomas Becket, the murder of the Duc d'Enghien, and the murder of Matteotti, are all three on the same plane, political crimes committed

either by order of the man in power or to please him. And in the twelfth century as in the nineteenth or twentieth centuries the moral conscience of every class of citizens protested; there was the difference that in the twelfth century the murderers of Becket were punished and King Henry II did public penance, whereas in modern times neither Napoleon nor Mussolini were condemned or did penance. So much for progress in moral custom!

But it is not only against such glaring crimes that the general moral conscience protests, but also against those more usual in political life—the breach of pledges and oaths and the breaking of treaties. How much has been written against those sovereigns who gave their peoples free parliamentary constitutions and swore to respect them, and then, in the course of the last century and the present one, violated them, withdrew them, breaking their oaths? Who can defend their breach of faith? To-day Fascists and Nazis banish moral duties from public life, believing they must consider only what is or is not to the advantage of the nation. What is more, a new ethical principle has been installed: that which corresponds to the advantage of the State or nation is *ipso facto* moral. Thus State or nation is made what the philosophers call an *ethical primary*. The place of conscience is taken by the State or nation.

Against this perversion we must react and show it up for what it is, the old, false maxim that ‘the end justifies the means.’ For us, the end never justifies the means. Even if the end is the good of the nation, that does not justify immoral means like treaty-breaking, the treacherous murder of opponents, massacres of the innocent, the persecution of a race, the suppression of religious worship and of moral, civil, and political liberties, or unjust war—none of those things that the dictatorships of to-day hold lawful. The fundamental reason for our firm and trenchant assertion of this principle is that any moral system must be based on respect for human personality, and any immoral system violates before all and above all the rights of human personality. Human personality represents a great value; it was set on a new basis by Christianity which, as a personal

religion, established a new and direct relationship between man and God, no longer through the intermediary of the family, caste, city, kingdom or empire. It was in this sense that Christ said that He came to separate the father from the son, the daughter-in-law from the mother-in-law, the husband from the wife, and that our foes should be members of our own household, in the deep sense that if family affection and ties conflict with the duty of conscience, which is the relationship between man and God, duty must prevail over the affection, ties, and ends of the group. This is the same as what St. Peter said in the synagogue, that we must obey God rather than men.

Such an act of the individual conscience is not an act of rebellion against authority (the early Christians paid for it even with their lives), but an act of union with the moral law, which is to be found in each one of us through the fact of our human personality, and which is made plain to us by Christian teaching and practice. This act of conscience is based on the twofold Christian love, love of God and love of our neighbour ; it is this that is the well-spring of morality, of all morality that is truly human and truly Christian. Hitler's propaganda is contrary to love of our neighbour, inasmuch as he establishes the race as the principle of human selection ; for Hitler, there is no neighbour outside the race. And for him his neighbour is not a person, but is depersonalized, for each is nothing but a number, a quantity which serves the whole, so that the whole absorbs the numerical individual and transforms it. Monstrous as this seems, it is what is happening in Germany under our eyes.

Bolshevist Russia has made a speciality of the negation of God, thus denying the love of God. What foundation remains then for the individual personality of each man ? What is the source of love of one's neighbour ? Invasive materialism can only depreciate personality, reducing it to the level of a machine. And this is just what has been done among ourselves by anonymous capitalism and industrialism ; it is the running sore of our Western democracies. The immoral and inhuman background of our civilization is constituted by its negation of human personality ; the

deeper is this negation, the more immoral and inhuman the system. Therefore, we denounce Fascism, Nazism, Bolshevism, all dictatorships, as inhuman and immoral systems—but we do not forget how much inhumanity and immorality there is still in the present structure of the democratic nations. What is necessary is a return to the Christian principle of an entire respect for human personality, which is only ennobled and elevated when morality is at the basis of both individual and social life, as the indissoluble expression and perennial fruit of love of God and love of our neighbour.

V

THE ETHICS OF POLITICAL COLLABORATION

ON the publication of the Encyclical *Quadragesimo Anno* (May 15, 1931), British Catholics who were members of the Labour Party were concerned at the famous sentence: 'No one can be at the same time a sincere Catholic and a true Socialist.' Not that they believed themselves Socialists in the true sense of the word, but they feared that either their support of Labour might be doubted by their associates, or that they might be considered luke-warm Catholics by the Church. Cardinal Bourne, in order to cut short controversy and to explain the Pope's real mind, in a speech at Edinburgh the following June, confirmed the right of Catholics to belong with a clear conscience to any of the three traditional parties, Labour included, to which, he said, the principle of incompatibility with the Catholic faith did not apply. A declaration by Mr. Oldfield, M.P., as a Catholic member of the Labour Party, on the same lines, had already been reproduced by the *Osservatore Romano*, but Cardinal Bourne's speech had a wider range and a deeper significance than a mere practical rule of conduct; it dealt with the essential problem of the ethics of political collaboration.

Starting from the premise that 'Naturally a great many Catholics desire to enter into political life. It is right that they should do so,' and that 'In order to enter politics in England, and in most other countries, it is necessary to join some political party,' the Cardinal stated that:

'The Catholic Church as such has nothing whatever to do with any political party. Like her Divine Master and Founder, she has never enunciated a scheme of politics. Our Lord was content with teaching us the truths of

revelation, and with giving us certain definite principles of conduct. The Church teaches these same truths and enforces the same principles. It is on his own principles of moral conduct, based on the teaching of Our Divine Lord, that a Catholic must rely when he adheres to a political party.'

After a brief sketch of the relations of Catholics with the three parties in Great Britain, Conservative, Liberal, and Labour, he came to the conclusion that 'In considering the three parties now existing in England, it must never be forgotten that no Catholic can ally himself to any one of them absolutely and entirely. . . . A Catholic is obliged to walk warily, and, while accepting in a general sense the policy of the Party to which he belongs, must carefully guard himself against any theory or action which contradicts the teaching of the Church, or which is contrary to the dictates of his own conscience. . . .

'What then is my general conclusion? First, in this country a man or woman is free to join the political party which makes the greatest appeal to his sympathy and understanding. Secondly, having done so, he or she must be on guard against erroneous principles which, on account of the affiliations which affect these parties, are to some extent at work within them. Thirdly, he may never deliver himself, or his conscience, wholly into the keeping of any political party. When his religious faith and his conscience come into conflict with the claims of the Party, he must obey his conscience and withstand the demands which his party may make upon him.'

It was, indeed, in conformity with these principles that the Catholic members of the Labour Party spoke and voted on the Education Bill introduced by the Minister of Education, Mr. Trevelyan. After seeking in vain for amendments that would put the non-provided schools on the same footing as the others, they voted against the Bill, indeed John Scutt, a member of the Labour Party, was the leader of the opposition to it. As a result, the Bill was thrown out and

Mr. Trevelyan resigned. Though the leaders of the Labour Party blamed their Catholic colleagues for their conduct, no one dared to enforce disciplinary measures against them, since they had acted in accordance with conscience.

The pragmatism at the bottom of the British political parties, their distrust of general ideas and of the logic of systems, makes it easier for Catholics to belong to them without compromising on principles. Labour indeed, both in its Congresses and its more solemn declarations, has assumed the name of Socialism and given a Socialist colour to certain of the aspirations and demands embodied in its electoral programme. On the eve of the elections of 1931, Mr. Arthur Henderson, in his speech of closure at the thirty-first Labour Conference, held at Scarborough, declared: 'The Conference has passed resolutions consciously intended to effect the transformation of the present system into a socialist society.' But the resolutions at Scarborough, taken one by one, had little that was specifically Socialistic about them. Reorganization of basic industries and their transfer to public ownership is what Mussolini and Hitler have been doing; public control of the banks, too, exists in many countries of Europe; the nationalization of the coal mines falls short of what was practised before Fascism in various regions of Italy where the subsoil belonged entirely to the State. (In 1927 Fascism made this the case for the whole of Italy.) The transfer of the land to public ownership seems indeed to bear a Socialist imprint, but if it means merely an ultimate title vested in the community, this was a reality in the feudal system, when all landed property belonged either to the King or to the community as a whole.

For the Englishman, problems are discussed when they present themselves in concrete form. Then will come the time for Catholics—and especially their centres of culture, of which the best known and most authoritative is the Catholic Social Guild—to study them from the point of view of Catholic social teaching, so as to contribute, as far as in them lies, to a solution that will not conflict with our principles. It is true that on the application of these principles there may be differences of opinion and even

opposition, but this is always the case when theories must be applied to facts. This happened in the General Strike of 1926. Cardinal Bourne declared it immoral. The majority of Labour Catholics supported the strike. Five Catholic Members of Parliament made a reply to Cardinal Bourne, declaring that Labour men were in the right in calling the strike, and that neither morals nor theology justified so harsh a condemnation. Even among the Catholic Hierarchy and in the Catholic Press opinion was divided and hesitant.

The position on the Continent is very different from that in England. The German and French Socialists, the founders of Socialism in general, who later became orthodox Marxists like their comrades in Holland, Austria, Belgium, Italy, Spain, and elsewhere, all took their stand on a materialist conception of life. Reformist currents have not been such from an ethical standpoint, but mainly from that of economics or politics. The hallmark of continental Socialism is a theory based on historical materialism and on class war. The abolition of private property was their war-cry for many years, as to-day it has become the war-cry of the Communists.

Political programmes based on abstract theorizing lead to dogmatic intransigence, logical sophistries, and fanatical confidence in a particular sect. Historical materialism and the class war became Socialist articles of faith. The reformists were treated as heretics; resounding schisms came about, nor were synods and councils lacking. The various Socialist parties called themselves revolutionary, though not one of them has ever made a revolution. For them the class war resolved itself into preaching hatred against the *bourgeoisie* and against the Church which supported the *bourgeoisie* and its right to property. Thus Socialism became the ally of *bourgeois* anti-clericalism.

I remember how in Italy at the end of the nineteenth century the Socialists spread among the industrial workers and the masses in the Northern cities the custom of refusing to baptize their children, to be married in church, and to have religious funerals. In the country-side this anti-

religious propaganda did not go far, and the leaders themselves refrained from it. The Socialists did not everywhere and always stress the anti-religious struggle, but according to place and circumstance this struggle had its acute phases. The conflict was more marked in those countries where Catholics (and also Protestants, on a smaller scale) had organized the workers in Christian unions, breaking down the Socialist monopoly, and had founded their own political parties on a democratic basis.

Whether workers belonged to the Socialist trade unions or to the Christian ones, was originally determined on religious grounds. The political contest on two opposing fronts, especially before the war and before the application of P.R. (which is a method of electoral toleration) from time to time exasperated opposition between the two. On the other hand, the economic contests, in which Socialist and Christian workers fought side by side, drew them towards each other but without their mingling. In substance, this fact which originated in the second half of the last century, has helped to impoverish the religious background of the working classes, the majority of whom followed Socialism, while it has led to a radical dualism especially in the smaller States such as Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, and at one time Austria, where parties were more compact and dissensions more tangible and constant. Socialists and Catholics contest the fields of politics and economics, so that there is no room for religious penetration.

It would need a common peril to restore the moral and political contacts which, in the long run, attenuate points of conflict. After the war there were experiments of collaboration between Socialist parties and the democratic parties of Christian inspiration, but they were inconclusive. In Belgium, the first attempt at such collaboration was transient, in Lithuania and Poland it took place in the midst of the confusion and difficulties of newly created States; in Czechoslovakia it was more lasting and significant, and it was particularly important in Prussia. In Belgium the Catholic public found it so difficult to understand the possibility of collaboration between Christian Democrats

and Socialists in the Poulet Cabinet that the Bishops thought it necessary to speak of this in a collective Pastoral Letter. In this they justified the experiment as for the good of the country and pointed out the religious dangers to be avoided. This was the precedent for Van Zeeland's experiment.

But apart from appraisement of concrete facts, what is of interest to us is that the Socialists, when they came to grips with realities, mitigated their theories and their revolutionary attitude, and the Catholics began to renew moral contact with the various sections of the working classes. Unhappily, there is still a long way to go between the respect shown by British Labour for the religious conscience of its members and the materialism, theoretical and practical, of continental Socialism ; between the repeated declarations of eminent English Labour leaders that they repudiate the class war, and the theories and propaganda of continental Socialism in favour of the class war.

The majority of Catholics on the Continent feel rather differently about joining or collaborating with the non-Socialist parties. These are known as the National parties, or else simply as Democrats or Liberals ; on the Continent the label Conservative is no longer used, but its place is taken by a wide use of the word National. Where Catholics have no organized party of their own, as they once had in Germany and Italy, and as they have still in Holland, Belgium, and, since 1925, in France, the majority of them belong to the National parties. It cannot be said that such parties do not imply principles and practice in contradiction to Catholicism. The whole fight of the Church during the nineteenth century was almost wholly waged against secularist Liberalism, which forms the basis of all political parties, from the Right to the Left. And if these parties to-day are the static side of the established order, yesterday they were its dynamic side, and were believed to be revolutionary.

There are various reasons for Catholic support and membership of such parties, and the general acquiescence

See and the Italian Government over Catholic Action in 1931. In Italy to-day, since there is only one party, the Fascist Party, if Catholics want to take part in political life, albeit in a subordinate capacity, they must register as members of the *Fascio* and submit to its discipline. But such membership comes about not only through political vocation, but, as Pius XI wrote in his Encyclical *Non abbiamo bisogno*, 'Membership in the Party and the oath are for countless persons a necessary condition of their career, of their daily bread, and even of their life itself.'

It is well known that Fascism professes anti-Christian principles: 'The erroneous and false doctrines and maxims that We have just pointed out and deplored have appeared many times during these last few years, and it is well known that We have never, with God's help, done any less than our apostolic duty in exposing them, and in confronting them with the just claims of true Catholic doctrine,' wrote Pius XI, after speaking in particular of the effort 'to monopolize completely the young, from their tenderest years up to manhood and womanhood, for the exclusive advantage of a party and of a régime based on an ideology which clearly resolves itself into a true, a real pagan worship of the State.' Of the oath he wrote in the same document that 'Such an oath, as it stands, is unlawful.'¹

None the less, the Pope did not wish to condemn the Fascist Party as such, but 'to point out and to condemn all those things in the programme and in the activities of the Party which have been found to be contrary to Catholic doctrine and Catholic practice, and therefore irreconcilable with the Catholic name and profession.' Therefore, recognizing the difficult position of Italian Catholics seeking 'to find a way which would restore tranquillity to their consciences, reducing to a minimum the external difficulties of the situation,' he declared that it would suffice for Catholics who had already joined the Party on taking the oath to make 'before God, in their own consciences, a

¹ As an example, all teachers and professors must swear to train their pupils to be 'devoted to their country and to the Fascist régime.'—*Translator's Note.*

reservation such as "Saving the laws of God and of the Church" or "In accordance with the duties of a good Christian," with the firm proposal to declare also externally such a reservation if the need of it arose.'

When a *modus vivendi* was reached between the Holy See and the Italian Government over the particular case of Catholic Action, the following note appeared in the *Osservatore Romano*: 'There is no need to add that in virtue of the agreement the compatibility of membership of Catholic Action and of the National Fascist Party is restored.' (September 3, 1931.) These words do not refer to a moral and religious compatibility, but to a political or, better, civil compatibility that the Pope had claimed for members of Catholic Action in his letter to Cardinal Schuster of Milan (May 1931), against the Fascist declarations which averred membership of Catholic Action to be incompatible with that of the Fascist Party. It was therefore a case of removing this civil disability which affected organized Catholics, depriving them of parity of civic rights, even in private life and in their careers or trades. Even after the agreement the reservation to the Fascist oath remained in force, as essential to the very nature of the oath, with the condemnation of the anti-Catholic doctrines involved in Fascist theory and practice. Certainly the margin of liberty left to Italian Catholics is a narrow one, if they have to have recourse to mental reservations in taking the oath, and if they are exposed to losing their civil rights if they dissent from the Fascist Party.

On various points there is a strong resemblance between Italian Fascism and both the *Action Française* and Nazism. There is, however, this difference, that the *Action Française* and Nazism till its advent to power, were condemned by the ecclesiastical authorities (the first by the Pope, the second by the local Bishops), and Catholics were forbidden, under pain of grave canonical penalties, to be members of such parties. Of Germany we will speak elsewhere. The difference between the treatment meted out by the Pope to

Fascism and the *Action Française* is due to the fact that the latter, while building up its theories on the deification of the nation with a markedly positivist character, took up a doctrinal position of its own within Catholicism itself with the open support of a part of the clergy. The infiltration of the *Action Française* into the ecclesiastical camp increased concern in Rome, where the case was considered rather as that of a religious sect than of a true political party. The fact that the *Action Française* had not behind it the political power of the French State and therefore could not identify itself with the country, as Fascism and Nazism do in Italy and Germany, enabled the Holy See to strike at the evil without risk of complications with the State.

The German Catholics when the Nazis seized power divided as the Italian Catholics had, some preferring silent protest, prison or exile, and others on the contrary collaborating as a subordinate collaborates with his master. This we may note not as approving their political attitude, which is not to our taste, but to throw light on an aspect often overlooked of the position of Catholics in regard to the State or Government. Whatever the *de facto* conditions and the constitutions of States, even if they are founded on principles contrary to Catholic doctrine, it is not possible in the name of the Church to prevent citizens from taking part in public life, so long as they respect the moral and religious laws. Who does not remember the campaign in France against the Republic as a secularist and masonic State, with which Catholics should have nothing in common? And how ill received was the letter of Leo XIII on the *Ralliement*?

Etat laïque or Fascist State, Nazi State or Bolshevist State are labels given by the majorities in power to political society, against dissident minorities. But the State, as a necessary body for civil life, as ordered society under an authority, is the State *de jure*, for all, in which all can and should work for the common good. Politically each must choose his post, as collaborator or opponent of the Government, never of the State. Pius XI in the case of the *Action Française* did not deny the right of French Catholics to be

monarchists if they so wished, but he forbade them to put forward their monarchic ideal in the name of the Church. In the same way he did not prevent Italian Catholics from being anti-Fascist, but he forbade any anti-Fascism or rather, politics in general, in the name of Catholic Action, which shares in the mission of the Church.

This established, to dissipate once for all the confusion made by some between politics and religion, we must form a clear notion of up to what point political collaboration is such and hence can be considered as legitimate and lawful, and at what point on the contrary it is ethically transformed into a true co-operation for evil. Let us consider the three types of collaboration. There is the collaboration that implies membership of non-Catholic parties (the Labour or Socialist Party in England) ; there is that between political parties composed of Catholics and those of non-Catholics (as was the case with the German Centre and the Social Democrats) ; and there is the collaboration of citizens with the Government, as that of certain Italian Catholics with the Fascist Government and certain German Catholics with the Nazi Government.

Presupposing—as is actually the case—that we are here speaking of political collaboration with those who either as individuals or collectively in politics profess principles contrary to morality and religious faith, it must be presumed that the Catholics who collaborate with them do not mean to sanction such principles in any way. This starting-point is difficult to recognize where it is a case of membership of a party (as in England) unless, as we have seen, the ecclesiastical authority and Catholic practice guarantee at least implicitly the reservation of non-support of such principles. This state of things corresponds to a method of political toleration, which can the better be realized the more the régime is free and parties confined to practical experiments.

With this premise, the problem of a positive separation of personal responsibility from that of others in the domain of principles, is posed only when dividing principles affect the very matter of political collaboration, that is, when they

are *actualized* so as to involve all collaborators in a definite practical assertion of them. For example, if the English mentality were not so fluid and remote from precise declarations and were like the Latin, Catholics would not have been able to avoid clearing up in an orthodox sense Henderson's declaration that 'the Conference has passed resolutions consciously intended to effect the transformation of the present system into Socialist society.' In the same way, if those Italian Catholics who collaborate with Fascism had been free to express their thought, they would have been bound in duty to express their dissent from Mussolini's assertions that 'the State is the end of the citizens,' or that 'violence is moral,' when these assertions were translated into a concrete policy of the Fascist Government. The silence of these Italian Catholics was broken, indeed, by the Pope's protests. But is that enough for those who continue their political collaboration in silence? Apart from such special cases, it cannot be denied that the very spirit of political collaboration helps to accentuate personality, to throw principles into relief, so that the practical assent or dissent that results helps greatly towards a true political education.

This applies also to the case of institutions and laws already existing which are contrary to Catholic morals. In Belgium, for instance, divorce is allowed. No one has brought this as a charge against the Catholics who either alone or in coalition with other parties have governed the country for half a century. And this because the problem of divorce has not again become a problem of the day on the political plane, has not been *actualized*. Whether Catholics ought to have taken the initiative in actualizing it is another problem from that which we are now considering. In France, on the other hand, with the Bill for *l'école unique* the problem of freedom of education was brought back into politics. In that moment Catholics had to reaffirm their principles, while collaborating in drafting the new Education Bill. In substance, while on the one hand we must recognize the presumption that Catholics in collaborating with other parties mean to safeguard Catholic principles, on the other, the moment that such principles

are disputed on the plane of actual politics, it is the duty of Catholics to reaffirm them both in theory and in action.

Passing from the conflict of principles to that of practical action, it is clear at once that since this is actual, implying direct co-operation, theoretical reservations and disapproval are not enough ; in such cases there can be no collaboration. If a Government introduces a divorce bill, or a bill legalizing birth control, Catholics can never vote for it. If a Government proposes an unjust war, Catholics should be unable to co-operate, vote credits for it, or approve it. In a conflict between morality and political practice, morality should always prevail.

As a rule the problems of political life are not those of ends, whether remote or proximate, for generally the ends will be good in themselves and to the advantage of the community, but the problem of the means by which these ends are to be attained. In theory there is no one who does not condemn the principle of 'the end justifies the means,' but unfortunately in political practice this principle operates more than is believed. The idea of fatherland, State, nation loom so large to the modern mind that they have become almost divinities. The modern State is pantheistically conceived not only by philosophers but by jurists and politicians. It is the ultimate expression of human reality, the sole fount of law, the sole limit of activity. The nationalists make of the nation a living spirit. For them religion and morality pass to the second place as means for the realization of the virtue of the race, of the perennial vitality of the nation, of the complex reality of the State.

What wonder then that conscience and human personality are subordinated to these divinities, new and old ? The theory that the end (State or nation) justifies the means is intrinsic to the pantheistic conception of human society. It becomes an element of education, of literary and artistic development, of mental formation and culture, so as to warp consciences and to pervert moral values. French Catholics about half a century ago passed through a morally

difficult period over the Dreyfus case. Was Dreyfus guilty or innocent? Were his judges in good faith or not? Here were small moral problems, which should have been solved by those competent and responsible. But these problems were turned into political values. Would the condemnation of Dreyfus save the honour of the army and the armament the State? Then let Dreyfus be condemned! Certainly the Catholic anti-Dreyfusards did not reason so simply, but unconsciously and swayed by passion they applied to politics the idea that the end justifies the means.

What was the controversy over the '*Politique d'abord!*' of the *Action Française* but a controversy on the same problem of the end and the means? The Irish Republican members of Parliament, who are mostly Catholics, in order to remain in Parliament and avoid the annulment of their election if they did not swear loyalty to the King, in the elections of 1929 declared that for them the parliamentary oath was an empty formula. The oath thus voided of its content was a means to an end—that of carrying on the struggle for the republic in Parliament. Was this lawful? Many examples might be cited from the political life of the present day, but these suffice.

Did the Catholics in the parliaments and government of Austria-Hungary believe in conscience that the war against Serbia and the consequent war against France with the violation of Belgian neutrality was based on right and morality? If they really believed this and had not sufficient light for an exact judgement on events and on the proposals made by those mainly responsible, then perhaps their conscience could remain tranquil. I add 'perhaps' to counterbalance laziness and negligence in ascertaining the moral features of the war, with the patriotic passion that drove them to believe in its justice. But if doubt entered into their conscience, could they continue their collaboration with their Government? If they supported an unjust war, was not this a true co-operation in evil? Is not such an attitude a real and serious affirmation of the principle that the end justifies the means?

A similar question might be asked of the Catholics of every country, covering the whole wide field of politics, since this (save in dictatorial and absolutist régimes) is no longer the private domain of a few, but through the electorate, the organization of parties, the Press, and parliament, it extends to all adult citizens. We must, certainly, graduate the idea of co-responsibility, limiting it to action directly willed and practical duties imposed on the conscience of each one by his state and capacity. The responsibility of the elector is other than that of the Cabinet Minister. But once due discrimination is made, with the recognition that political life to-day is so complex, its working so specified and bureaucratic, that it is difficult from outside to fix individual moral responsibilities in political matters, we must still affirm that all political activity when it becomes a personal act on the part of each one of us, assumes a moral aspect before our consciences and creates in us our share of responsibility.

Often a secret vote, or a reservation expressed in private, is enough to take away co-responsibility for collective acts of Cabinets or Councils, when we do not approve these on moral grounds. But when it is a case of public acts, which may bear the stigma of immorality and injustice before public opinion (as the case of an unjust war or that of forced colonial labour), secret dissent is not enough. There then comes the duty for each man to assume his whole responsibility and to end his co-responsibility with the Government or party or parliamentary group that defends action incompatible with morality. In free régimes there are many and obvious cases of dissent that lead to the resignations of Ministers or of party leaders ; dissent is therefore far easier than in absolutist and dictatorial régimes. In these, the collaborators give a blank cheque to the principal holder of power. Silence surrounds the dictator. All criticism is silent, the voices that speak are all those of courtiers who approve and praise, even acts that deserve blame.

Then it is inevitable that success, apparent or real, prevents a just critical appreciation, and takes the place of a

moral valuation of acts. This happened in France under Napoleon III, when a part of the Catholics and of the clergy were often blinded by success and sang the praises of the dominator. (Public praise is a form of moral co-responsibility.) The same thing is to-day happening in Italy, and elsewhere.

Let us admit all the extenuating circumstances, but let us maintain the principle of moral co-responsibility, which is a vital principle of Christian ethics. Politics, which are so badly spoken of because they can so easily lead to forgetfulness of moral values, are in themselves a civic duty and an act of 'charity to our neighbour,' as Pius XI defined them in a speech to young Belgian Catholics. To-day politics in truly civilized countries are open to all, even to women, who have become or will become electors. Politics, under any régime, mean direct or indirect co-operation. From the moral standpoint they can become co-operation for good or co-operation for evil. The enlightened conscience of each man is summoned to say its decisive word.

VI

EXPERIENCES AND REFLECTIONS

I WAS an ordinary professor, teaching philosophy and sociology in the Great Seminary of Caltagirone, and in my spare time occupied with Catholic Action, organizing students and workers, founding co-operatives among workers and peasants, and editing a Catholic weekly. My native city for about the last twenty years had been torn between two bitterly hostile factions, led by rich and powerful families. The artisans and working classes, who in Italy had only recently won the right to vote at the municipal and parliamentary elections, were to be found in either party, sharing their hatreds with ferocity (there were on occasion sanguinary encounters in which men were wounded and one was killed). What is more, they lent themselves to electoral corruption, to a sale of votes which had become an established system, for a third of the town councillors were re-elected every two years and parliamentary elections were frequent owing to frequent dissolutions of the Chamber. In Sicily and Southern Italy only the priests (and not all of these) and a very few laymen observed the *non expedit* preventing Catholics from taking part in political life.

This was the position when a group of working men came to me saying that since I had formed co-operatives to fight usury and concerned myself with the training of boys and youths, why should I not also take in hand the civic education of the working classes. I made one condition: propaganda among the workers to induce them to redeem themselves from the traffic in votes and party hatreds, and to acquire a moral and civic personality of their own. It was accepted. In a few years the majority of the workers of the city and a good portion of the peasants

belonged to the Christian Democratic organizations. I resigned my post as professor and entered upon a period of intense life as journalist and organizer, involving municipal and later political struggles, always under the banner of the moralization of public life. The results were such as to convince me of the aptitude of the masses for education and of the possibility of dominating the mob element. It was not so much the mob, but the small groups, the cliques, the would-be *élites*, who proved most refractory to the rule of morality in public life, for group egotism develops more readily among the few than among the many. The few work in darkness, the many are obliged to work in light. It is from ruling groups that evil spreads to the masses, and not vice versa, and this is true in politics as in every field of collective life.

Little by little, through my experiences and studies, I came to the conviction that any moral education in public life must rest on a sound conception of politics; otherwise we should build on sand. I speedily reached the conclusion that the modern State, as currently conceived, would always be an obstacle to Christian morality in political life unless its theory were changed and its practice amended.

The fundamental problem is that expressed in the term used by Hegelian Idealists, 'the ethical State,' which, as such, is to-day reflected in the spirit and aims of political parties. Once the State was envisaged as sole sovereign power, not merely as an expression of the will of the people but as the permanent mind and will of human society and an end unto itself, it assumed the character of an *ethical absolute*. No matter whether the prevailing political philosophy be that of Hobbes, or Rousseau, Hegel or Comte, its ethical or pseudo-ethical substance is an immanent and absolute power. Where in Christian countries the State was conceived under the religious aspect, Catholic, Protestant, or Orthodox, the ethical premise was furnished by the religious conception, and disputes between the two

powers of State and Church turned on the limits or overlapping of their spheres, or the predominance of the men invested with the offices of Pope, King, Bishop, or Prince. Once the State had broken away from positive religion—in our case from Catholic Christianity—the struggle between the two ethical conceptions was a logical and inevitable consequence.

The State has not a mind or will of its own. It is the politico-judicial resultant of the minds and wills of its members. In it the theories of the ruling classes prevailing at a given period of history find realization. The formation of parties as the practical expression of theory and methods in respect of the State, is inherent in the nature of the modern State, whatever the form of government. It does not matter what aspect, potentialities, characters, or limits such parties assume. True parties are inspired by quasi-mystical motives and are based on a transcendental value, a faith. The liberal of 1848 was in this sense a mystic ; so was the communard of 1870, the radical democrat of 1880, the nationalist of 1914 ; and so are the Communists, Fascists, and Nazis of to-day.

In general, the quasi-mystical current coincides with an ideal to be realized and is therefore dynamic. When through achievement of power and the practice of government the ideal is lost and what has been achieved appears in its human poverty and with its unsatisfying limitations, other ideals will take its place, to inflame the heart and stir the imagination.

Between the two poles of an ideal to be realized and the practical result achieved, political parties pursue their activities on the plane of the State. And since the modern State precisely in virtue of its ethical character seeks to monopolize the whole field of social life, family, education, culture, public and private morality, law, religion, economics, general interests, and will not stop short on this road till it has reached a ' totalitarianism ' absorbing every value for its own ends, in the same way political parties, if they are of any importance, take their stand on the same premises, seeking to ensure the predominance of their doctrines and

their own ends. There is no serious modern party that does not aim at the mastery of a State envisaged as monopolizing for its own ends the whole activity of society. Where is the party that would deny State intervention in any and every domain of human personality, however sacred? Even the exponents of economic liberalism (if they still exist) do not hesitate to urge the State to interfere in religion and education. Not only Russia, Germany, and Italy are given over to extreme totalitarianism, but France too and even England are set on the same path. Faced with this state of affairs and with the continual impulse towards the deification of the State and the deification of parties through the various symbols representing their ends—for nationalists make a god of the nation, socialists of the class, Nazis of the race, and so on—what is the duty of true Christians who will not worship any god but the True God?

This is the problem of Christian charity in political life, of which I was increasingly aware the more deeply I went into active politics, and still feel to-day when I am remote from them. Why charity? Not only because of the duty of enlightening those who are in error, of bringing back to the right road those who have gone astray, of helping to raise those who have fallen, but in order to prepare suitable means for a healthy and Christian politico-ethical orientation of public life. So long as the modern State is not seen in its true colours as a Moloch to which all to-day burn continual incense, so long as the parties which make the State—or surrogates of the State such as nation, class, or race—their end are not seen in the same light, it will not be possible to speak seriously of morality, still less of charity, in political life. Indeed there is the danger that we too may go astray and set our grain of incense before these new and at the same time ancient divinities.

It was for this reason that the promoters of the Italian Popular Party, in launching their appeal to the country on January 18, 1919, declared their will to substitute for the actual conception of the State a new conception: 'For a centralizing State, seeking to restrict all organizing powers and all civic and individual activities, we would

substitute, on a constitutional ground, a State truly *popular*, recognizing the limits of its activity, respectful of natural centres and organizations—the family, classes, municipalities—respectful of the rights of human personality and encouraging private initiative. . . .¹

The conception of the State which we called Popular (in contradistinction to the *centralizing* State, to-day become *totalitarian*) is founded on the method of liberty, through an exigency not only political but also moral. Only in a régime of freedom will it be possible to wage war against *pan-étatisme*, the absorption of all ethical and social values in the State, and against the application of the theory that the State is the end and individuals the means: 'everything for the State.' Under a modern authoritarian régime not only practical struggle, but even theoretical struggle against State centralization is impossible (the experiences of Russia, Italy, and Germany are conclusive), for such States cannot admit of ethical dissent. The State in itself is ethics, in the sense that it is morality and the fount of morality, law and the fount of law. The State demands sterilization laws, racial marriages, pagan education, and all this is to be right and just because the State wills it.

When it is said that Catholics as members of the Church are free to choose their political conception, since this is a matter of opinion, the statement is absolutely true from the Christian standpoint, but always on condition that it is a question of the form of government apart from its content. In fact it is possible to have a constitutional monarchy as in England or Belgium, and an authoritarian republic as in France under Combes and . . . others. The problem facing all true Catholics is not this but another: whether they can in conscience accept, or, worse, promote, a State régime that denies civil and political liberties, thus depriving themselves of the necessary instruments for asserting, or in any case defending, moral values in public life.

Frequent and violent attacks were made on the Popular Party on the question of our sincerity in defending a programme of freedom. We had made freedom our banner,

¹ L. Sturzo, *Italy and Fascismo*, Faber & Gwyer, 1926, p. 92.

for we held that under the post-war Italian State true freedom did not exist, through excess of State intervention and monopolies, extending to education, local government, and trade. Our motto was *Libertas*, inscribed on our banners and on little shields, on the cross of the Guelf Communes of the Middle Ages. The proof of our sincerity was provided by events ; our attitude towards Fascism was maintained with courage and sacrifice. And yet even to-day there are ex-adversaries who repeat that apart from the sincerity of individuals, the Popolari did not and do not represent more than a political minority, alien to the thought and sympathies of Catholics of every country, who are nearly all for the authoritarian State.

It is true that the active groups among us have always been a *pusillus grex*, but this cannot be understood by adversaries alien to Christian thought. It is indisputable that not all Catholics realize that in the modern political system the choice does not lie between a so-called Christian or Catholic State (which is non-existent) and a liberal or agnostic State, nor even between the *bourgeois* State and the Bolshevik State, but between a régime of law and opinion and a régime of dictatorial authority, whether of Right or Left. Let us be clear. Either régime to-day is founded on a monistic conception of the State, which we cannot approve, but in a régime of law and opinion the citizen can play his part, there is something he can say, while in the other his role is reduced to applause and adulation. In the first case he can still defend his principles in a legal way and organize in fighting groups, while in the second he cannot. In the first he may succeed by means of the political parties in gaining a place in the Government or in directing it, upholding his own ideas, defending Christian morality, and seeking to give the State a less pagan ethos ; in the second he can do nothing but offer his personal sacrifice for the sake of a future not yet in sight.

We will pass over the practical experiences of Catholics under dictatorships, for whom the problem of a choice no longer exists. It exists instead for the Catholics of France, Spain, Belgium, Holland, and elsewhere, and even

in England, where British Fascism finds no few sympathizers among young Catholics. Do Catholics find that the Fascisms of the various countries (whatever name they may adopt) possess that minimum of morality without which membership or even support must transform itself into a 'co-operation in evil,' in the sense in which the phrase is used by the moralists?

Here is a grave problem which must be considered. From 1919 to 1922 in Italy it tormented those Catholics who, while dissenting from the programme and methods of the Popular Party, saw all the dangers implied by Fascism. If they were to become Fascists (and a certain number did so, while others, landowners and bankers, gave money and support), they would have liked to see the revolver and the bludgeon used simply for intimidation and not in earnest. But a party of action cannot act merely as a scarecrow, especially when young men are supplied with a uniform, revolvers, and bludgeons, organized in militarized bodies and imbued with hatred of their adversaries and scorn of life, especially of the life of others. In the most acute period of the struggle in Italy statistics showed not less than a hundred dead a month, Fascists on the one hand, Socialists, Communists, and Catholics on the other, not to speak of the wounded, of the burning of co-operative premises, the sacking and destruction of Catholic clubs, Popular Party offices, and private houses. The Pope made a famous gesture when he sent a large sum of money to the Catholic Young Men's Clubs in Brianza, which had been destroyed by the Fascists because of the result of the elections, in April 1924. None the less, Catholics, including a few priests and religious, might be seen in the Fascist ranks when in October 1922 they made their march on Rome.

My friends round Venice, who were most exposed to Fascist reprisals, often asked me whether it would not be well, for purely defensive purposes, to form bands of young men in *white* shirts, but I forbade it unequivocally. We had our victims, but no member of our organizations stained his hands in blood. The theory of 'useful violence'

is at the basis of every Fascism ; the organization of armed bands is their means of winning power ; the totalitarian conception of the State is fundamental to them. Does this allow room for Christian charity ?

The question might seem fatuous, but from the day when Fascism won success in Italy, not a few Catholics have asked themselves whether it would not be better to accept a totally authoritarian régime in order that religion should be respected (they believe it is respected in Italy to-day), rather than to have to deal with secular democracies which are often anti-clerical. To certain of my Spanish friends (not members of the *Ceda*) who a month before the revolt in the Asturias and Catalonia (October 1934) asked me if it would not be better to support a *coup d'état*, not so much to restore the Monarchy as to create a civil or military dictatorship and to prevent the domination of the Left, I replied (and I wrote an article to the same effect) that they had not the patience God has. They always want an immediate remedy for an evil present or seemingly to come. Hence they look benevolently on violent *coups*, while scorning or failing to appreciate in the same way the force of organization, education, persuasion in the civil and political field, for such methods are slow or take very long to show their effect, while the *coup d'état*, when it succeeds, gives an immediate impression of success and security.

Unhappily, as often as the champions of a good, honest, moral idea wish to impose it by force, they spoil it, and produce instead feelings of reaction and hatred. I do not question the use of force by the State in accordance with the law, to preserve public order and repress crime ; what I deny is the use of force, by the State, or worse still by private individuals, to obtain a political advantage or to enforce conformity.

If the problem is thus envisaged, Catholics of countries where the faculty of choice is still allowed them are obliged more often than they realize to choose between the method of liberty and that of force, or rather between constitutional and legal methods and revolutionary, illegal, and violent methods. Although for the most part Catholic moralists

and writers will naturally opt for legality and against the use of force, at the same time the concealed or avowed sympathies of not a few, even among friars, monks, and priests, will be with the parties of the Right, which are well armed, are supported by the clamorous youth of the universities, and do not rule out violent *coups d'état*—those *coups d'état* that have often been the dream of certain Catholic circles that have lost touch with reality. Of this France knows something, from the days of Napoleon Bonaparte onwards.

What may seem morally inconsistent is that they themselves would never take part in violent ventures, and perhaps had never had a revolver or a bludgeon in their possession. They would shrink from hitting a political adversary simply because he was an adversary; they would not hurt a fly. They would never go about cutting telegraph and telephone wires, or cutting off light and water. Ecclesiastics, moreover, by their nature shrink from bloodshed. But the men of whom we speak, with no remorse of conscience, would encourage, approve, and defend those like Hitler, Mussolini, Maurras, or Franco, or other *condottieri*, real or imagined, great or small, who collect arms and train young men for the desired *coup*. Such Catholics and ecclesiastics do not want the risks of Fascism, but they want its advantages. But do they believe that they are thus free from offence against Christian charity and morality, and cannot be charged with co-operating in evil? Or do they believe that the end, a given order in the State, justifies the illegal and violent means used by the various forms of Fascism for its attainment? Or do they believe that the order to be inaugurated will not imply that deification of the State that is in the spirit of totalitarianism, and must deprive Catholics themselves of all human means of combating State pantheism?

If we rule out the revolutionary parties of Right and Left and the anti-clerical parties, Catholics on the Continent are left to choose between the old innocuous parties of the Right (for the most part small personal groups, of a liberal and *bourgeois* mentality) and parties of social renovation inspired by Christian principles. For some time past

there has been a curious lack of sympathy for such parties, particularly in Belgium. The German Centre, after its fall, came in for sharp criticism, even in England, and was accused of having prejudiced religious interests. A distrust of such parties is spreading in intellectual circles, especially among those who have never taken an active part in political life, or in Catholic trade union and economic organizations.

If justice is to be done to what have been known as the 'Catholic' parties (the custom of calling them so is most regrettable, but had at one time its justification), it must not be forgotten how great a function they have fulfilled, from 1848 onwards, in the defence of Catholic principles. To-day a confessional party is no longer desirable; the Popular Party was non-confessional, and never compromised either the Holy See or the Italian Episcopate. It could therefore assume weighty political responsibilities and fall under the blows of Fascism *at its own risk*. Such indeed was the phrase used by Cardinal Gasparri in December 1918, when he gave me leave to found the party before the raising of the *non expedit*. The *non expedit* was rescinded only in November 1919.

Catholics in constitutional countries have three paths open to them. They may form a party of their own (as in Belgium, Holland, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland), distinct from Catholic Action and with no political dependence on the Episcopate. Or they may join the legally constituted parties of the Right, at the same time forming groups of their own, inspired by Christian aims, as in France. Or they may belong indifferently to all and any of the parties of the country, as in Great Britain and the United States. What my experience has invariably shown me is that when, on the Continent, Catholics become members of purely political parties, they not only lose the sense of a moral and social apostolate possessed by parties of Christian inspiration, but they become too attached to the material and utilitarian aims of politics, failing to discern honest methods from those that may be described as questionable, and often finding themselves an ineffectual minority, overwhelmed by a majority at once too material-minded and . . . realistic.

For Catholics a party means not merely a political instrument, but an ideal and ethical content.

The December evening of 1918, when a group of forty friends, assembled at Rome in the Via dell'Umiltà (a name suited to a *pusillus grex*), decided on the foundation of the Popular Party remains unforgettable for all. It was midnight when we came away. On a spontaneous impulse, as we passed the neighbouring church of Santi Apostoli, we knocked at the door; it was the nocturnal adoration. The lay brother who opened was alarmed at the sight of so many people, but my soutane reassured him. In that hour of adoration I saw before me the tragedy of my life. I had asked nothing, sought nothing; I had remained an ordinary priest. In order to give myself up to Catholic Action in the social and administrative field I had resigned my chair of philosophy; now after twenty-five years so spent I was leaving Catholic Action to give myself up exclusively to politics; I saw the peril before me and I wept. In that hour I accepted my new post as head of the Popular Party with bitterness in my heart, but in a spirit of apostolate and sacrifice. Why not? A priest in politics was an exception, especially in Italy, but there were others in other countries. At that time Catholics were returning in a body to the public life of Italy after half a century of abstention in obedience to the papal *non expedit*; it was not unfitting that a priest should be with them. But it was not unfitting solely because the Popular Party, though unwilling to be called a Catholic party and with no political dependence on the Hierarchy, took its stand on Christian morality and the method of liberty.

A step further. Even parties of Christian inspiration, with noble aims and the pure purpose of serving their country, run the risk of forming a coterie and yielding to an egotistic *esprit de corps*—like every other human group, whether family, class, or professional body. Every time such an *esprit de corps* becomes a chain, it must be

broken through ; the interests of the country must come before those of any party.

Here is a difficulty. Up to what point are the interests of the party identical with those of the country, and up to what point may the latter coincide with those of an opposing party ? To apply the rule is more difficult than to formulate it. One of the accusations often made by the Liberal and Democratic adversaries of the Italian Popular Party was precisely that it put its interests or views before those of the country at large. Unhappily they, who had a majority in the Cabinet, two-fifths of the Chamber, and nine-tenths of the Senate, had the habit of identifying their ideals, views, and interests with those of the country, and we, on whose support they depended for their parliamentary majority, disturbed their rhythm by our ideas.

For three years the Popular deputies had to wage a stalwart and subtle battle in order to introduce a small measure of freedom of education for the benefit of Catholic schools by demanding State examinations. Three Bills were arranged for with the governments of the day, one presented by Croce the philosopher (Liberal), a second by the scientist Corbino (Democrat), the third by Anile, a doctor and man of letters (*Popolare*). But in the Chamber the Democrats and Liberals allied themselves with the Socialists and treated the Bills as the French deputies in the past have treated Proportional Representation, stifling them in the toils of parliamentary procedure. Before the threat of the Popolari to leave the Cabinet, they replied that the times were difficult (at one moment it was D'Annunzio's raid on Fiume, at another the Rapallo Treaty, at others Socialist strikes or Fascist assaults), and that our demand for equal opportunities for Catholic schools was a wasting of time on trifles.

Giolitti gave me a similar answer in a dramatic conversation, the last I had with him. It was at the time of the occupation of the factories in certain centres of Northern Italy. The Catholic workers of the Italian Confederation of Workers (known as the 'whites') were for workers' co-partnership, while the Socialists demanded workers' control.

Giolitti agreed with the latter to bring in a Bill for workers' control, refusing to further the Bill sponsored by the Christian trade unions. I asked him to agree that the two Bills should both be introduced by the Government and left to a free vote. He refused, and to my remarks replied with evident ill humour: 'I know the interests of the country; you are considering those of your trade unions.' I replied vigorously that the interests of the country did not mean putting industry under a political control and rejecting what would be a real advantage for the working classes, and I concluded: 'Your policy is a capitulation to the Socialist Party.'

The same charge was levelled against the Popolari when they made their collaboration in the Government conditional on a Bill for the colonization of the Italian latifundia¹ and the reform of agricultural contracts. After long and tiresome formalities the Bill passed the Chamber; when Mussolini came into power it was before the Senate. He withdrew it, in *odium auctoris*. But if it had passed it would have been possible to establish three hundred thousand peasants in Central and Southern Italy. The expenditure envisaged was a thousand million lire, to be spread over twenty years. Perhaps it would have been insufficient, but how many thousand millions have still to be spent on colonizing Abyssinia in order to establish there far fewer than three hundred thousand peasants?

Practical mistakes are always possible, whether one acts in the name of a party or in the name of the country. But whatever may be the views of the various parties, the moral estimation of an action or undertaking must be fundamental, and must precede any further judgement as to the advisability of accepting or rejecting a proposal, whether it be made in the name of the country or in that of a party. It is clear that when a party is seeking to prevail over others it may prejudice the common good, but it is also evident to those belonging to a party that the common good coincides with the conception they have formed of it through the ideas

¹ *Latifundia*, the big uninhabited estates, cultivated on a primitive system for cereals only.—*Translator's Note*.

of their party. Therefore Catholics, when they are not bound to parties other than those of Christian inspiration, are better disposed to feel the impulse of morality and love of their neighbours, which will enable them, in so far as possible, to overcome party spirit and egotism.

I say 'in so far as possible' because there are times when passions run so high that this possibility is reduced to a minimum. Take, for instance, the Dreyfus case. The majority of French Catholics were not able to rise above an egotistic *esprit de corps*, nor to remember the duty of justice and charity. The same may be said in respect of anti-semitism in every country. I believe that if German Catholics had adopted an attitude of frank defence of the Jews in the first moment of Nazi persecution in 1933, they would not only have done their duty as Christians, but would have formed an invaluable front of resistance. War, too, brings a spiritual blindness, when the limits of morality and immorality can no longer be discerned. This is one of the most serious phenomena, weighing upon the political life of all countries, and Catholics are only rarely and in small numbers immune from war psychosis.

I have no clear recollection of the attitude of Italian Catholics to the war in Africa in 1895-96. In general, they were hostile to Crispi, who was an anti-clerical, a Freemason, and a nationalist. My own first journalistic campaign was against Crispi, and in this local motives were also involved; Crispi was the Liberal candidate for my Caltagirone. As far as I remember, the majority of Catholics were against what was then called the 'African adventure,' but I do not remember whether among their motives was the question of the just war. This question was raised in respect of the Libyan war of 1911, but the few of us who held that the war was not a just one found little response. The Catholic working classes were hostile to it simply because it was a war, apart from its intrinsic morality or immorality. Many of the middle classes on the other hand favoured it. The Bank of Rome, then in the hands of the Roman Clericals, had carried out a work of financial penetration in Libya and had helped to prepare for the conquest. The Catholic

Corriere d'Italia and *Corriere di Sicilia* fervently supported the Libyan campaign. Under these conditions, in view of my position as Mayor of Caltagirone, and holding other public offices, I thought best to adopt a prudent reserve.

Far graver for us Italian Catholics was the question of entry into war in 1914-15. I was then Secretary-General of Italian Catholic Action. The majority were for neutrality. They were not on the side of the Central Empires, for the war went beyond the spirit and letter of the treaty of the Triple Alliance, but neither were they against our allies. Moreover, it was thought just and moral to demand from Austria the cession of Trento, Gorizia, and Trieste, but 'sacred egoism' did not seem a principle that could justify war. Only small groups of Catholics favoured war for the sake of helping Belgium and France as unjustly attacked. At the beginning of May 1915 the Central Board of Catholic Action thought well, in order to give a guiding line to Catholics in general, to publish an appeal which, prudent though it was, in substance favoured intervention on the side of the Entente. This aroused sharp hostility among many Catholics and a certain anxiety in the Vatican. I was attacked by the neutrality party because I admitted the principle of intervention (though on condition our army could be more adequately prepared for it), and by the intervention party because I would not have it based on the principle, to me unjust and immoral, of 'sacred egoism.'

In regard to this, perhaps I may be allowed the following personal reminiscence: I was on the Capitol when Salandra (I think it was on May 6, 1915) read his famous speech on 'sacred egoism.' The crowd applauded, but I did not, and this was noticed. On my return to Caltagirone, students organized a pro-war demonstration which ended as a demonstration against myself. The Town Hall, where I was, was attacked, windows broken, lights put out, paving-stones torn up, with other acts of violence characteristic of student outbursts (*vide* the Latin Quarter of Paris). When I reproached the local chief of police for his inaction, he replied that he had done his duty 'within the limits of instructions received'!

In 1919 came D'Annunzio's raid on Fiume. In spite of the sympathy of one or two Popular deputies and of a few Catholic literary centres, the Party was hostile to the adventure and supported Giolitti's Government both in drawing up the Rapallo Treaty with Jugoslavia and in sending the fleet which, with a few shots, brought the provisional Government to an end. The Nationalists were furiously angry with us. The Popular Party was against the raid on Corfu, 1923. Unhappily, in a moment of incomprehension and national excitement, my friend, Giuseppe Donati, editor of the *Popolo* (the Party organ), wished to side with the Government on grounds of national honour. It was a transient phase, repaired a hundred times over when he led the campaign against the murder of Matteotti and denounced General de Bono to the Senate for complicity. He ended in exile, and to-day lies in a Paris cemetery.

It is melancholy to compare the present position of Italian Catholics with the freedom with which, whether organized in a party or no, from 1895 onwards they were able to play their part in forming public opinion in cases of actual or threatening war. No one living in Italy dared or was able to write against Mussolini's invasion of Abyssinia. No one was able to question the morality and justice of it. The Pope's words were never published in their entirety in any Italian paper (the *Osservatore Romano* is extra-territorial). No Catholic or ecclesiastic has been able to comment or recall the papal utterances, prudent as they were, by word or writing. And there is worse. All will remember how it was said that the Archbishop of Monreale in Sicily had handed over the church treasures to the Fascist authorities to help with the war. It was a lie, but it has never been possible to publish a refutation of it. I have before me a letter from a well-informed personage who vouches for this monstrous fact. And on the other hand, there are the Catholics who believe they can justify the war from a moral standpoint, to whom is given every facility for propaganda, as to ecclesiastics who grow lyrical over the advance of civilization, the abolition of slavery, and even Catholic evangelization, to justify so monstrous a war.

But even to these much must be forgiven, when we realize that war creates a fearful psychosis, which it is hard to resist alone without the help and solidarity of groups and parties, and the support of strong ideals and moral sentiments shared by currents of public opinion. All this is impossible in totalitarian régimes like that of Italian Fascism.

It is more difficult to excuse those who nourish such a war psychosis in time of peace, by inculcating feelings of hatred and vengeance between peoples or parties. Five or six years after peace had been concluded, I heard French boys from Catholic schools speak with an incredible hatred and contempt of the *Boches*. To one of them (it was in 1925) I said : 'Be careful, my son ; the *Boches* are our brothers and Christians like ourselves.' He replied roughly : 'Neither brothers, nor Christians.' In France this detestable idea is becoming a theory. Max Hermant, in his *Idoles Allemandes* (a book in many respects interesting and well written), leaves an impression that 'Germanism' is a fundamental and almost deterministic character. If this were true, Christianity could never reach the souls of Germans, which is an absurdity. But is not this the opinion of General Castelnau, the acknowledged leader of French Catholics, expressed in an article in the *Echo de Paris* of March 15, 1936 ? 'This impudent fanaticism,' he wrote, 'will not surprise those minds that have sounded the depths of the Germanic race ; it has only superficially renounced its barbaric origins. Witikind's conversion to Christianity has not modified its deeper essence.' Is it not arbitrary and unjust to attribute to all Germans the violation of the Locarno Treaty by Hitler (who is certainly no descendant of Witikind) ? And is it not absurd to differentiate between the Christianity of the Germans and, let us say, that of the French, and to deny that the former can be true Christians ?

What would General Castelnau say of the Italians ? For Mussolini has violated several treaties, and, what is more (what Hitler has not done yet), he has attacked an almost unarmed or ill-armed people. Are the Italians too only half converted to Christianity ? No, in the case

of the Italians, the barbarians are the Abyssinians, 'dirty negroes,' as the *Echo de Paris* calls them, an inferior race. Where they are concerned there is no harm in breaches of faith, in the bombing of Red Cross ambulance stations, the use of poison gas against civil populations, or in massacres, euphemistically termed battles, in which, according to the Italian bulletins, there may be one thousand dead and wounded on the one side, and fifteen or twenty thousand on the other.

This moral insensibility is not confined to a few. Did not the French Catholic Academician, M. Madelin, glorify the 'avenging' of Adowa in the *Echo de Paris* at least three times? And be it noted that after the defeat of Adowa (1896) there was a treaty of peace. Since then there have been various treaties of amity and commerce between Italy and Abyssinia, the last that of 1928; the Emperor Haile Selassie was received in Rome by King Victor Emmanuel and Mussolini with sovereign honours and signs of great friendship. No one in Italy at that time thought or wished to avenge Adowa—an honourable defeat, in any case, in which a small force, hopelessly outnumbered, surrendered only after firing its last shot—any more than the French to-day want to avenge Waterloo. But, for M. Madelin and others, that old Italian defeat had become a matter of national honour, for the sake of which thousands of Ethiopians must be slain, like scapegoats offered in sacrifice to the spirits of the Italian soldiers who died in 1896. Is this Christian charity in political life? Are these feelings that should be spread among Catholics and by Catholics?

In conclusion: a Catholic in a régime of freedom cannot remain isolated and alien from the life of the modern State, which has assumed many characteristics and cultural and moral functions that it once had not, and now controls almost all the forces of society. If the Catholic remains aloof, he assumes grave responsibilities before God and his neighbour, for too often this means abandoning the common weal to those who do not recognize the laws of Christian morality. In uniting with non-Catholics, a Catholic, if he will not co-operate in evil, must not countenance either an

anti-religious policy, or immoral methods or exclusively material ends. Nor can he (in my modest opinion) associate himself with parties that seek to establish dictatorial forms of government and to suppress civil and political liberties, for thus he would co-operate in making the State the master of bodies and souls, persons and things, in the public and private domain, and in creating a permanent discrimination between the dominant party and those subject to it. Finally, it is essential that Catholics should always preserve their own moral personality and religious character, in order to withstand the egotistic tendencies of nation, party, class, trade, or professional group, and this not only in the name of religion, but also in the name of their social and political convictions.

VII

GERMANISM AND CHRISTIAN CIVILIZATION

LICTORS' RODS AND CROOKED CROSS

FASCIST Italy has adopted the emblem of ancient Rome, Nazi Germany that of Teutonic tradition. Both seek to establish a genealogical tree that will show an historical continuity—that of the Roman Empire in the case of Italy, that of the Aryan race in the case of Germany. It is easy for the historian to show the incoherence of this claimed continuity. The Fascist myth and the Nazi myth have no such heraldic origin; they are phenomena of the day, and their vitality will not carry them beyond the brief circle of historical reactions. For history, twenty or fifty years is the moment of a phase. We should serve no purpose in seeking to play the prophet and determine here and now how long these two adventures will endure; a few years more or a few years less are no matter. What matters is the significance of Italian and German happenings. They are so akin as to appear identical, a model and its copy, and at the same time they are so remote as to seem worlds apart.

One of the most characteristic phenomena was the similarity of state of mind of the opponents of the new régimes. Liberals, Democrats, Popolari and Centre, and Socialists, both in Italy and Germany, were convinced of their power to bar the way to Mussolini and Hitler. The Germans had before their eyes the example of Italy, but did not profit by it. They believed that their case was different and the danger of a dictatorship imaginary. A friend of mine who in 1931 warned certain leaders of the Centre of the imminent catastrophe, received the arrogant reply: 'We are not Italians!' Not only in France and

England, but in Germany, too, the idea was current that Fascism was an excellent system—for Italians. When it was too late, many Germans, no longer able to express themselves aloud, realized in their hearts two fundamental facts: first, that the outstanding error, in Germany as in Italy, was that of allowing private associations and political parties to arm themselves; secondly, that no political party can endure if it has two simultaneous policies, one for home and one for abroad.

The armed bands were allowed in Germany by the democratic and republican governments as a way of evading the restrictions imposed by the Treaty of Versailles and of giving military training to the young men. Here was at once a political error and moral duplicity, and no party can be exonerated, not even the Centre, not even the Social-Democrats. Both, from the first period of the Weimar Constitution, yielded to pressure from the generals, who from behind the scenes continued to guide German policy towards rearmament and revenge.

We cannot here discuss the position in which Germany was placed by the Treaty of Versailles. The political and psychological error of the Entente Powers was immense. We cannot lay on Germany the whole blame for what ensued, for it would be unjust to do so. But the Centre and the Social-Democrats, who for thirteen years (1919-1932) governed the Reich, could have carried out a constructive policy and restored confidence in Germany. Their error was fatal.

At bottom there was a conflict of ideas and policies that the Weimar Constitution had failed to resolve. The Social-Democrats were Marxist, they had preached the advent of the working classes through the class war and a victory over *bourgeois* capitalism, and yet they were obliged to govern a *bourgeois* republic, within the limits of a régime on a liberal and democratic basis, in alliance with the Catholic Centre and under military influences. The German Socialists resolved their contradictory position through bureaucracy. Like all good organizers in Germany, they were accustomed to the bureaucratic system in their co-operative societies,

banks, and trade unions, so that the cream of the Party was simply a class of clerks with a fixed salary. Just as the Social-Democratic Party resolved itself into a bureaucracy, so did the Government of the separate states and of the Reich itself. For propaganda, a proclamation of principles and the repetition of Marxist dogma sufficed.

The greater portion of the Centre disliked the necessity of political collaboration with the Social-Democrats, either from religious feelings or because of the rivalry between the Catholic and Socialist trade unions. Many had no belief in the Weimar policy, but sought to carry it out, *faute de mieux*, as a duty towards their country in a melancholy and difficult period. This feeling of duty—which was not without nobility—rested on an equivocal situation that could have resolved itself only in favour of democracy. Few of the Centre were truly democratic and republican—as was the Chancellor Wirth, who was unable to do much owing to the influence of the Right in his Cabinet and the weakness of his foreign policy.

It thus came about that behind the Socialist and Catholic façade of power and their vigorous trade union organizations, the militaristic training of youth was increasingly restored, the generals and the army recovered the influence they had lost through the defeat, and with hatred against Versailles there grew up a corresponding hatred against the Weimar Constitution, which had made the 'dictation' of the Peace Treaty possible and had recognized German war guilt. If this was the result of German home policy, it could not fail to have its repercussions on foreign policy. The French, who have always been the most alive to the domestic fluctuations of Germany, never believed in these republican democrats, because they saw their equivocal basis, which in foreign policy became a double game, now skilful, now grotesque. The French Right magnified the facts in order to justify its own insane policy, but the facts were there.

We cannot here discuss German foreign policy, which after Wirth and Rathenau was associated with the name of Stresemann. The ambiguous position created at Genoa by

the Treaty of Rapallo with Russia (1922), of which Rathenau was the chief author, continued with Stresemann through all the subsequent phases, such as Locarno, Germany's entry into the League of Nations, the Thoiry talks, the evacuation of the Rhine, the Young Plan, the attempted *Anschluss* with Austria. These developments of foreign policy had been accompanied by the growth of nationalist forces and the Hitler movement, the armed bands, the influence of the army on the life of the country, the agitation for treaty revision. And when honest Brüning in 1931, at London, put his cards on the table to make France and England understand that he stood on the edge of an abyss, he obtained only delays and refusals. Tardieu at the Hague and Laval in London must bear the greatest responsibility for what followed. France ended by giving way over reparations at Lausanne (July 1932) and over the right of parity of armaments at Geneva (December 1932), conceding to von Papen and Schleicher what she had denied to Brüning for two years.

All this seems and is so remote from what happened in Italy from 1919 to 1922 that many think it superficial to draw comparisons. And yet at bottom there are psychological and political factors in the Italian Fascist movement that show many points of contact with German Nazism. In Italy, too, if the democratic governments of the day had not permitted the formation of the armed bands, the Fascist adventure would not have assumed the character it did, nor would it have been able to overthrow the Liberal constitutional system on which the Italian State rested. These assertions after Mussolini's success seem not only anachronistic, but unfounded. Success, unhappily, covers even its very causes and renders them remote and almost non-existent. Man sees a success simply as success, just as a dazzling light is seen as just a light, and not as the lamp from which it comes. When success is over, then it becomes more possible to see its origin and nature. For those who like myself have lived through the phases of the Fascist

success, it is easier to analyse the facts and find their reasons.¹

A normal government in a régime of opinion as in Great Britain and France can canalize any political movement that has lawful methods and aims, and it can justly repress any violation of moral and positive law. To allow the existence of armed irregulars, to tolerate their acts of violence and personal or collective crimes, with the acquiescence of the police and the indulgence of the magistrates, proves that a Government has lost its necessary authority, or that it is using such means for unlawful and partisan ends. Under Giolitti's Government the Fascists were secretly supplied with arms from the military stores. The Government encouraged this, while ready to repudiate those responsible if they were openly accused.

Two motives had led the Italian *bourgeoisie* to turn towards Fascism—fear of a coalition of Socialists and Popolari who would have given a preponderance to the working classes and peasants in the political field, and hence in the economic field; and the nationalistic spirit, fomented by the Fiume question and the conviction that in the Peace Conference Italy was being treated like a poor relation by the Entente Powers. The Liberal-Democrats, Giolitti's following, and the Liberals of the Right who paved the way for the advent of Fascism, reasoned in pretty much the same way as Hugenberg and von Papen in regard to Hitler. They thought they could make use of Fascism to hold the Socialists and Popolari in check (the Communists at that time counted for little); thus they hoped to be able to keep the Liberal *bourgeoisie* in power as it had been for half a century, during which its merits and faults had both been indisputable.

Mussolini, during the months of September and October of 1922, seemed to confirm their faith in him. He repudiated his republicanism, thus removing a bar to his becoming a minister of the King of Italy. At the same time, through trusted emissaries, he was treating with the three leaders of

¹ See *Italy and Fascism*, which Don Sturzo wrote in the first year of his exile. This analysis of the remote and proximate causes of the advent of Fascism was able to withstand the most searching criticism and has up till now been borne out only too well by events.—*Translator's Note.*

parliamentary liberalism, Giolitti, Orlando, and Salandra, showing himself prepared to become a member of their Cabinet. And meanwhile he was preparing the insurrection and the March on Rome. With the collapse of the old ruling class, Mussolini was able from a distance to impose his candidature as Prime Minister on the King, without going to Rome, but remaining in Milan, and putting forward as a condition that his thirty thousand followers should march armed through the streets of the capital. This march was the symbol of a taking of power that came not only from the King, but also through a revolution.

We are too accustomed to the habit of mind of historical determinism to appreciate either personal action or the influence of the small causes from which often the most remarkable changes depend. Everyone who has lived through a 'revolutionary' period knows how often a revolution springs from modest and often contradictory sources. To-day, thinking of the Great War, it is often said that it was prepared in the minds of the peoples, in its economic causes, in European policy, and hence the frequent conclusion that it was inevitable. But it is certain that without Sarajevo, without those two or three men in Vienna, who assumed the responsibility, and without the imprudent move of Russia who, though not wishing for war, mobilized her army, or without the indecision of Lord Grey who did not make it clear to Berlin that England would enter the field if Belgium were violated and France invaded, the war, that war of 1914, would not have broken out. Once it had done so, deterministic historians say that it was inevitable. So it is with Fascism, so with Nazism, so with all human happenings.

When in the summer of 1930 Dr. Brüning, having failed to come to an understanding with the Socialists, and seeking support on the Right, dissolved the Reichstag and called the elections for September, he was unconsciously repeating the same gesture as Giolitti made in the spring of 1921, when, in order to overcome the difficulties created for him

by both Socialists and Popolari, he dissolved the Chamber a bare fifteen months after the elections of November 1919, and thus facilitated the entry of Mussolini and the first Fascists into Parliament.¹ As we have seen, in Germany as in Italy, the existence of armed irregulars in the service of political parties was secretly favoured by the Government. In Germany as in Italy, though not to the same extent, the police failed to restrain the lawless enthusiasm of these armed youths, or to prevent their excesses. As in Italy, though again in a lesser degree, judges and courts were indulgent towards them. In Italy, indeed, one saw Fascisti who had killed or wounded their adversaries acquitted by the courts and borne in triumph by their supporters. In December 1922, a generous amnesty was proclaimed for all offences committed '*for national ends.*' Firm and timely measures should have been taken against these armed bands and the false nationalistic militarism, at once compromising, anti-educational, and anarchic. When in Germany Brüning and Gröner sought to do so, it was too late.

The circumstances in which the German Centre Party and the Bavarian Popular Party voted plenipotentiary powers to Hitler, resemble those of Italy, when on November 15, 1922, the Parliamentary Popular Party voted plenipotentiary powers to Mussolini. The Italian Popular Party was in its youth; if its 107 deputies (out of 535) had voted in opposition, Mussolini (like Hitler) would not have had the necessary majority. Their moral and political motives were almost identical with those of the German Centre and the Bavarian Popular Party. They thought to contribute to the pacification of the country and to the '*normalization*' (it was the word then current) of public life. On the flank of the victor, they would diminish the dangers of a government supported by over fifty thousand armed partisans.

Mussolini in these circumstances used a brutal frankness. He declared that '*of that grey gloomy House,*' he '*would make the bivouac of his Black Shirts,*' and that it depended

¹ This fact Don Sturzo recalled in an article published on October 3, 1930, in the Barcelona *El Mati*, in which he then forecast the fall of Brüning and the advent of Hitler to power.—*Translator's Note.*

on the Chamber itself '*whether it would live two days or two years.*' His armed bands had been busy burning co-operative and trade-union headquarters, and thus figuratively he burned Parliament. Hitler had the added satisfaction of seeing the Reichstag in actual and by no means figurative flames, just before the solemn opening. In both cases there was a like military array of armed irregulars. In Italy on November 15, 1922, Black Shirts, armed with daggers and revolvers, surrounded the Parliament House and thronged the galleries—all ready to force their way into the assembly had the vote gone against the Duce.

Unfortunately, violence once let loose and possessed of power cannot easily be bridled. Everywhere the excesses of the Fascist bands multiplied, with the sense of joy in victory, on the seizure of command. In every town there were 'Marches on Rome' in miniature. Municipal councils were forcibly dissolved, town-halls were occupied by the armed bands, and the leaders of opposition parties, if they escaped the castor-oil, the dagger-thrust, the revolver bullet, were forced to take flight, to go into hiding. It was at this time that in the night of December 17, in Turin, twenty-two workmen were murdered and thrown into the river on the pretext that they were Communists, and, while the city was still horrified by so terrible a tragedy, the Fascio of Turin received a telegram of congratulations from Mussolini's Under-Secretary, De Vecchi, who afterwards, having received the title of Count, became Ambassador to the Holy See.

Acts of violence continued. Mussolini's decision to legalize the armed irregulars under the name of National Militia, against the will of the Popular Party who desired their disbanding, pure and simple, hastened the calling of a National Congress of the Party. This Congress was held in Turin, in April 1923, in an atmosphere of national expectancy and attracting a host of adherents. The resolution passed put an end to equivocal collaboration in government, and is worth recalling: 'The Italian Popular Party confirms once more and with renewed faith, even after the recent political events, the Christian-democratic character, the spirit, the substance and the points of its programme; its

independence of organization, its specific reason for existence and its high aims, ethical, political, and economic ; it reaffirms its will to continue the fundamental battle for liberty and against any centralizing perversion in the name of the pantheistic State or deified nation ; it asserts its solidarity with those who suffer for the Idea and for internal peace, and invokes for the welfare of Italy respect for human personality and the spirit of Christian brotherhood.¹

What followed is well known. The Popular Party's struggle against Fascism, in the Chamber, in the Aventine Secession, in the Press, and in local meetings, lasted three years, till, in November 1926, the Party (like the other political parties) was dissolved by Government Decree ; and in Germany the Centre Party, after having voted plenipotentiary powers to Hitler, in 1933 disbanded itself of its own accord, under the threat—which it hoped thus to avert—of a persecution of the Catholic Church.

All that we have just recalled must seem a past buried in oblivion. Figures of the first rank in those days have been lost to view, and no longer have importance for public opinion, which lives hastily through the events of the day, straining into the future, a future of darkness and distress. Whatever the circumstances of their advent, Fascism and Nazism are the new factors of Italian and German life, and stamp their imprint on parties of other countries, which accept their theory, methods, and ends. But those who wish to study the political phenomena of to-day from the point of view of moral values and political orientation, must look back to the times when Nazism and Fascism organized themselves as parties and won power.

Both in Italy and in Germany they were faced by two powerful parties formed of Catholics, the one in its youth (the Popular Party), the other ripe, full of experience, glorious through its victory over Bismarck in the days of the *Kulturkampf*, and which, with Democrats, Liberals, and Socialists, had built the new German Republic. The resistance of Catholics on the political plane to the violence and disorders of Fascism and Nazism, was weakened

¹ *Italy and Fascismo*, p. 130.

(from inside and outside their respective parties) by nationalistic and economic preoccupations, by a confusion of the just claims of the workers with Bolshevizing propaganda, and by the opposition of the possessive classes to the collaboration of Catholics with Socialists. The Fascist and Nazi movements, in spite of their method of violence—indeed, it may be, because of it—were looked upon as a handy means of restoring order among the masses, where there was much unrest owing to the post-war crisis.¹ They were therefore encouraged by the banks, by the rich landowners, by big industrialists, and even by the General Staff of the army (in Italy they were favoured also by the Liberals then in power, such as Giolitti), and by certain sections of the clergy, both Catholic and Protestant, so that they received arms, money, help, and impunity. For more than a year, the year before the March on Rome, in Italy at least a hundred persons were killed a month, anti-Fascists and Fascists, in street fights and assaults on co-operative and trade union headquarters and Catholic clubs, many of which were burned.²

The moral resistance that should have been the chosen platform for all, whether Catholic or Protestant, who sought to engage in public life in accordance with the principles of Christian morality, proved ineffectual because both Nazism and Fascism were looked upon more as political than as ethical phenomena. It is true that the Bishop of Mainz and other German Bishops in 1929-30 forbade Catholics to belong to Hitler's party, under pain of serious canonical penalties, but these measures were local, confined to three or four dioceses, and were not carried to their full extent because the wealthy classes, even when they were Catholic, supported Hitler, while the Government of the Reich itself used him as a bogey to frighten France, as an

¹ This unrest was general after the war. It will be remembered that in England the Prime Minister, Mr. Lloyd George, thought it necessary to put up barbed-wire barricades in Downing Street. It may be noted that very much the same elements as went to form the Fascist squads were utilized to form the Black and Tans in Ireland.

² When in April 1924 the Catholic clubs of Brianza were destroyed by Fascists, Pius XI caused a protest to be made to the Fascist Government and sent half a million Lire to the clubs concerned.—*Translator's Notes.*

instrument of national policy, and as a means of holding the Communists in check. When Hitler came into power and declared that he would respect the Christian churches, Protestant and Catholic, the Bishops practically withdrew their ecclesiastical measures against the Nazis. Thus the Concordat between the Reich and the Vatican was achieved.

GERMANY ON THE ROAD TO APOSTASY

When the Nazis began to persecute the Jews, waging war on the Semitic race in the name of the Nordic or Aryan race, Catholics and Protestants, the hierarchy, the religious Press and associations, nearly all kept silence. Some even assented to the anti-Jewish campaign for various reasons or from feelings and resentments which, although not wholly without grounds, were none the less inopportune and unchristian. Neither Catholics nor Protestants realized that the race theory, which provided the motive or pretext for anti-Jewish persecution, contained in germ the motives for a radical struggle against the essence of Christianity. Not only this, but there were scholars who even in the religious Press began to defend the racial principle, to give it an ideological consistency, such as the German mind demands, and develop it into a sociological philosophy.

The idea of the Chosen People is not new to Germany. It might be considered an idea taken from hated Judaism and transferred to a bio-sociological plane, to imply a principle of selection giving a species of right of rulership over inferior races and peoples. This idea, which the Nazis have carried to extremes, found temperate exponents among those Catholics and Protestants who like to establish an immediate agreement between religion and the latest dicta of 'science' or politics. The reaction against such theories was feeble, just as feeble as the reaction against the persecution of the Jews. But the logic of events is more powerful than the logic of our reasonings. Once the race has been established as a principle of superiority, it demands special rights and seeks to become itself the fount of law. Hence legislation classifying the citizens of the State according to race, providing for

divorce or forbidding marriage in cases of racial difference, making race a differential criterion in civil and criminal justice, and so on.

All these were steps in the path towards a war on Christianity. The last step was easily taken. For Christ there is neither Jew nor Greek, Gentile nor barbarian, all are equal before God. The race asserts itself by force and in warfare, Christ brings love and peace. The assertion of racial superiority is an assertion of pride. Christ wishes us to be humble. Christ cannot be the symbol of a race; there must needs be special symbols, differentiated as the races are differentiated. Hence the recourse to the gods of pre-Christian Germany.

No one thinks that the Neo-Pagan Nazis believe in the miraculous powers of the divinities they are exhuming from the Nordic sagas, or that theirs is a faith in the Christian sense of the word, or in that of primitive peoples before they have known the light of the Gospels. These Neo-Pagans need imaginative symbols corresponding to the feelings aroused by the idea of the race as a sense of physical superiority, of national pride, of the will to power. They have asserted as principle the material fact of the blood, in the sense of biological participation in a community, in a clan embracing all Germany (purged of alien elements and the infiltration of disturbing ideas), and for this they need a symbol. This symbol calls for a cult; the cult of the Germanic race. Those who seek to bring to life Wotan or Baldur or Fricka cannot be taken seriously; these can mean only symbols or motives for festivals or dates to be noted in the calendar. For such men, and alas! for many Christians, the real divinity is Germany as race and nation. Christ and the Faith and Christian morality are abandoned for a new faith and a new morality. In this dualism, which grows more accentuated day by day, lies the beginning of the apostasy of the German people from the Christian faith.

Let it not be thought that we are exaggerating in using the word apostasy, or that we believe the extravagances of two or three million Neo-Pagans to be shared by the at least sixty million baptized Christians, Catholic and Protes-

tant. We are faced by an increasingly powerful current which mingles patriotic feelings with the turbid exaltation of racial materialism, religious symbols with semi-mystical philosophies, and which profits by the economic and national crisis to draw after it a considerable section of the people. The German is not an individualist like the other European peoples ; his instincts are gregarious, he loves the collective, he seeks for outward conformity, he needs leaders whom he may follow and in whom he can believe. Luther made three-quarters of Germany turn Protestant by gaining to his cause many princes to whom it was of advantage to break away from Rome or from the Holy Roman Empire. Luther proclaimed the principles of Free Enquiry and the Servile Will. In politico-social life free enquiry was reserved for the rulers and servile will was the portion of the people. Political conformity in religious matters was proclaimed in the *Pax Augustana* of 1555, with the famous formula : '*Cujus regio, illius et religio.*'

Now Hitler proclaims the Germanic race as an ethical principle, as fount of law, as an absolute. What more is required to transform it into a divinity ? Simply the repudiation of Christ. It is towards this that Nazism is tending, both in its intrinsic nature, and through the propaganda of its authorized leaders. Resistance must be made where the new idol, the divinized Germanic race, has been set up. Every concession to this new idol and to the affirmations, ethical, juridical, sociological, political, philosophical and religious, made in its name, is a step nearer to the repudiation of Christianity.

It is not the first time that, under a political colour, an attempt has been made to subvert Christian civilization and to crush freedom. The positivist influences which dried up the most vital sources of religion and morals and debased the significance of human freedom, are but of yesterday ; they still prevail among a wide zone of the middle classes and of the organized proletariat. Nor is it anything new for governments and parties on the Continent to engage in

anti-clericalism, even in religious persecution. Azaña is of yesterday, Combes well within living memory. What is most disturbing to the public mind to-day in the case of Germany is the attempt to replace the Christian religion and civilization by a religious mysticism, founded on the race.

A great number of Frenchmen and Spaniards were able, legally and morally, to fight Combes' legislation and Azaña's policy, on various fields, religious, political, and economic, and no one could identify Combes with France or Azaña with Spain. But in Germany, opposition is rendered practically impossible by the total lack of legal and moral freedom, by the suppression of legitimate means (speech, the Press, propaganda, associations), and by the identification of Hitler, of his Party, with the existence, character, and future of Germany. This identification, which is not only symbolic but practical, hampers the Catholic clergy and Protestant organizations in their defence of Christian faith and morals. Most significant was the cry of the Catholic bishops in their letter of August 20, 1935, a cry repeated with every paragraph: 'Stand fast in the faith!'

The chief danger lies in the assertion of the Race Principle, an assertion that is not only theoretical, pseudo-scientific, and even metaphysical, but practical, sentimental, mystical, political, and legal. To us who are not Germans, this divinization of the race may appear childish folly, but Germans accept it with gravity, conviction, obstinacy, faith, enthusiasm. They have finally found a basis for their superiority, for their rights as a people, and for their mission, in obedience to a new '*multiplicemini!*' They will remake a Western civilization that will dominate the world, at a time when the old civilization is mortally sick, doomed to inevitable death. And this conception is not the delirium of a few fanatics or merely a professorial thesis; it is the new Gospel that is being spread through every class in order to create a new spirit, a new Germany at the head of the world.

A French writer, François Perroux, who though not of the first rank, knows his Germany thoroughly, in his interesting book, *Les Mythes Hitlériens*, makes a searching analysis of the Germany of to-day, correcting many false impressions that are current, and bringing out how the conception of the Race coincides with the idea of the People. 'It is the German People that is the supreme reality, not the German nation. The People as a whole, with definite racial, historical, and psychological characteristics. One cannot enter a People; one cannot leave it at will. A man may enter a nation by becoming naturalized, he can leave it by acquiring foreign nationality.' This is the German view. For them the nation is static and determined within historical or arbitrary limits; the people is moulded by nature, it is a living whole in process of perpetual becoming. Thus the image is built up of a racial unity—a people of one blood; an end to be sought—the maintenance of the purity of the blood; a vitality derived from nature herself and evolving with unity of command, as by an inexorable determinism.

To deny the value of human personality, which Christianity has raised to supernatural ends, means always to fall into those doctrines by which the individual is lost in collectivity. The whole movement towards State exaltation tends in this direction. But there are differences. Mussolini's formula: 'Nothing outside the State, everything in the State, everything by the State, everything for the State,' implies an act of surrender and a subordination to the State as end, voluntary on the part of the Fascists and by them to be imposed on others. It has therefore a pseudo-ethical value, as ultimately reposing on an act of will. But in the Germanic formula there is an immanence that suppresses any will seeking any other object. The race is the whole, the immanent; within it individuals move as a herd, as though driven by an inward determination imprinted in their nature by the blood. The sole condition of life, and hence the sole moral and social law, is that the blood must be pure, that the bodies in which such blood circulates must be healthy, that the racial whole must be powerful.

Max Hermant, who is well known in France and elsewhere

as a brilliant writer, in his widely read book, *Idoles Allemandes*, tries to define and analyse 'Germanism' as the basic characteristic of the German people and almost as though it were the determinant cause of the present phase. 'To become aware of this fact, to express it, to proclaim it, to define the German nature, to discover within it a mysterious law, to formulate that law, to transform it into a method, to assert its ethical value, to accept it, finally, as supreme norm and to submit to it wholly—such is the task of that ever-present but never concrete moral entity that we may call Germanism. First it notes data, then it makes assertions, and, knowing itself for what it is, wills to be what it is' (p. 23). All this is well expressed and brilliant, but it has a defect, the conception of that 'moral entity' as though it had an intelligence and will of its own such as to become a kind of deterministic force in the activity of millions and millions of Germans and through countless generations.

Every people which has a language of its own, a unitary or moral centre, a traditional conception of life and social values, and whether or no it possesses political unity, comes to develop certain qualities, to create certain currents of ideas, and to express itself in particular ways in art, philosophy, and life. It has been the mistake of positivist sociology to seek to resolve into a social whole, as into a real entity (psychological or bio-mechanical), the associative life of men and their flux and reflux of thoughts and activities, which spring always from single individuals, even when transported into the field of life in common. Max Hermant certainly does not conceive of Germanism as a tragic, racial heritage imposed on millions of men, but only as an awareness of their racial qualities, good or evil, raised by a mystic or mysterious will to ends and action of their own. Even under this second aspect, the present Hitler phase would be justified according to Max Hermant's thesis, as the logical consequence of three or five or ten centuries of Germanism, which has passed finally from an unconscious, instinctive, and primitive stage to full consciousness, intellectual and voluntary, and to organized expression. Many

Frenchmen are of opinion that the antithesis Germany-France is a collective and necessary antithesis ; and they express in political terms what Max Hermant has expressed sociologically.

The truth is that in Germany, as among every people, there are various currents, various modes of feeling, a diversity of focal points in every field, religious, political, cultural, artistic, economic, domestic. And though these currents and these forms of organized life express themselves in the language of each country, they cannot be reduced to a common denominator that would be an impassable barrier and an insuperable sociological condition. One cannot be deterministically German, as one is not deterministically Latin or Anglo-Saxon. If it were so, Christianity could not be the religion of all, but only of certain peoples, and certainly not of Germany.

Now the conflict to-day, and not in Germany alone, is between the dualistic and transcendent Christian conception, and an anti-Christian, monistic, and immanent conception of life. In this conflict all are engaged, consciously or unconsciously. And in every country, including Germany, opposing currents face each other, and many souls are troubled by the conflict itself and the impossibility of establishing and solving it in its real terms. The reason is that the monistic-immanent current seeks to fetter all men to a collective entity, whether this be the State, the nation, the class, or the race. Therefore all State-exalting, nationalist and class currents (Bolshevism, Communism, Fascism, Racism), implicitly and often explicitly repudiate freedom, all and every freedom—not only political freedom (which would be the least important, and which is valuable principally as a method), but the freedom which expresses itself in personal autonomy, in respect of human personality, in respect of the individual conscience, in respect of the moral, cultural, and religious life of each and all.

The State, class, nation, or race, seeks to control souls. Therefore all becomes a monopoly : power, education, economy, religion, culture. Therefore all freedom is denied. But this is not enough. Hidden in every soul is the freedom

to worship God and to safeguard, if need be by death, the rights of conscience. Nazism in Germany wishes to occupy even this place, presenting itself as a religion, a mysticism, a collective pantheism, of which the concrete idol is Germany, and of which rites and symbols are taken from ancient paganism, in repudiation of Christ, of faith, of Christian morals, and civilization.

It may indeed be salutary that matters should have reached this stage, in order that true Christians should have a deep-seated reason for fighting, and for remaking even with their blood, a Christian nation, setting a barrier to apostasy and reasserting the undying values of the Gospels. No 'Germanism,' conceived as a mystic and racial force, as an inward and inexorable urge, can prevent the encounter between the Christian and the racial conceptions. The clash between Nazism and the Jews did not produce practical and tangible results because the Jews framed their defence badly. They invoked their German nationality, precisely at a time when the Nazis were emphasizing their diversity of race ; they invoked personal liberty when the Nazis were asserting the higher interest of collectivity ; they could not take their stand on a religious principle, because many had abandoned their religion and because Judaism is only a particular religion, not a universal one.

The Christians, Catholics and Protestants, should have invoked the principle of Christian brotherhood and distributive justice in favour of the Jews ; this would have been a first line of defence against the race theory. They lacked the courage to do so, for defence of the Jew was unwelcome to traders who had suffered by Jewish methods of competition, and to the unemployed who saw in the exodus of the Jews a chance of finding posts or work ; and to the fearful, for it would have brought them into collision with the victorious Party. And so the battle was lost for both Jews and Christians. The turn of the Christians came, in spite of the fact that Hitler, in his speech of March 1933, had declared that Nazism would defend the two main Christian

Churches of Germany. In respect of the Protestants, Hitler's Government strove to create an organic unity, which would put an end to the various Churches separated by territory or tendency—a unification that would be not only administrative, but conforming to the new régime. In respect of the Catholics, he hastened to negotiate a Concordat with Rome, to take the place of the particular Concordats already signed with Bavaria, Baden, and Prussia. Hitler promised support on a basis of mutual loyalty.

Those who believed in his attitude did not reckon with the fundamental theory of the Germanic race; they thought that the loss of all freedom would be compensated by a religious tranquillity that became at the same time political conformity. Not all were of this opinion, but the pro-Hitler currents prevailed. Neither for Protestants nor Catholics did matters turn out as they expected.

The result was quite different, in both theory and practice. They lost thus the instruments of defence which liberty gives, and confined themselves to a purely religious defence. The situation goes from bad to worse. The struggle against Nazism must start from the negation of the Race Theory, in the name of two principles, one human, the other religious, Christian. By the first we assert the universality of humanity and the value of the person. By the second we affirm equality in the love of God and one's neighbour. Freedom, signifying personal, human right—Christianity, signifying a duty of brotherly love, since all are children of the same Father in Heaven.

The modern error lies in having separated and opposed humanism and Christianity. It has turned humanism into a religion, and made the Christian religion a private matter of conscience, or else a sect or church that is to be the affair only of priests and pious ladies. What we must do is to re-establish the union and synthesis of the human and the Christian. The Christian is in this world and must transform it in accordance with religious values, and the human must be penetrated by Christianity. Therefore it would be an error to attack Nazism either solely in the name of freedom or solely in the name of the Christian

religion as something apart from collective life as a whole. The battle must be waged in the name at once of the human values implied by integral freedom, and of the Christian religion which orders these values and sanctifies them to nobler ends.

This struggle is not something peculiar to Germany. It exists in every country, especially in those of Western civilization, for the apostasy from Christianity, though not everywhere equally declared, is everywhere present, and the cult of the divinity of a collective entity, State, nation, or class, substituted for God, has succeeded the failure of the cult of the individual, who by science and in the name of Progress was to attain his own bliss. The liberty which the peoples are losing under the dictatorships is most tangible and plastic ; but so much liberty has been lost even under modern democracies, in social organization, in individual life, and even in the very fount of liberty, the human spirit, that everywhere there is need to fight for it and to regain it. And this struggle and reconquest can only succeed if they are carried out in the name of the Christian spirit and of its moral values.

NOTE

In the encyclical Letter *Mit brennender Sorge* of March 14, 1937, [] emphatically condemned the principle of racialism on which Hitler wants to base the III Reich, and which is taught in all the schools of Germany, in Catholic Saar, in Catholic Austria, and in the Sudeten area. Racialism has recently been imported into Italy, together with the persecution of the Jews. The Pope has therefore renewed his condemnation. In a recent speech he declared, having in mind the text of St. Paul on spiritual descent from Abraham. "No, it is not possible for Christians to take part in anti-semitism. . . . Anti-semitism is inadmissible. We are spiritually semites." (*Avant-Garde* Bruxelles, Sept. 14, 1938.)

The introduction of Racialism in Italy, in opposition to previous Fascist policy, besides being a recent event (July, 1938) is for many people wholly inexplicable. It is thought that Mussolini has taken this way of showing more openly the concurrence of his ideas with those of Hitler and the solidarity of the Rome-Berlin Axis ; others say that the anti-semitic campaign is being used to gain the sympathy of the Arab world now in conflict with the Jews in Palestine ; others again think it is for reasons of internal economy, especially because of unemployment among young men of the professional classes who desire to obtain the positions and situations now held by Jews.

VIII

OPPRESSED PEOPLES

NATIONALITIES, MINORITIES, AND RACES

POLITICAL history may be described as a struggle between oppressed peoples and oppressor peoples, with the melancholy alternation of oppressed peoples become in their turn oppressors. A typical example of this is Poland. For a century and a half Poland was the victim of Russians, Prussians, and Austrians (these last not so bad as the others), and now that she has regained her freedom and is her own mistress she in her turn oppresses the Ukrainians of Galicia, Jews, and Catholics of the Greek rite. Italy in the course of her history knew oppression from foreign peoples, Spaniards, French, Austrians. To-day she oppresses the Germans of the Tyrol and the Slavs of Istria. Among the most famous victims in history is Armenia ; in this the Armenians are on a par with the Jews. To-day we have the vanquished Basques, victims of nationalist fury, and maybe to-morrow it will be the turn of the Catalans. The list of oppressed nations, minorities, and races extends far in time and space.

The Powers convened in Paris after the Great War to draw up the peace treaties sought to safeguard the position of racial and religious minorities included in the newly formed States and in States which had received increase of territory. A supplementary treaty was therefore drawn up, first with Poland (June 28, 1919) and thereafter extended (by new treaties or through simple declarations) to fifteen States, not counting Danzig and Memel. The rights of the minorities were guaranteed and placed under the supervision of the League of Nations. Turkey modified her status as

affected by the Minorities Treaty of August 1920 with the Treaty of Lausanne in July 1923.

Though the supervision of the League was uncertain and inadequate, it none the less established an ethical principle and gave a channel for complaints on the part of the minorities. But Poland has taken the lead in declaring (unilaterally) that she no longer feels bound by the terms of the treaty. The reaction of the signatory States and of the League has been very feeble and undecided. The system of international guarantees corresponded to two motives : to assure the populations united, willingly or otherwise, to the States formed or enlarged after the war that their collective personality and their rights would not be violated ; and at the same time to promote mutual trust and co-operation between the different racial and religious groups of the same State, with the moral help of the League.

From the legal standpoint, the Minorities Treaty implied a discrimination that was neither politically profitable nor just. The Allied Powers were exempt from having to sign such a treaty, on the pretext that their pledged honour was enough. Among these Powers, Italy, on becoming Fascist, forgetful of the pledge, began to oppress Germans and Slavs to the point of forbidding the use of their mother tongues in public prayer in the churches. Fascist Italy has committed a good many other offences against the international structure as it emerged from the peace treaties, but here (and no one at Geneva dared to criticize or to remind her of the pledge of honour) she was the first to engage in flagrant violation of the personality and rights of the racial minorities annexed by right of war.

Attempted assimilation of heterogeneous minorities is as old as it is fruitless. If the minority has the beginnings of a collective consciousness and its own domestic, religious, and cultural tradition, it will not allow itself to be assimilated. Methods of coercion and violence exasperate resistance. Dispersal over vast territories makes the dispersed nuclei more compact. Time alone and contact willingly sought or brought about by natural necessities will attenuate opposition and lead to a mingling of peoples, but where differences

are accentuated by the political power, with exceptional laws and legal coercion, the collective soul gains fresh strength at the cost of the gravest sacrifices. This the story of Ireland proves plainly.

From the standpoint of natural morality, can we attribute a true right to the racial, religious, or historical group distinct from the State, as a collective personality with its own rights and hence its own duties? This is how the moral problem of nationalities, minorities, or races should present itself. Let us define our terms. Nationality indicates the personality of a people, whether it be independent or subject or united on an equal footing with another people in a single State. We may thus say that in the Swiss State there are three different nationalities, German, French, and Italian, and in the Belgian State two, Flemish and Walloon, just as in Spain there are Castilians, Basques, Catalans, and so forth. Historically, the word has been restricted to oppressed nationalities—Greeks, Roumanians, Bulgarians, under Turkey; Bohemians, Italians, Croats, Slovenes, Poles, under Austria. When nationalities are actually nuclei limited in number and in territory within a state ruled by a dominant people (such as Austrians, Prussians, Turks), they are then known also as minorities. Finally, the word 'race' (especially in the case of the Jews) gives us the idea of an ethnical difference not necessarily connected with political status, whereas the word 'minority' refers always to a political status. The Jews in France, Italy, and Great Britain are a race apart, but wholly assimilated politically, while in Poland and Hungary they form also a minority, and in Palestine a nationality.

Now that we are clear as to terms, we can consider the question whether from the moral standpoint such peoples possess a collective personality. In the Middle Ages, when social units were corporatively conceived, whether these were cities, guilds, ethnical minorities, or even the political community itself, all had rights and privileges to be vindicated in their mutual relations and in their relations with the sovereign. When the feudal ties slackened, the concept of nationality remained so

strong that Martin V, at the Council of Constance, drew up the first concordats with representatives of the nations as collective personalities. As little by little, from the sixteenth century onwards, powers were concentrated in the absolute sovereigns, local and national personalities lost their political character, but remained as a network of rights and privileges that the sovereigns themselves took care not to touch, save for reasons of State or to subdue rebellious populations.

The Protestant Reformation, which struck a fatal blow at the religious unity of the West, brought into being the religious personality of separate communities, and this led to the confessional State, based on the principle *cuius regio illius et religio*. It needed, however, a century of struggles, disputes, wars, atrocities, before the world recognized the new entities born of the rupture. All this is the past which consecrated the personality of various groups, established their rights, and imposed their duties. From the time of the French Revolution the individualistic conception predominated, which by destroying all special groupings set the individual and the State face to face. But since the destruction of every group was neither historically nor morally natural, they resisted or came back to life, according to affinities, needs, and possibilities. Favoured by the climate of liberty, the claims of the nationalities to independence and unification and the irredentism of frontier minorities reached their full strength. The period that saw the formation, in the economic field, of syndical groups and trade unions saw the rebirth of regional aspirations to autonomy.

The principle of the personality of a people, a nationality, a minority, a race, is reborn, reflowers, and imposes itself according to historical circumstances. But it is rooted in the collective consciousness of the group, in the possession of its own language, in its respect for its own family and religious traditions. It is nature itself that is asserted in the age-long struggles of such groups, and in their formation and persistence throughout all the oppressions and attempts to denature and assimilate them, and all the series of

massacres for their gradual or total elimination, as with the Red Indians of America and the Australian aborigines.

The individualism of a century ago started from an ethical principle, the equality of all before the law. No more privileged classes or groups, no more classes or groups subject and oppressed. The realization of this principle implied civil guarantees and political liberties, without which individual equality becomes a privation of rights. Civil guarantees were not extended to the social plane, and hence an individualism that oppressed the worker. Political liberties were denied, wholly or in part, to the adversaries of the State (that is, to the adversaries of the dominant party and of the ruling class), so that there were now religious and anti-clerical persecutions in the name of secularism, now political persecutions in the name of nationalism.

These facts are symptoms of the lack of a certain homogeneity in the State, such as is necessary in an individualist régime. Such homogeneity can be formed only slowly, through hard experiences, and on a plane transcending that of pure politics and on which it is possible to find a loftier sentiment synthesizing and expressing the basic homogeneity of a truly united people. Among peoples that have achieved this homogeneity in different and characteristic forms we may take as typical Switzerland, France, Great Britain. Switzerland, though a country of diverse languages, nationalities, and political bodies, can be said to be not only a single State but a single nation (in the broad sense of the word); that is with unity of feeling, civilization, politics, and interests. This is not the effect of a homogeneity produced by levelling down and by oppression, but is on the contrary a liberation from all excessive bonds of all that is really essential to the life of a people. This has come about through a balanced mingling of individual liberty, autonomous local life, federal and unitary ties, with respect for the cultural, religious, and linguistic traditions of each component group. If there exists anywhere a people that is *one*, while wholly made up of minorities, and which, through internal struggles round religion and politics, has achieved

homogeneity in mutual loyalty and loyalty to the federal State, it is precisely the people of Switzerland.

If the Habsburgs had known how to turn the Austro-Hungarian Empire into a great Switzerland, the Empire would still be there. But the Habsburgs would not grant liberty, which they feared and hated. They were the prisoners of the hegemonic races of the Empire, the Austrian and the Magyar. They feared the disloyalty of the other peoples to the Crown because they oppressed them, and the peoples were loyal only inasmuch as they endured oppression. France has achieved homogeneity by uniformity and centralization. Culture generalized the use of the French language (save in Alsace and in the Saar, both Rhenish in character). The Paris of the monarchy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, of the Revolution, and of the Empire became naturally the metropolitan centre of the nation. State centralization, the unified school system, and legal uniformity did the rest. The Jews were easily assimilated because they were few and mainly of the professional and middle classes. French anti-semitism has been merely a political by-product.

Republican homogeneity was more difficult to create, but after the experiences of the Restoration and the Second Empire, France had outgrown the old monarchism and ephemeral Bonapartism, so that to-day homogeneity is more a political and party problem than an institutional and national one. And if Alsace and Lorraine have their own language and certain distinct institutions (a fact which irritates all the legal and logical uniformity-lovers of France), no one can doubt the patriotism and attachment to France, to republican France, of these populations, which thank God that they are not still bound to the Third Reich.

Great Britain has been able to preserve her old localized and corporative tradition, with its variety and its slight, pleasant eccentricities, at the same time widening personal freedom and the collective sense of public opinion to a maximum. She has thus brought British loyalty to its full and permanent efficacy, amid a diversity of institutions. But while she had outgrown her anti-papalism, granting

Catholics freedom and civil equality, and abolishing Protestant traditions that offended the Catholic conscience (such as the old formula of the Royal Oath), she could never resolve to give justice to Ireland, oppressed for centuries and for that very reason unassimilable. The Home Rule question dragged on for more than half a century, till the Great War and the consequent Irish Rebellion, which ended with the compromise of the Free State for Southern Ireland. This is now on the way to becoming a republic, and wishes to unite the northern provinces too in a single State.

History is inexorable. National homogeneity in a single State cannot succeed in suppressing nuclei that possess or are winning a life of their own. When these exist as such, they acquire a personality with rights and duties of their own in regard to the rest of the State community, and vice versa. Violation of rights, non-fulfilment of duties, in the political, religious, and economic field, carry with them those grave crises that end always in schism, struggle, revolt, war.

Let us distinguish between two cases—that in which a distinct group personality really exists, creating a reciprocity of relations with the rest of the State community, and that in which there is merely an initial tendency to form a group personality, as yet non-existent. Any human nucleus, racial, religious, or domestic, will lack a personality if it has no traditional basis, no history, no concrete centre (territory, village, church) through which a distinct relationship could come into being. With time and through favourable happenings such nuclei may be able to create a collective state of mind and hence a tradition which will be the prelude to the rebirth or simply the birth of a group personality. But apart from the desirability or otherwise of encouraging differentiations and sub-divisions in the political domain, there are many peoples that have yet to achieve civilization or to return to civilization, by acquiring or regaining a personality of their own. Among populations still in inferior social conditions, this process should be encouraged by a wide education. The nascent personalities are a political, cultural, religious ferment of the highest importance for the development of

civilization, and bring about interesting historical periods. Servile populations (for the most part shepherds, labourers, craftsmen) emerge to the surface and develop significant forms of art and literature and political potentialities.

Unhappily, no sooner does a new group-personality begin to be apparent, to demand some elementary right for its own church, its own school, its own township, or the use of its own language, than the dominant people resents it. Why? It fears that those peasant families, that frontier zone, those wretched serfs will bring a disturbance of established order, of its own order, which is the dominion of a class. For such men the affirmation of new rights becomes an offence against the fatherland. At once the punishment for this pretended offence becomes the motive of discontent and revolt. The revolt calls for repression. Repression deepens the group consciousness and accentuates the differentiation of nationalities and their opposition on the political plane.

The personality of a racial, religious, historical group, when it has a territorial basis and has reached maturity, may assume its own character within a multi-lingual State, as in Belgium and Switzerland; or else it may become itself an autonomous State, like Ireland, Sweden, Norway. In such cases the group-personality coincides with the political personality; there should be no further motive for struggle. Not always are these solutions practicable or put into practice. Yugoslavia is faced with the gravest internal difficulties because she has not realized that if she would have peace and progress her three chief component nationalities, Serbs, Slovenes, and Croats, must be set on the same footing of political and administrative equality. In Belgium the aftermath of the language question (whatever may be thought of the solution) has still to be faced.

The Spanish problems are similar. The Catalans have a language, a literature, an art, an economy of their own, a history of resistance, revolts, victories and defeats, a true nationality, though in a setting of Spanish unity (not uniformity). The same, with certain attenuations, can be said of the Basques, with their historic Statute, their

democratic spirit, their religious vitality, and their very characteristic language. To-day they have affirmed their political personality with their blood. The monarchy endeavoured to create a uniform Spain, centralized as though it were France, but this did not correspond to the personalist character of the Spaniards and their regions. Spain should find her solution on the same lines as Switzerland, with a strong central discipline keeping the balance between the parts.

In the name of what ethical principle is it possible to deny to the various nationalities, ethnical and religious minorities and races, recognition of their special rights within the frame of the political life of the State? And what super-eminent right has one race over others that authorizes it to arrogate a political monopoly to itself, as once the Magyars and Austrians in the Habsburg Empire, and to-day the Serbs in Yugoslavia, the Castilians in Spain, the Prussians in Germany, and so on? There is one necessary condition if the problem of nationalities is to be placed on the plane of equality of rights and duties between the diverse peoples making up a State, and that is loyalty towards the State as the unitary resolution of the various components. The ethico-political plane must therefore transcend the single ethnical personalities, whether these be almost equal in number and importance (as in Belgium the Flemings and Walloons) or else simply minorities (like the Germans and Slavs in Italy).

Most of the disputes between the two parties, the causes of the rancour of the oppressed and the violence of the oppressors, spring from mutual incomprehension; fear lest the minority should undermine the security of the State, throw off the dominion of the ruling group; and from suspicion that the rulers will use their predominance to tread underfoot the rights of the minority. The case of irredentism occurs where border peoples for reasons of language, history, and political affinities wish to belong to the bordering State which they consider as their mother country. Thus for half a century Trento and Trieste dreamed of union with Italy, which was brought to pass by

the Great War ; thus to-day the German and Hungarian fragments detached from their ethnical centres.

Political, economic, and historic motives often explain the position of these frontier zones detached from the rest of a kindred people. But irredentism is an effect, not a cause. There is no irredentism in Switzerland, there was no irredentism in the old Venetian republic. There was, on the contrary, irredentism in the Italian districts of the Habsburg Empire. Irredentism may be artificial and demagogic, just as it may have deep motives, historical, religious, and economic. To-day the most dangerous irredentism is that of the Germanic peoples. It is in part artificially produced, founded on a hegemonic pan-Germanism that seeks to lay hold of Central Europe. Language cannot be the sole test of identical nationality. Austria speaks German but is not Germanic in the unitary sense. The same is true of the German-speaking populations belonging to Czechoslovakia or Italy. The Reich itself is not homogeneous ; the Rhinelanders and the Bavarians are not the same as the Prussians. The unity imposed in the Third Reich is contrary to the true Germanic traditions.

A final and serious problem is that of the race. There are in fact to-day two grave race problems in civilized countries, that of the Jews in Central Europe and that of the Negroes in the United States of America. Where life in common between the races has been achieved, either through the events of history (the Jews in Italy, France, and Great Britain), or because it is a question of very small numbers (the Negroes on the Continent), there is no problem ; Jews and Negroes are citizens like the rest, subject to the same laws. But where the problem exists it must be solved with careful prudence, gradually, by wise laws, in equity and charity. Otherwise there comes to be that dull hatred, that irremediable contempt, that unbridgeable gulf, that will show itself even in the religious sphere of Christianity itself, the religion *par excellence* of brotherhood and love.

What is to-day being done in Germany against the Jews is uncivilized and anti-Christian. In Poland, too, in Hungary, in Austria, in Roumania, and elsewhere, the same spirit of

anti-semitism is spreading. There are faults on both sides, but a peaceful life in common between the Jews and other populations will never be attained through laws of exception or by persecutions and struggles. In America, with its marked individualism, life in common between whites and Negroes is a matter for moral and Christian education. Lynching is a relic of barbarism that must be fought. The servile condition of the Negroes can be corrected by the formation among them of professional and commercial classes, such as are already coming into being. Isolation from contact will lessen gradually as these classes assume such social position as they are able to attain.

What is lacking, nearly always, in relations between group and group of different populations, is mutual understanding and love. The ethical value of human relations is overlaid by political preoccupations, by economic exploitation, by traditional hatreds, by religious rancour, by the spirit of domination. The result of all this is that the oppressor peoples fail to understand the immorality of a violation of the rights of the personality of the oppressed peoples, and these in their turn fail to understand the immorality of a disloyal attitude towards the community of which they form part, and against which they nourish hatred and the spirit of revolt.

Among different peoples obliged to live together in a single State the respect of mutual moral obligations is made impossible in the absence of justice in the laws and of equity in government policy. The vicious circle of injustice from above and revolt from below must be broken. The Government must take the lead, containing its action within the lines of morality. This is based on the principle of personality. Without the value of the personality, its responsibilities, its conscious acceptance of the law, there is neither natural nor Christian morality. Personality is strictly individual, but since there can be neither individuals apart from society nor a society apart from individuals, all social formations are extensions of the personality, from the family proper, step by step, to the family of peoples. In a Europe so dense in diverse populations, the mingling

and stratifying of which are factors of civilization, the human and Christian ideal is precisely the attainment of a family of States, a federation of manifold nationalities, minorities, and races, co-operating in peace and progress.

THE COLONIAL PROBLEM

Discussion has opened on Germany's colonial claims. Public opinion in the mandatory countries is perturbed, uncertain, divided. There are those who hold that a certain satisfaction should be given to the German demands. There is talk of direct understandings ; the wildest hypotheses are current. As one reads the newspapers, and in particular the letters from politicians and scholars in *The Times*, it seems that the greater number have forgotten a capital point, that the colonies that once belonged to Germany have been entrusted to the League of Nations, and that the States responsible for their guardianship and administration are mandatories of the League. They have neither sovereignty over these colonies nor are free to dispose of them. That Germany (with her allies of the moment) should declare these facts to be lawyers' subtleties is quite natural. She has repudiated unilaterally a good many other articles of the Treaty of Versailles. She has left the League. She claims the total return of her colonies as taken from her by theft. Finally, in form of law, she turns to the 'Principal Allied and Associated Powers' in favour of whom, by Art. 119 of the Treaty of Versailles, she renounced 'all her rights and titles to her overseas possessions.'

But the same treaty, by Art. 22 of the Covenant of the League, clearly established the character of this cession. The member States cannot forget their duties, nor can they change a colonial mandate into possession. It is not a merely formal and legal question, but an essential one, for the League made care for the 'well-being and development' of the colonial peoples placed under its lofty guardianship 'a sacred mission.'

The distinction between A, B, and C mandates was a rational one, made according to the standard of development

of the peoples under mandate, with the aim of co-operating in the formation of the administrative, juridical, and political personalities of each separate colony. Thus A mandates will soon have achieved their purpose. Iraq (formerly Mesopotamia) is already a sovereign State, received as a member of the League of Nations. Palestine is on the way to becoming one, though the recent proposal to make of it two States, one Arab, one Jewish, with a buffer zone in between, has aroused much resentment and must overcome much hostility. Syria and Lebanon will soon follow. During this period the function of France and Great Britain as mandatory Powers may be said to have been of real utility (in spite of errors of detail and angles of approach) ; it has served to give the mandatories themselves a sense of the limits and value of co-operation with the native peoples, on whom eventually full sovereignty will devolve. The presumed advantages to be gained by France and Great Britain have been less than the vexations entailed, while more than once their prestige as Great Powers has suffered.

The B mandates are those that interest public opinion to-day ; they include the ex-German colonies of Togo, the Cameroons, and East Africa, while West Africa is classed under mandate C. The difference between B and C mandates is all but substantial. The mandatory Power with a B mandate has merely the administration and guardianship of the colony. It may not annex it, nor build fortifications or naval bases, nor give general military training to the natives, nor extend native recruiting beyond the needs of the local police forces and defence forces of the colony. Nor may it limit the trading-rights of other members of the League, or establish preferential systems to its own advantage. Mandate C, on the contrary, allows the incorporation of the territory of the colony in the mandatory State, under the sole conditions (common to mandate B) of safeguards for the native populations such as the prohibition of slave-trading, arms traffic, the sale of alcohol, with respect of freedom of conscience and religion except where immoral practices are entailed.

Colonies under C mandates could be returned to Germany only with the consent both of the League of Nations, which conferred the mandate, and of the States which hold them as cessionaries, since in this case there was a genuine cession. On the other hand, to my mind, colonies under B mandates could be restored to Germany through a deliberation of the League of Nations only, without any special consent by the mandatory State (apart from its vote as a member of the League), though of course with the payment of any indemnity or compensation that might be due.

We know that some jurists, such as M. Fauchille, for example, believe that B mandates imply a 'disguised' cession; but, with due respect for such authorities, this does not correspond to either the letter or the spirit of the Covenant. It is true that the cession of colonies was made by Germany to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, and that they demanded this by right of victory. The League of Nations did not exist, nor had it any special right where this cession was concerned. It was natural too that the Supreme Council of the Powers should at once distribute these colonies, on May 7, 1919. But even then it was a question of a mandate and not of cession. The juridical form of the mandate and its limits were defined in the Covenant of the League of Nations. This took place in the first Council of the League, at St. Sebastian in 1920, when it was sought to reconcile the allotment of mandates by the Supreme Council of the victorious Powers with the exercise of such mandates in the name of the League of Nations. If this explains how matters came about, it does not create a permanent right vested in an ephemeral body such as the Supreme Council, which ceased to exist. All that remains is a potential and indivisible right vested in the Principal Allied and Associated Powers (by Art. 119 of the Treaty of Versailles, already quoted), integrating, as it were, the right to-day vested in the League of Nations, whether as conferring the mandates or as representing the original and inalienable right of the native populations concerned.

The spirit inspiring the institution of the colonial man-

dates, and which was largely transfused into the Covenant of the League, was one of guiding the colony towards acquiring its own political, economic, and juridical personality. This idea is fundamental in the modern conception of the colony.

America was once a network of European colonies. Their independence, won by revolt and war, was already ripe at the end of the eighteenth century. It would have been better if the possessor States had not opposed American aspirations towards freedom and autonomy, and had helped and encouraged them. But this was repugnant to the mentality of the *ancien régime*. Great Britain, a century later, was very wise in granting the Dominions their full personality and even parity with the United Kingdom, which is now only morally the metropolitan State. India is set on the same path. Either she will become a Dominion or win complete independence.

France, with other methods (and not always happy ones), has given her colonies a certain political and administrative personality, and an electoral participation in parliament. Native military formations are part of the French Army. Racial differences are less marked in France than elsewhere. The French colonies feel more closely bound to the mother country than the colonies of other countries.

The old idea of the subjugation and exploitation of the colony by the colonizing country is being superseded (at least as an ideal policy) by the more humanitarian and Christian idea of the education and progressive evolution of the colony and its achievement of a personality of its own. To say that everything in this world is done for the best would be to shut our eyes to all the defects, faults, and crimes of European colonization. Therefore the task of the League of Nations was intended as one of stimulation, control, co-ordination, co-operation. Where a single State can do little, and isolated initiative is doomed to failure, combined efforts under a single direction will succeed. The prohibition of the slave trade, of exploitation of native labour, of the sale of arms, alcohol, opium, and other drugs, are possible only when there is both co-operation among the

States involved and control by a common and central organism.

Where the colonizing nations have failed is in their lack of generosity, foresight, and faith in the League. They began at once to quibble over the character, extent, and powers of the mandate. They did not seek to extend the mandate principle to the other colonies that were in the same conditions as the German ones. They admitted Liberia and Ethiopia to membership of the League of Nations, though in these countries the slave trade still continued. Such States should have passed through a qualifying period and been obliged to accept the supervision of the League before becoming part of it.

The same mistake was made over disarmament, by the failure to put into effect in time the reduction of armaments envisaged in Art. 8 of the Covenant. Thus the disarming of the defeated countries appeared as a diminution of their sovereignty and a state of perpetual inferiority. Thus the malicious-minded could say that the principal Entente Powers (with the exception of Italy) invented the League mandates in order to take possession of the German colonies, to which they could show no real title. In Wilson's Fourteen Points, the moral basis of the Armistice, the terms employed in regard to colonies were so vague as to suggest that some colonies, if not all, should be left to Germany.

We must go back to the beginning ; that is, to the spirit and letter of the Covenant. If to-day the problem were exclusively a colonial one, in the pre-war sense—that is of the possession or non-possession of a colony and of the sovereign right of the colonizing country—there would be no difficulty in discussing with Germany the return of part or all of her former possessions. It would be a question of agreements, of safeguarding interests, of guaranteeing rights. A good treaty would put an end to a controversy that might take a dangerous turn. But the problem must be set within the ethical and juridical order in which it was framed by the Covenant, and through which it has assumed an indelible and specific character.

The colonial mandate is part of a complex international

system which, if it is not yet stable, cannot be replaced by another. Germany to-day boasts of being outside any international juridical system that does not originate with herself and the premises of the Third Reich. She does not belong to the League of Nations. She feels that she can repudiate unilaterally any treaty that does not please her (Locarno included, freely accepted and freely confirmed by Hitler himself). She would never accept her own colonies under a mandate, and if she accepted them she would not feel bound to the League of Nations by the terms of the mandate. A unilateral repudiation would settle that. The question of form is not without value, but the substance has more value. Germany cannot wish for limits to her sovereignty, not even such as concern the safeguarding of the natives, nor those that refer to the political and juridical personality of the colonies themselves.

It may be said that this is inductive reasoning, since till now the problem has not been envisaged otherwise than from the standpoint of national claims and economic needs. But the trend of Germany is very clear. To-day in the international field, among civilized peoples, there is no longer a unitary conception or structure. There are three different and conflicting ones: the traditional, democratic conception, still bound to the League of Nations; the Russian Communist one; and the totalitarian one of the Fascists and Nazis.

It was a grave error to have accepted Russia at Geneva without demanding a minimum of civil, political, and religious liberty at home and the cessation of Communist propaganda abroad. It was equally an error to have allowed Italy to play a double game, undermining the principles of the League while remaining in it as one of the principal Powers, and it was a further error to give Germany a plausible motive for leaving the League through the lack of equable and adequate disarmament. Juridical unity is necessary to the international political structure; it is its basis for its ethical content and the stability of forms and aims. This unity is broken. It must be remade. There is no going back. To-day the democratic League ideology has still

the most stable ethical and juridical content. Totalitarian ideologies are based on the will of one man, without moral or political limits, while mixed systems are springing up founded on armed force and violence. That from these a new order may arise, in fifty or a hundred years' time, does not interest us except as prophets. What is necessary to-day is that constituted order should be reinforced, follow its logical development, and should not be exposed to continual default, repudiation, and treachery.

To restore the colonies to Germany otherwise than as mandates—strictly as mandates—would be a betrayal of the present juridical system, would increase the causes of international bewilderment and disorder, and would violate the recognized right of the native peoples to be protected by a body such as the League of Nations against violation and vexations from the mandatory Power. At a moment when we see the feeble dawn of a system of safeguarding the colonial peoples (who have been and are still in certain regions and under certain aspects oppressed peoples), at a moment when the civilized world should reaffirm its will to help to give the colonies their own political personality, a return to the old system (with the visible token of a surrender of the colonies to Nazi Germany) would be a terrible breach in the present international system, and another step taken towards future chaos.

IX

THE SOCIAL QUESTION

REVOLUTION

THE sonorous word 'revolution' is on the lips of many. To destroy everything, to remake everything anew in the material and violent sense of the word ! Thus, they believe, insoluble problems will find solution, the evils rooted in society will be abolished, and a new world will be created. Yesterday it was the Socialists who talked of revolution. To-day it is the Fascists. Their revolution is still in progress—new laws, new legal codes, a new method of counting the years, which must date from the fateful march on Rome. The Russian Soviets extol their revolution (and what a revolution, if one counts the murdered, the executed, the deportees, the exiles !). So do the Mexican generals theirs (in Mexico everyone is a general, even the Socialists and brigands). And then there are the imitation revolutions, such as that of Dollfuss in Vienna, with the bloody repression of the Socialist revolt and its Nazi aftermath (in which poor Dollfuss lost his life). Now Austria as a State no longer exists.

Here we speak not of these but of true revolutions, which are spiritual, not material, quickened by ideals, ennobled by sacrifice. For us the first, true, unique revolution is that of Christianity. The others, if they are true revolutions, have a Christian setting ; they are the more true the more they are animated by the Christian spirit, the less true the more remote from it. Christ brought to the earth a Gospel repudiating all human perversions and oppressions, all dominance of the world over the spirit, of the collectivity over the human person. In place of egotism He taught love, in place of exploitation justice.

the Even before the time of Christ these words had been
 ide ard, but in the pagan world their meaning was ambiguous
 p and ineffectual, while in the Jewish world they were under-
 stood in the letter and not in the spirit. From Christ
 onwards these words have a spiritual intimacy and a new
 significance, for they draw all their force from the fact that
 men share in sonship to God and in brotherhood with the
 Redeemer, the God-Man. There is no true revolution which
 is not based on the two principles of Charity and Justice,
 for involution or retrogression (co-natural to us through sin)
 is due to the prevalence of egotism and injustice. These are
 the principles of our sins and passions and in social life they
 become collective facts, such as slavery, polygamy, war,
 serfdom, racial oppression, violation of the rights of minori-
 ties, economic exploitation of human labour. In a word,
 the systematic and constant violation of human personality.

How can such violations be remedied? First of all, by the
 recognition that they are violations (for there are many who
 still do not realize it), and that such violations are systematic
 and constant violations of the social, economic, and political
 structure itself. Open and bold attack must be made on
 the positions of those who seek to justify such violations in
 the name now of public order, now of national interest, or
 of politics and even of morality and religion. Does the last
 seem strange? When slavery reappeared in the fifteenth
 century, when America was discovered and the unfortunate
 Red Indians were made slaves, were there not friars and
 Catholic writers who declared this to be legitimate? Men
 like Bartolomeo de Las Casas and his fellows, Dominicans
 and religious, were rare and found small backing against
 the greed and oppression of the subjects of His Catholic
 Majesty.

To-day there are other slaves in the economic world, for
 another master has taken the place of the old ones, capitalism.
 By capitalism we do not mean capital in itself (which
 might be called savings), the fruit of production and labour,
 whether manual or intellectual, and no matter whether it
 be re-employed directly or used for the purchase of useful
 property such as fields and houses. By capitalism we mean

above all the system of the exploitation of work, by which all benefits accrue to those who have brought money into a business. We mean, too, the abuse of traffic in money as something productive in itself. And finally we mean the anonymity and irresponsibility of the money and shares representing the capital of a business.

This is a system founded on egotism and injustice, in itself bringing a violation of the rights of the human personality of the worker and of the consumer, and subjecting society (even in its political aspects) to the dominion of irresponsible groups. The evil has been many times analysed, from various points of view. For us Catholics, it has been analysed authoritatively by Leo XIII and Pius XI in the two Encyclicals that must be considered inseparable, *Rerum Novarum* (1891) and *Quadragesimo Anno* (1931), and again by a fresh Encyclical, *Divini Redemptoris* (1937). There is no lack of scientific books and pamphlets criticizing the system.

But what is needed is reconstruction. A revolution that destroys is never a true revolution. A revolution that hastens to rebuild in order to establish some sort of order and to put a stop to anarchy only replaces a system, bad maybe but established and more or less workable, by an improvised system that will soon have to be destroyed in its turn. True revolution starts from a spiritual negation of evil and a spiritual affirmation of good. In practice this becomes slow but sure construction, a building with deep foundations and therefore stable, founded on the salutary energy of nature and always inspired by the Christian principles of justice and charity.

Those who conceive of revolution otherwise confuse the outward appearance of any and every popular agitation with the profound re-elaboration that always comes when truth is applied to new situations. Therefore we refuse to follow the ebullitions of anonymous mobs, often guided by irresponsible leaders, supported by nameless money, national or foreign. The stirring up of popular passions is always exploited for devious ends and finishes with bloodshed. A Hitler, a Mussolini, is not for us. Their revolutions

are neither human nor founded on Christianity, but mean instead disorder, violence, tyranny. We do not want passionate and excitable men but men of conviction, men who are able to repress the forces of egotism in their own individual sphere in order to be able to correct them in the social sphere. Our world is a world that must be recreated through confidence in the Christian idea, which is ever living and ever capable of transformation.

Why does it seem as if the efforts of Social Catholics up till now have been feeble, often even barren? That nothing serious has been achieved? That evil overcomes good? That on the one hand we find the predominance of a capitalism of ever-increasing power, and on the other an ever more threatening Communism? From my experience in this domain I have gained certain ideas which, in spite of all, have preserved for me the optimism with which, forty-odd years ago, I entered on political life.

First of all, evil is always more visible than good because evil is materialized, good spiritualized; evil expresses the world with its pride, which is very visible, good is founded on feelings of humility, which seeks concealment. Many believe that the Encyclical of Leo XIII on the labour question did not produce much result in the Catholic field. They forget the accumulation of prejudices among Catholics, which the Christian Democrats of those days had to overcome; how their activity was looked upon with suspicion by bishops and clergy; how the anti-liberal mentality that had grown up in the first half of the nineteenth century weighed heavy on all enterprises founded on parity of civil and political rights. Who to-day realizes the flourishing growth of workers' leagues, Christian trade unions, co-operatives and land banks, that came into being through half a century of patient labour? And this in spite of the inexperience of their promoters, the opposition of Conservatives, the now veiled, now open hostility of governments, and the mistrust of the masses who were permeated by Socialist propaganda and anti-clerical prejudices? We need someone

to write the story, critically, not as a panegyric, to give the Christian Social organizers of to-day a knowledge of their noble ancestry, of the examples and sacrifices of their forebears and what their experiences can teach.

The practical mistake that made so many labours and sacrifices of no avail was the prolonged effort to keep social action, in the strict sense of the words, distinct from political action. It was believed that it was enough to form leagues and co-operatives to solve the problems of the working classes and create a new social economy. Thus on the Continent the affairs of the State were left for half a century to a reactionary and retrograde *bourgeoisie*, whether clerical or liberal. The working man was kept at a distance, either through syndicalist and revolutionary prejudice (as was the case for a long time among continental Socialists) or through the anxieties and fears of ecclesiastics who did not wish political passion to prejudice the educational and religious part of the social movement. At bottom there was an unconscious bond between the dominant *bourgeoisie* and the laymen and clergy, who in politics favoured its monopoly, partly through fear that the masses were not ripe for politics. To-day it is well understood that politics are not merely a technique of government, but the synthesis of the economic, social, religious, and cultural interests of a people, as expressed in the relations between the citizen and the State.

The dictatorships, by depriving the constitutional State of its liberties, have shown how all society can be under the dominion of one man or of a clique. Nothing is safe from the dictatorships, neither the university, nor the Church, nor the Press, nor economy, nor even the family with its responsibility for the upbringing of its children. In order to bring a realization that every social and economic movement must have its political expression, and that therefore there can be no true workers' movement that is not politically autonomous, it required the prolonged experiences of Christian Democracy, its vigour and its decline. And since this experience was not everywhere conclusive and entire, even to-day we find Christian-Social Catholics who believe

in the possibility of pseudo-corporative systems under dictatorial régimes, and who write of the Austrian and Portuguese experiments as realities. They either do not know or have forgotten that Christian corporativism flourished and was valid only when, in the mediæval republics, it created an economic structure with a political function.

That is why the problem of working-class unity presents itself to-day as more arduous than it was yesterday, both in the trade union and the political field. The working class can only be considered from two standpoints: the positive standpoint of labour as a means of life (and in this the working class is in the same position as other professional classes), and that of the antithesis to capitalism, up till now known as the class war. Since these two positions spring from practical elements in the social structure, they cannot be taken as essential factors of an organic class unity. There must therefore be a legal means of identifying the working class, differentiating it from others, without opposing it to them as irreconcilable. But the workers among themselves should not be divided by interests or ideals or passions, or at least they should find in mutual toleration and understanding a means of eliminating motives of conflict, while in the defence of their class interests they must find a motive for collaboration.

In the past, working-class unity was envisaged in terms of political parties, as a unification of all in the Socialist class war, with (on the Continent) an anti-religious colour. After the war, after the advent of Bolshevist Communism in Russia, after the suppression of the trade unions in Italy, Germany, Austria, and elsewhere by the dictators, there grew up a trend towards a very different conception of working-class unity. Moreover, since the war, the political collaboration of Socialist Parties with Catholics or Liberals or Radicals has been a new and most useful experience, tending towards collaboration between the various classes without political or religious prejudices. Those who believe that the Christian Democratic experiment of half a century has been in vain should note well how much to-day remains

in Italy and Germany among the working classes of their Christian Social or Socialist past, and how at bottom the principles of freedom, justice, and charity on which our movements rested, remain intact in the hearts of the greater number, and flower again (with the deviations brought by other ideals) among the ex-Socialists themselves. The dictatorships can alter appearances, but not convictions, when these are deeply rooted as ideas and practices.

There is a crisis: the surrender to Fascism, the open support of fanatical nationalism by a section of the clergy, trouble the consciences of the working classes, while the generation that is growing up knows nothing of the past and is being educated only to sing the praises of the strongest. The crisis in Spain is a bloody one. The responsibilities of those who opposed the social propaganda of an Aznar, an Ossorio, an Arboleya,¹ are immeasurable. To-day we see the consequences.

In countries where Catholics are organized and have at the same time a free Press, as in Belgium, Holland, and Switzerland, we find three results. First, the part they play in political life is vigorous, decisive, and on a par with that of the *bourgeois* and Labour Parties; secondly, their trade unions are as strong as the Socialist ones, and in some cases stronger, and their voice is decisive; thirdly, the trend of the country is towards social reforms, and the old anti-clericalism and clericalism are being left behind.

If this has not come about in other countries, as in France, for instance, there are reasons for it, historic faults that to-day must be paid for. What must be clear to all Social Catholics is that capitalism is no less an enemy than Communism, even though it may camouflage itself as the defender of order and religion, while Communism is revolutionary and anti-Christian. Moreover, in fighting Communism, more or less ably as the case may be, we are too many and our company is not of our choosing; in fighting capitalism,

¹ Professor Severino Aznar, of the University of Madrid, organized the Social Weeks of Spain on the lines of the *Semaines Sociales* in France. Don Angelo Ossorio y Gallardo founded the Social Popular Party before Primo de Rivera's dictatorship. Canon Maximiliano Arboleya edited the review *Renovacion Social* of Oviedo and founded the Christian Trade Unions.—*Translator's Note.*

without seeking to destroy either private property or saved capital, we stand alone. The company of others, whether Socialists or no, cannot here help us, save when it is a case of taking up some particular position for a definite economic or political purpose. But it falls to us in the domain of ideas and in that of practical realizations, in the domain of the mind and in that of economics, in the domain of religion and in the domain of politics, to prepare the true revolution that will lead us to an organic economy without capitalism and to a working-class policy without Communism and without class war.

COMMUNISM AND FASCISM

The Popular Front and the strikes and occupations of factories in France, the civil war in Spain, the Germano-Japanese treaty, Hitler's proclamation of a crusade against Russia, the 'Rome-Berlin axis', the anti-Communist Pact based on the triangle Berlin-Rome-Tokyo, and the open military intervention of Germany and Italy in Spain, are so many motives why Europe should appear placed in the dilemma of Communism or Fascism. But although the Pope and Bishops have redoubled their warnings to Catholics against the Communist peril, they have not put forward this dilemma of Communism or Fascism. On the contrary, Pius XI has on several occasions spoken and written against the Fascist theories of the State as end, the citizens as means. His Encyclical on the position of Catholics in Germany, *Mit brennender Sorge* (March 14, 1937), all but coincided with that on Communism, *Divini Redemptoris* (March 19). The remedies he has proposed for averting Communism have always been of a religious, moral, and social order, never political. The Bishops of Belgium and France have explicitly repudiated Fascism as a remedy for Communism, and in England Cardinal Hinsley has more than once warned Catholics that they must not believe that all that is not Communism is Fascism.¹

¹ Notably at a banquet in 1936 at which leading London Catholics met to discuss the programme for Catholic Action.—*Translator's Note.*

In spite of this, on the one hand, on the Left, Socialists, anti-clericals, and Communists accuse the Church, the Bishops and Catholics generally of being the allies of Fascism, and of conducting their anti-Communist campaign to this end ; while among nationalists and Fascists on the Right no mention is made of those sayings of the Pope and Bishops that might seem a criticism of Fascism, so that they may be passed off as its allies. Thus, through various causes, two points of orientation are being created, towards which, consciously or unconsciously, the masses, the youth, the *élites* are moving, as towards two battle-flags, or two magnetic myths, Communism and Fascism.

How many people to-day believe that the war in Spain is a battle between Communism and Fascism ? If we analyse the position, we find that on the side of the Generals are first of all the soldiers of the regular army and the navy—at one time mostly republicans, some of them anti-clericals ; then the soldiers of the *Tercio*, colonial troops and foreign legionaries, neither Fascist nor anti-Fascist, but professional soldiers and mercenaries. We find with them many Catholics, the Carlists of Navarre and the men of Gil Robles' *Accion Popular*, all of whom say that they are not Fascists ; the monarchists ; and finally, the *Falangists*, the true Fascists. On the side of the legal Government there are the Liberal and Democratic Republicans, the Socialists, the Syndicalists, the Anarchists, the Communists, the Catholics of the *Cruz y Raya* group, the Basque Catholics. The vast majority are not Communists in any sense. In this horrible fratricidal war, the Communist colour comes from Stalin, who is on the side of the Government, the Fascist colour comes from Hitler and Mussolini, who are for Franco and are sending armies to Spain, classed as 'volunteers.' We are thus brought back to the central point of the European situation, in which to-day Communism and Fascism resolve themselves into *Russia* on the one hand, *Germany* and *Italy* on the other.

After the Nuremberg speech, when Hitler launched his

anti-Communist crusade, Mr. Anthony Eden replied by repudiating the idea that Europe must be divided between two conflicting ideologies, and reaffirming the office of the democracies in present day civilization. This was the British attitude a century ago, when Castlereagh refused his signature to the appeal of the Holy Alliance, saying that it was the business of States to carry out definite obligations, not to proclaim general principles, and when, a few years later, Canning refused to intervene in Spain to suppress the liberal revolution for the constitution of 1812. To-day the same positions are repeated, with a few variations. In place of an anti-Liberal crusade led by Vienna, we have an anti-Communist crusade led by Berlin. Then Vienna feared what actually came to pass, the revolt of the subject nationalities and the loss of the Italian provinces. To-day Berlin seeks to isolate France, to assume a position of hegemony in Europe. Then it was France who played second, intervening with her armies in Spain on behalf of the absolute monarch. To-day it is Italy who is sending her 'volunteers' into Spain, on behalf of Franco and the other generals. The anti-Liberalism of those days had the same hegemonic and utilitarian motives behind it as the anti-Communism of to-day.

To justify the charge of insincerity brought against Hitler, it will be enough to quote a few unquestioned facts. Hitler on May 3, 1933 (just three months after his nomination as Chancellor), renewed the Russo-German Treaty of April 1926 which had expired in 1931 and which neither Brüning nor Schleicher nor even von Papen had wished to extend. On March 27, 1934, Hitler signed with Russia a financial and economic protocol, which was praised by the whole of the German Press. Again in April 1935 Hitler entered into further agreements with Russia. It was only after France, Roumania, and Czechoslovakia had signed their defensive alliance with Moscow that Hitler became aware of the Russian Communist peril, and, after signing a treaty with Japan and consolidating friendship with Italy, proclaimed his crusade.

It may be objected that Hitler has constantly opposed the Communists of Germany, sending them to concentration

camps or prisons, or scattering them by dictatorial and police methods. But he had been careful not to carry the struggle into the field of international relations, indeed, he seemed on the way to ever better understanding with Russia. Mussolini had done the same, from the first days of Fascism ; he was practically the first to recognize the Soviet Government and to establish diplomatic and economic relations with it (there were grand receptions at Rome and Odessa, and mutual toasts to the Governments of Rome and Moscow). It was Russia who urged the raising of the sanctions imposed on Italy during the Abyssinian war, though for a time she had appeared in favour of them. Since then there has been a change of route. Hitler and Mussolini demand the exclusion of Russia from any European peace-pact, a struggle against her, or a sanitary cordon (as in 1920) to prevent the spread of Communist infection.

To exclude one people, even a less numerous people than the Russians, from the rhythm of the political and economic life of States would be a mutilation. The mistake of the Treaty of Versailles was the attempt to reduce Germany to a condition of almost complete economic serfdom and hence to a semi-permanent political subjection. The Treaty of Versailles thus acted as a politico-economic cordon drawn round Germany. Reaction came and ended with the collapse of the treaty and a Europe thrown into disorder and mutual suspicion.

Certainly, every country must defend itself against the Communist propaganda fed and directed from Moscow, adopting those measures that best correspond to the character and need of each separate State. But this does not mean that it would be either profitable or possible to exclude two hundred million people from the normal rhythm of collective life, creating against them a psychology of permanent conflict. It was thus natural that both Great Britain and France should refuse such a platform for a political struggle, which would be the prelude to a war of ideologies, like the wars of religion between Protestant and Catholic countries in the seventeenth and eighteenth

centuries. Hitler's anti-Communist platform has no ethical foundation, and is therefore a political danger.

To oppose Communism to Fascism, the one as an evil, the other as the remedy (or vice versa, according to the point of view), the two would have to be antithetical, and the one capable of repairing the evils of the other. And here is the crucial point. Considered as concrete political systems, as they are presented to experience and imagination in Russia on the one hand, Germany and Italy on the other, both are dictatorships, both are maintained by powerful armies, able and dominant police-systems, organized and perfected espionage, extra-legal tribunals, concentration camps, the abolition of all parties save one which is recognized and incorporated in the State, the abolition of all civil and political liberties, the monopoly of the Press and the wireless, of the schools and the training of youth, the militarization of the whole people.

What then is the difference between Russian Communism, Italian Fascism, and German Nazism? A first difference lies in the fact that in Germany and Italy the various social classes still co-exist, with the principle of private property, while in Russia private property has been abolished, the proprietary classes scattered and their members have either fled abroad or merged with the workers. What is left of private property in Italy and Germany besides the name is hard to say. Taxation makes inroads upon capital and dries up the sources for the upkeep and increase of property; the laws of expropriation and the financial and monetary system make the values of holdings precarious and small; the State monopoly of foreign exchange hampers trade; the corporations are political organs in the hands of the State, which introduces an arbitrary factor into economic life; the enormous effort that country and State are making goes into armaments, and this disorganizes both economy and finance.

I do not know if the following anecdote was born in Italy or Germany, but it circulates in both Italy and Germany,

passed from mouth to mouth, but only between people who know each other well, and in great secrecy.

‘Daddy,’ asks a small boy, ‘what is the difference between Socialism, Communism, and Fascism?’

‘It’s like this, son, we have four cows in our cow-house. Socialism will take two away from us, for the community.’

‘Then we have two left!’

‘Communism takes all four, and pays you a wage for the work you do.’

‘Where do the cows go?’

‘They go to make up a bigger herd. Well, Fascism leaves you your four cows, but it does all the milking.’

In spite of this, landowners and industrialists prefer the Fascist régime (though they do not like it), for fear of something worse, for in the meantime they keep their social rank, they hope (each one for himself) that they will be able to obtain favours, legal or otherwise, from the Fascist authorities, and they think to compensate themselves by paying low wages and by tariff protection. The workers of Germany and Italy for their part, faced with unemployment and wretchedness (when they are not employed, as to-day, in war industries), with State aid for unemployment limited to a few months (in Italy to ninety days), do not want to run the risk of losing what little bread they can earn (often they work only three or four days a week), and prefer to be silent and to applaud.

Another difference between Russian Communism, German Nazism, and Italian Fascism is the treatment of religion. Russian Communism declares itself materialistic and atheist. It denies God and deifies the class; it persecutes religion and puts material progress in its place. German Nazism, for its part, does not deny God, but wants a religion for its own purposes, to deify the race. All that conflicts with the race principle is to be attacked, whether the Bible, the Catholic Church, the Protestant churches, or Judaism. Finally, Italian Fascism has sought a compromise with Catholicism, in spite of its tendency to deify the State and make it the end of the citizens. Against this theory Pius XI has twice protested in his consistorial addresses, and once

solemnly in his Encyclical *Non abbiamo bisogno* of June 29, 1931, when a conflict had broken out with Fascism over Catholic action among the young. The conflict was settled, but the papal condemnation remains. At the moment relations between Fascism and the Vatican are good, partly because the Vatican has sought to avoid further motives of dispute, in view of the very grave ones it has with Hitler's Germany, but given the Fascist spirit of domination, pride and violence, it should be no surprise if the Church were subjected to persecution or humiliation.

Fascism and Communism are neither antithetical, nor is one the remedy for the other. To change a dictatorship of one class for a dictatorship of another would mean simply passing from one tyranny to another. This would resolve none of the social, economic, political, and moral problems of the present crisis. The real fact is that Fascism paves the way for Communism or for something of the kind, and that Communism paves the way for Fascism or for another régime of the same type. Who can maintain that Stalin's present régime in Russia is Communist? To-day in Russia there is a reappearance of small holdings, family farms, retail buying and selling of goods and savings. From the religious standpoint, a certain freedom of worship is emerging, and the few churches that have not been destroyed have been reopened and are crowded. In the international field, Russia conforms to the *bourgeois* order, is represented at Geneva in the League of Nations, at London on the Non-Intervention Committee, at Montreux at the Dardanelles Conference. What does Russia lack in order to become a Fascist country? The Moscow trials excel those of Leipzig or Rome; but the Nazi purge of June 30, 1934, has its counterpart in Russia. Russia's anti-Trotskyism corresponds to Germany's anti-semitism.

What does more than anything to put Germany, Italy, and Russia on the same plane, so that they disturb the whole world, is their common and relentless war against western democracies, against the system of traditional

rights, against respect of human personality, things rooted in our Christian civilization. These régimes sooner or later are bound by their very nature to result in war. Hence their need, before the fatal hour strikes, to disintegrate the system underlying the power of their eventual adversaries, and to create for themselves favourable currents of opinion in the very countries on which they will make war : Russia among the workers, Germany and Italy among the middle classes. Such is the dilemma of Fascism and Communism.

CORPORATISM

The Encyclical *Rerum Novarum* of Leo XIII set the crown to forty years of aspirations and work of the Catholic Social movement, which from 1848 onwards had striven for a Christian reorganization of labour. The names of Mgr Ketteler (Germany), Cardinal Mermillod (Switzerland), and Cardinal Manning (England), of Mgr Gibbons (the United States), Gaspard Decourtins (Switzerland), Count de Mun and La Tour du Pin (France), the philosopher Balmés (Spain), Count Eduardo Soderini and Professor Toniolo (Italy), Baron Volgesang and Hitze (Austria), Mgr Pottier (Belgium), and Mgr Nolens (Holland) are the best known of the pioneers of Christian social work. They prepared the way for the great Encyclical or were its most authoritative exponents. The idea of a new corporative order (after the suppression of the craft and trade guilds by reforming kings and the revolutions of the eighteenth century) was first mooted by Catholic economists, politicians, social organizers and priests. From every side came the appeal for an authoritative word to overcome the mistrust and opposition with which they were met in both the Catholic and the Liberal camps. After much research and some hesitation and opposition, on May 15, 1891, Leo XIII published his Encyclical.

To understand its significance, we must realize the position half a century ago. Against the Liberal theory that the State must not interfere in private economy, and in economic conflicts must confine itself to the maintenance of

public order, Leo XIII asserted the right and duty of State intervention. But against the Socialist theory which confused the economic and political fields he set limits to the intervention of the State, marked by the rights of human personality, of the family, of the class, rights that the State could not violate. For Leo XIII the right to vocational unions, whether of employers or of workers, was a natural right, which the State should recognize and regulate, but which was not created by the State—in the same way as the right of the family is such by nature and not a concession from the State.

While during this period States were introducing or had already introduced labour legislation, and were permitting the formation of trade unions, which earlier had been rigorously forbidden, Catholic Conservatives resented the Encyclical *Rerum Novarum*, which they considered rash. In a later phase, they upheld the thesis of 'vertical' unions of employers and workers together, as a check to the movement for Catholic Workers' Leagues. Controversy raged, especially in Belgium and Germany, where a fine working-class movement was taking form. In Italy it was disputed whether Catholic workers could lawfully call their leagues trade unions (*sindacati*) and not till the pontificate of Benedict XV was there an end of opposition to the formation of Christian unions and their Confederation, founded in September, 1918.

In spite of this, the Catholic workers' movement was a fact of the first importance, embracing a million and a half members in Germany, over a million in Italy, nearly four hundred thousand in Austria-Hungary, three hundred thousand in Belgium, a hundred and fifty thousand in Holland, a hundred thousand in France, two hundred thousand in Switzerland. After the war the International Confederation of Christian Workers was formed, with headquarters at Utrecht, where it still continues, in spite of the fact that through political events in the totalitarian States it can no longer include the Catholic workers of Italy, or Germany, or Austria.

In the Anglo-Saxon countries, Great Britain and the

United States, there has been no question of Christian trade unions as distinct from others, for the trade union movement *did not present itself*, as on the Continent of Europe either as a revolutionary, Socialist or Communist movement, or as an anti-clerical one. Catholic workers who belong to the trade unions normally do not find themselves in a hostile environment, though, to tell the truth, certain socialist ideas circulate pretty freely. Given the pragmatic and practical spirit of the Anglo-Saxon, theories were left in the background or at least each member was free to appraise or adapt them as he wished. The Catholic workers for their part, in order to have a religious, moral and social formation of their own, have their own associations with their own bulletins, and university colleges such as the Catholic Workers' College at Oxford.

It is not here the place to deal with the practical achievements in the labour field of European Catholics during half a century, especially on behalf of the agricultural classes. In spite of the fact that the Catholic workers organized in trade unions were fewer than the Socialists, their activity, especially in Germany and Italy, was notable, and was recognized by the International Labour Office of the League of Nations. In the legislative field, they demanded the legal recognition of vocational groups, free trade unionism, compulsory corporations. This was the formula of the Italian Popular Party, and was adopted by all the Catholic Social movements of Europe.

This was the position, actual and theoretical, of the Catholic social movement in regard to the corporative system up to the advent of Fascism in Italy. In early days Mussolini was not a corporatist, but a revolutionary syndicalist. In 1920 he favoured the occupation of the factories by the workers, and he fiercely censured the Socialists who yielded before the action of Giolitti's government. But once in power after the march on Rome (1922) he gradually moved in the direction of trade union monopoly by the Fascist party, and finally, of an economic monopoly in the hands of the State.

By the law of 1926 free trade unions ceased to exist. The old Confederation of Labour (controlled by the Socialists), the young Italian Confederation of Workers (controlled by Catholics), the militant Syndicalist Union, were deprived of all practical functions and therefore came to an end. Legal recognition was confined solely to the Fascist trade unions. This monopoly of trade unionism corresponded to the law which recognized a sole political party, the Fascist Party, and decreed five years' imprisonment for any person who sought to re-establish, or engaged in propaganda on behalf of the disbanded parties—Popular (Catholics), Democrats, Socialist, and Communist.

In England and the United States trade unions form indeed a single organization, but this is not imposed by law, nor recognized as the monopoly of a single party. In Italy and the other dictatorial countries, there is on the contrary a party monopoly recognized by law. To attenuate this political tie, it was declared that citizens should be free to join or not to join their Fascist syndicate, so long as they paid their dues (which were collected by the Government). But since no one could work or set up a factory without a syndicate ticket, in the end non-Fascists had to join the Fascist syndicate.

These syndicates are anything but independent and autonomous associations. They depend on the Fascist Party and on the Government Prefectures, on the Minister of Corporations, and, personally, on the Duce himself. The union secretaries are appointed officially by the Government, and are not chosen by the members. It is these secretaries who, in the first instance, settle labour disputes. The labour bureaux of the Fascist Party are the only ones that can give work.

On the Fascist syndicates have been built the so-called Corporations. These are nothing but meetings, held more or less frequently, of representatives of employers and workers, State officials and Fascist Party officials, under the presidency of Mussolini. Let it not be thought that the representatives of employers and workers are chosen by the interested parties; they are officially appointed by the Government.

The Corporations are in substance State organs for controlling production in national interests, for proposing fixed prices of goods, for settling those labour disputes that have not been settled by the special tribunal or by the local offices, and finally, for advising the Government on all questions of economic and professional interest.

The working of the Corporations has so far thrown little light on the practical possibility of an economic and occupational organization of the Italian State, for, no sooner were they appointed (and then not all of them), than war broke out in Africa and the economic sanctions were imposed by the League of Nations. A short time before, the Fascist Government had decreed the State monopoly of the foreign exchange ; then it was decreed that foreign trade could be carried out only through the State. With the end of Sanctions, the closed commercial system remained, in spite of the devaluation of the lira. Up to the present, in a régime of economic rarefaction and State-controlled trade, the corporation has served simply as a façade, useful for endorsing the measures taken by the various Ministers and for giving the impression to the world at large that Government, Party, and working and industrial classes are in harmonious agreement.

What is the difference between the Fascist corporations and those of the Christian Social school ? Since the latter have no factual existence and the former are without reality or personality of their own, we must speak of differences of theory and principle. The Austrian Corporations, decreed by the Government and placed under the banner of the Encyclical *Quadragesimo Anno*, never had any real consistency and collapsed with the independence of the State. Those of Portugal are likewise State corporations without autonomy or freedom. Another attempt in the direction of corporations, that of the Catholic canton of Fribourg in Switzerland, is on the contrary based on private initiative and on respect for trade union liberty, but so far it is more an aspiration than a reality.

The first and fundamental difference is that the Fascist corporations are an emanation of the State, to which they owe their existence, character, faculties, limits, and which holds them in dependence, bound to its aims, deprived of any possibility of acting for themselves, and without any real relationship between the organs of the corporation and the members of the classes concerned. Leo XIII, on the contrary, had laid down that the State should 'protect such societies . . . but let it not interfere in their internal government, nor touch the inward springs which give them life, for vital movement proceeds essentially from an intrinsic principle, and can very easily be quenched by the action of an outside cause.' The corporations to which he and his successors refer, and which were envisaged and upheld by Catholic economists and sociologists, are based on the principle of an essential autonomy, not in conflict with the State, but on the other hand not politically, administratively or functionally dependent on it, or rather on the Government.

In *Quadragesimo Anno* there is a passage that while necessarily cautious is very clear for anyone who reads it thoughtfully. 'But in order to overlook nothing in a matter of such importance, and in the light of the general principles stated above, as well as of those shortly to be added, we feel bound to say that to our knowledge there are some who fear that the State is substituting itself in the place of private initiative, instead of limiting itself to necessary and sufficient assistance. It is feared that the new syndical and corporative organization tends to have an excessively bureaucratic and political character, and that, notwithstanding the general advantages referred to above, it ends in serving particular political aims rather than in contributing to the initiation and promotion of a better social order.'

A Pope in Rome, his relations with Italy governed by a recent treaty and concordat, could not express with greater prudence or graver words what was not so much a premonition as a truth. Those who 'feared' in this manner in May 1931 were precisely those of the Catholic Social school, and their fears were not unfounded. A little more than a month later, Pius XI himself, in his Encyclical *Non*

abbiamo bisogno (June 29, 1931), declared that the oath enforced on all who registered in the Fascist syndicates (and Fascist Party) in order to get a labour permit and to obtain employment under the State, the municipal or provincial governments, in the corporations, in the schools, etc., could be tolerated only on condition that in swearing it they made the reservation (tacitly or explicitly according to circumstances) : ' save for the rights of God and of conscience.'

In order to mask the absence of liberty in the Fascist corporative system, the creation of the *Corporative State* has been proclaimed. Even the lesser imitators or would-be imitators speak of a Corporative State, and the Fascist Parties that are growing up in constitutional countries (Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia) likewise make the Corporative State part of their programme. In what does such a State consist ? In the suppression of the parliaments elected by universal suffrage and by free individual citizens ; with the substitution of assemblies of delegates from the several corporations. In a free country like England, with free corporations as autonomous vocational groups, the change would be an important one, inasmuch as instead of a House of Lords and House of Commons embracing all the interests of the country and representing them on the political plane, there would be one or two assemblies of a vocational origin and specifically economic in character.

But in countries like Italy, where the members of the Chamber are officially put forward by the Fascist Grand Council, from lists drawn up by a political committee of the Fascist Party, and which indeed may be wholly disregarded by the Duce, who decides everything ; where the electors can vote only ' yes ' or ' no ' on the official list approved by the Duce—and everyone knows how little political freedom exists in Italy—then in this case, whether the list be drawn up with political or vocational criteria, the result is always the same. The so-called Corporative Assembly will have the same character as the present so-called Parliament—an assembly without freedom, without personality, without autonomy, without opposition, without initiative, serving

merely to acclaim the Duce and to approve all the acts of the Government.

From this point of view, those who would make the Corporative State derive from *Quadragesimo Anno* deceive themselves and deceive others. The teaching of Pius XI is not political, nor on a political plane, nor does it confuse social reforms with the structure and technicalities of a State, but it proclaims certain principles of universal application, whatever the form of government a country may choose or happen to possess. These principles are :

1. That the vocational corporation is the organ of a class, which has by nature an existence of its own within the State. It is the duty of the State to recognize and regulate it, but not to distort its character or to make it serve political and party ends.

2. That the corporation, in pursuing its particular vocational and economic ends, must be founded on the principles of justice and morality.

3. That the corporation must contribute to the formation of an organic economic system, which will avert the excesses of a capitalism to-day in great measure anonymous and irresponsible, will lead the working classes to a sharing in capital by co-partnership or other suitable means, and will remove the motives driving the workers towards Communism.

Can these principles be realized in what is known as the *totalitarian* State, Nazi or Fascist? Can they be realized in what is known as the *Communist* State? Can they be realized in what is known as the *liberal-individualistic* State? Here is the problem of Christian corporativism. To our mind, the answer is in the negative for all three cases, but in different degrees. For State totalitarianism subordinates to the State all the living forces of the country, all its organisms, and human personality itself. Communism is totalitarian, just as Fascism and Nazism, but it implies in addition the suppression of social classes (save that of labour) and the abolition of private property at least in principle, if not wholly in fact.

The liberal-individualistic State too, if it is truly such, cannot admit of more than the two terms, the individual

citizen and the State. Therefore it struggled for nearly a century against any legal recognition of the class ; it first hampered, then tolerated workers' associations and the trade unions, and only belatedly recognized their existence ; it opposed State intervention in private economy, and for long years left the workers (including women and children) without legal protection. Now things have changed to a certain extent. But every step the State takes towards intervention in economic social questions and towards recognition and organization of corporations, is a step away from classical liberalism, towards the Organic State. Such a State, like all the political life of our civilization, must show the effects of Christian inspiration, must realize justice, charity, and Christian liberty even in economic and social life. In this economic and social life the working classes must find pacification with the other classes, and the urge to collaboration and fraternity.

OUR DEMOCRACY

In the concrete existence of each separate State there is no such thing as Democracy *tout simple*, there is that particular democracy that has taken shape with the growth of historical institutions. Philosophers and sociologists study the ethical and juridical principles and the political aims with which the central idea of democracy is imbued, but none the less, no one can put the democracy of Athens, that of the Roman Republic, those of the Middle Ages, and those of to-day in one and the same category. Even among those of to-day, no one can identify British democracy, French democracy, and the democracy of the United States.

Every democracy, in the concrete, must be distinguished by a qualifying adjective—whether historical (e.g. Athenian democracy), or political (e.g. Liberal democracy), or sociological (e.g. individualist democracy), and so on. Let us speak of *our* democracy. Let us first of all rule out what it is not. To us, democracy, like any other form of political government, is not, as it was at one time made out to be, anti-Christian, hostile to religion and based on principles

incompatible with our Faith. To-day this is a truism, but there was a time when the view it refutes was believed a truth, through a confusion between the democratic idea in general and certain principles which were put forward as the 'necessary premises' of any *true* modern democracy.

Again, democracy for us is not *secular or neutral* in the current sense that democracy must be dissociated from religious and Christian ideas. Democracy is not an end unto itself, it is not even the end of the citizens, it is a political means ordered to the common good. The culture, morality, religious feeling of a country are integral factors of the common good, as conceived in its totality, according to the historical conditions of our civilization, which is Christian. Let it not be thought that by denying, in this sense, the religious neutrality of democracy, we would have it become *clerical*, as we are accused of doing. Clericalism as conceived by our adversaries is not and cannot be *democratic*. The two terms, clericalism and democracy, in their current acceptance, are mutually exclusive.

A further step. Our democracy is not *individualist*, like that conceived by J.-J. Rousseau, and which, from historical causes, came into being with the French Revolution. We cannot attribute an *absolute* value to the sum of individual wills ; the result would be a tyranny equal to, or worse than, that which attributes an *absolute* value to the will of one. Political individualism leads to Etatism, to the centralization of all powers and all social values in the State, to the detriment of other social organisms and of human and civic personality.

Finally, our democracy is not the democracy of a *single class*. The middle classes in the last century formed middle-class democracies which became their monopoly. They refused the workers the right to organize themselves in trade unions, and they attacked the workers' parties as subversive. The workers' demands have led to a modification of *bourgeois* democracy, but the working classes seek to establish a régime with one class only, their own, under the banner of Socialism or Communism. We accept the existence and coexistence of all classes, and hence we deny that

democracy can be politically or socially the democracy of a single class.

Thus we have indirectly outlined our own democracy. We like to call it Christian Democracy, not as implying that the Christian religion should express itself in political terms, but in order, on the one hand, to rule out the whole anti-Christian democratic tradition from the French Revolution up to our own time, and on the other, to affirm the values of our Christian civilization, which must be able to live in our political institutions. The adjective 'Christian' is therefore not specific (as the philosophers and grammarians say) to the noun democracy, and hence we cannot define it.

Our democracy is often termed *Organic*, to oppose it to that which is *individualist*. The meaning of the word organic is complex. In the democratic State all the administrative, economic, syndical, social, cultural, and religious organisms which correspond to the needs and character of every class, region, and group and to their general and particular interests, must have their own existence, autonomy, and freedom of initiative. To-day we often hear the term Corporative State, or corporations, to designate the economic organisms of classes or professions. What is more, the Corporative State is made to coincide with the authoritarian State, and with the suppression of parliamentary political representation. We do not accept this conception, which falsifies the nature of the State and does away with democracy. The organic conception presents itself as opposed both to political individualism and to State centralization, which are the bases of French democracy.

After the war, in Italy first, then elsewhere (in Bavaria, Spain, Poland, Czechoslovakia, France), democratic Popular Parties or People's Parties were formed, maintaining the principle of the coexistence of classes and of a State based on the whole people. Hence the term *Popular Democracy*. To-day the slogan 'Popular' has been adopted by other parties also, and, what is worse, by so-called Popular Fronts. The true idea of *people* (the Roman and Christian idea) loses its significance (as it has tended to do even in

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THE CITIZEN'S RIGHTS IN TIME OF WAR

THERE is more talk of the citizen's duty in time of war than of his rights, and up to a point this is very natural: *salus publica suprema lex est*. But in an integral and logical conception of law, it is not possible for there to be duties without corresponding rights. The workman's duty is to carry out the work entrusted to him, and he has the right to be paid for it. The employer has the right to have the work done and it is his duty to pay for it. The political authority has the right to see that the laws are carried out, but it is its duty to make good laws. It is the citizen's duty to obey the laws, but it is his right to demand that the laws shall be good.

These two examples, the one of commutative justice and the other of social ethics, though very different in character, bring out a point which, we believe, is often overlooked. That is, that where there is a right, whether natural or acquired, the subject of it is in consequence obliged to fulfil the duty correlative to it, at the same time as, while obliging others to recognize his right, he himself is obliged in duty to recognize the rights of others. For this reason the fundamental character of every juridical system might be defined as *the coexistence of rights in the reciprocity of duties*. We cannot find a man with only rights and no duties, or with only duties and no rights, save through the monstrous disparity of an unnatural society. The same applies to collective bodies, chief of which is the State. We can and should discriminate between the personal rights and duties of those invested with power, and the collective rights of the State as such, but we must agree that any right over

citizens acquired by the State must be counterbalanced by a categorical duty towards them.

It is difficult, on the sociological plane, to draw a distinction between the State and citizens, since there can be no State without citizens, nor citizens, as such, without the State. But juridically we can, by abstraction, consider the State—the organized political authority—as distinct from its citizens considered either severally or as a community, inasmuch as they are subject to the power and law of the State.

The citizen's duty in the event of war is plain and undisputed. It may be defined (according to individual possibilities and public needs) in the following terms: 'A duty of civic solidarity, of obedience to civil and military chiefs, of financial support, of armed defence, of sacrifice of life.' These are the rights of citizens, both severally and as a body considered as distinct from the supreme political power, the moment these potential duties become actual through the emergence of a probable case of war.

War demands a general and special preparation, definition of the *casus belli*, declaration and the opening of hostilities to be carried on to their natural term, which is peace. In the various stages of this tragic process the citizen, since he has duties, cannot but have rights, and hence must be put in a position to exercise them. The difficulty lies in recognizing and defining them, in harmonizing them with the public interest, and in guaranteeing them.

Let us consider the general and merely hypothetical preparation of a war. The nature of this preparation follows from the character of the State and its economic, political and military structure. The citizen may or may not possess recognized political rights, and he may demand those he has not or amend those he has. The problem here would be simply the general problem of how the citizen can be protected against heavy taxation for military purposes and how he can control such expenditure, were it not for the fact that in many countries conscription has been introduced,

bringing them on to a permanent war footing, and in any case to-day war implies a whole nation in arms.

Compulsory conscription extending to all able-bodied male citizens as soon as they reach a certain age (usually twenty), with their periodical recall to the colours and the obligation of military service in time of war, arose on the Continent with the recognition of the right of suffrage (which was to become universal) and with the proclamation of the principle of the Sovereign People. Although compulsory conscription was reinforced by a still more militaristic tendency under the dictatorships, from Napoleon onwards, it is none the less characteristic of the national State based on popular sovereignty and would have been inconceivable under the aristocratic type of the *ancien régime*. The dictators themselves make sure of a popular, demagogic basis by plebiscites, immense gatherings and the manipulation of the mob. Compulsory conscription fits into their picture. The Anglo-Saxon countries have not introduced conscription as a regular practice, but by indirect means they seek to arm as many citizens as possible.

In the Middle Ages and even in the early centuries of modern times, when there was no true State treasury, nor a budget nor a sound financial organization, expenditure for war preparation was decided on as occasion arose, for special purposes and under special administration. The citizens formed corporate orders and agreed to the added burden either willingly or perforce; guilds, cities, provinces, aristocracy and clergy, contributed according to their capacity. The clergy, indeed, were protected by ecclesiastical immunity and often papal consent was required before they could be made to pay the war tithe. The free cities decided on their own authority. Thus under various forms the citizen had a control over war charges, and hence, from this standpoint, indirectly over the aim and possibility of war.

In regard to military preparations, citizens as such had no direct obligations, but according to the system of government, custom and period, the nobles or vassals were born soldiers and had to contribute a definite number of men-at-arms. These were professional soldiers, often from father to

son, and they too were bound by a feudal bond. Subsequently, especially after the invention of fire-arms, there came into being the Free Companies and the standing armies of mercenaries, such as the Swiss. The maritime cities had their permanent fleets, which simultaneously engaged in trade and policed the seas, and often fought amongst themselves, as Pisa with Genoa or Genoa with Venice. But the seamen too were paid volunteers and formed corporations or guilds.

Till the advent of conscription, in the normal way citizens and peasants were never obliged to war service, save when the city was besieged, when all lent themselves to the defence. In communal wars, and especially in the wars against the Emperors, the Italian cities (from the First Lombard League onwards) armed the burgesses and the men of the people. But then popular consent, springing from the republican and democratic-corporative system of government, was at the basis of such wars. General preparation for war, from the financial and military standpoints, is stamped by the constitutional system of each country and its will, generic but presumed, to put itself into a position to defend its territory and its political personality against foreign attack. In such a system the citizen normally has the right, implicit or explicit, of consenting to the financial contribution demanded of him and to his direct or indirect share in military preparations. All political régimes that deprive their citizens of these rights or render them ineffectual, by administrative centralization or by a tyrannical and arbitrary excess of permanent militarization, violate basic rights and alter the normal relations between citizens and the political power of the State.

The most delicate period is the subsequent one, when the causes of war are ripening and its outbreak is being technically and politically prepared for. It has always been difficult, and to-day we might say impossible, for an intention to make war to remain a secret between the rulers of a State, without reaching the citizens or being divulged

to the presumably enemy State. We must also admit the difficulty of establishing beforehand the moral and juridical responsibilities for a war, and the side on which they lie. Let us therefore suppose, as a hypothesis suited to our investigation, that war is being prepared by both sides from mutual fear of aggression and that the citizens of both States share in this fear, with a vague knowledge of the reasons for it and with more or less conviction. The duty of the heads of the two States, apart from special pacts between them, or from alliances with other States or leagues of States, would be, according to traditional ideas, to ascertain the reality of the danger and to seek to overcome it by pacific means. If every pacific means fails and there is fear that delay will bring immediate injury of a real and serious nature, then their duty, in the face of the menace, lies in organizing resistance and if necessary entering into war.

Let us consider this hypothesis (the gravest one), and see what will be the right of citizens in this second phase. With the French Revolution in 1790, the right to make peace or war was transferred from the King to the People. Among the Constitutions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the more democratic have established this as a popular right, others have left to the King and the Government the decisive power of peace or war, subject to ratification by Parliament, or else they have found a compromise between the rights of the people and those of the King. In practice, whatever the various Constitutions, it has been the governments and the general staffs that have prepared for war, and the parliaments have merely been called—when they have been called—to deal with a *fait accompli*, to ratify what has been done, and to legalize a war that has already morally, and sometimes actually, started.

Yet, whatever the government practice in the past, it cannot be doubted that citizens in the greater number of cases could put themselves in a position to exercise their political right, to weigh the causes of war and to anticipate any invasion of the sphere of parliamentary power by the executive or royal power. If they did not do so, or did not do so effectively, part of the fault was theirs, for *vigilantibus*

jura succurrunt. The Press, elections, public meetings, permanent organizations, the constitution of parties, the existence and working of Parliament, are so many means by which the citizen may share, lawfully and harmoniously, in the State's powers and find a way to safeguard his rights. Where the constitutional system functions badly, the rights of the citizens too (rights that from one aspect or another may also be called duties) in regard to war preparation and decision cannot be properly exercised. In such cases the whole machinery must be rectified and improved. The specific question becomes a general one, and is no longer juridical but political.

In States of an absolutist and militarist type, like the Russia of the Czars, the Germany of the Hohenzollerns and the Austria-Hungary of the Habsburgs (the two latter in spite of parliaments), the political rights of citizens in the matter of war were non-existent or merely apparent. They had no opportunity of appraising the necessity, opportuneness, and utility of war during the preparatory period. We shall speak later of the present situation. Here it is necessary to reply to the following questions: (1) Can it really be asserted that it is incompatible with the interests of the State for the citizens to have a right to a say in this second phase, the preparation and declaration of war? (2) If such a right is not compatible, should it not be roundly denied, or else reduced to a mere form (though leaving, according to the régime, a certain freedom of appraisal), so that the powers of the State shall neither be hindered in their moves nor delayed in their decisions?

The better to answer, let us make a short digression into history. In the Middle Ages, when defensive weapons and methods were superior to offensive ones, the preparation and decision of war was carried out not by the royal authority alone but by the king together with the feudal lords, lay, or ecclesiastic, and with the consent of the participant bodies. It was the feudal aristocracy that decided (for the king was often merely *primus inter pares*), in agreement with the autonomous bodies (cities, guilds, universities, abbeys, and the like), because only so could armies and economic supplies

be gathered together. The political structure determined the system. The idea of a citizen with a personal right was not then current. Each was represented by his social group, because his rights were corporate rather than personal. The possessor of a right did not speak for himself but for all his associates. The citizens, burgesses or common people, who inhabited a city were guaranteed through their own city or their own guilds, and if the city was free and autarchic, they themselves decided as sovereigns. In substance, even in the preparatory phase of war, the citizen, as a general rule and within a political system that was more or less well organized, like the mediæval one, had his say in the preparation and declaration of a war.

As little by little the powers and organization of the kingdom became centralized in the ruler, and barons and vassals left their fiefs and castles and came to court (even the bishops abandoning their dioceses), and the free cities became subject, and the guilds privileged, closed corporations, wars became enterprises of the sovereign, and the participation of the corporate bodies, *États Généraux*, parliaments and the like, decreased till it practically disappeared. When we reach the Sovereigns by Divine Right, theory and practice concentrate everything in the will of the sovereign. The theologians confine themselves to insisting that the sovereign should consult the constitutional bodies and persons capable of honest, dispassionate, and enlightened advice on the justice and opportuneness of the war, while they exclude any right either corporate or personal that could bind the king's decision. It must be remembered that in those days compulsory conscription did not exist. Wars were limited, and the greatest injury to the populations came from epidemics, famines and money shortage, rather than directly from the wars. It should also be added that in certain periods and for determined ends, wars assumed a national and popular character, like the wars against the Moors in Spain, the Crusades, the wars of the Italian cities and the Wars of Religion.

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The last point enables us to distinguish between the

so-called royal wars (to-day we should say State wars, among which we find colonial wars), and those that might be said to be popular, whether national or religious. In the first case the will of the people cannot be implicitly assumed as it can in the second. This distinction brings us back to our question on the right of the citizen in the second phase, the immediate preparation and declaration of war.

To our mind there may or may not be a political right attributing to the people, and through the people to Parliament, any final decision over war. This depends on the régime of the State. The citizens who have acquired such a right will do well to see that they do not lose it. But we believe that there is a primordial or natural right in the citizens taken as a whole—to be expressed in the constitutional organic forms of the time—to have their say in the preparation and declaration of war.

This participation must be co-ordinated to that of the rulers of the State, so as to avoid the danger of anarchy at such a delicate moment. It must therefore be regulated by traditions and by the constitutions suited to the time. But it cannot be suppressed without violation of a natural right inherent in human personality. Citizens must be placed in a position to give or refuse their assent to the burdens and sacrifices of a war. To conceive of the supreme authority as the sole judge of war with no obligation to acquaint itself with the feelings of those most concerned, is to conceive of the State in a monstrous, unnatural fashion. On the other hand, if the general opinion of citizens is contrary to war, so long as this opinion remains unchanged it is unnatural for a ruler to force them to fight at any cost. If a conflict breaks out between the citizens on the one hand, and a monarch or dictator on the other, it means, sociologically speaking, that the monarch or dictator has lost the moral basis of his authority.

If the citizens have no means of expressing their will in regard to the war, because the absolutist régime is protected by armed partisans, a powerful police force, and a wide-flung spy system, this proves merely that in such a State not only the right we are here considering, but all the

rights of citizens are violated and trodden underfoot by tyranny. This is a pathological case, which must be studied as a whole. What from the legal and political point of view is opposed to our assertions, is not the pathological case but a determined conception of the State and its authority. Such was the theory of the Divine Right of Kings, which to-day has no longer any importance, but which can explain certain historical aberrations. Or else Hobbes' theory, which supposes that the people, incapable of governing themselves, delegated their powers once for all to the sovereign, without the faculty of regaining them. This theory too to-day finds no one to defend it.

Yet most juridical and political theories, except the democratic, liberal ones, have sought to reinforce the authority of the State, under the belief that it had been undermined by the parliamentarism of the last century. In a question like that of the right of war it is sought to justify the concentration of all rights in the hands of the Government and of the Head of the State, for fear of weakening national defence and as the swiftest and most effectual means of preparing and declaring wars. In substance, there is here not so much a contempt for the citizen's right (which is often nominally recognized) as a political aim that has weakened its legal force. In practice we may say that where citizens have any real right in the matter, it has nearly always been rendered ineffective. We say 'nearly always' because in the case of national and popular wars, the governments themselves emphasize popular consent as though to justify their action, especially if this is legally contestable. In such a case, the opinion of the citizens serves as a pretext to cover a violation of international law.

The problem becomes a delicate one when between government and people, between monarch and citizens, an irremediable dissension shows itself over the preparation and declaration of a war. From the juridical standpoint, in a country with a democratic régime the people prevail; in a country with an authoritarian régime the Government prevails. But sociologically such a war (if it is decided upon) loses its moral basis. From this we see that whatever the

régime of a State, the presumed or explicit consent of the people to war is a necessary preliminary before the war can really be started. The absence of popular consent can be veiled. Reason may be overruled by passion, and instead of responsible men there will be excited mobs. This means a perversion of morality, politics and law, but such a perversion shows still more clearly how nature has implanted a fundamental right in the citizens, which cannot be violated with impunity.

The third phase of the war-process is its waging till peace is reached. It cannot be denied that once a war has broken out, political necessity demands a greater concentration of powers in the Government and the military authorities, and that citizens must put their confidence in their leaders. To confine ourselves to the present day, we may note, during the Great War, two methods applied in democratic countries : that by which the régime has continued to function normally, and restrictive legislation in constitutional matters has been a brief and justified exception, or else that by which the normal rights of Parliament, the Press and meetings are restricted and suspended.

This depends on the political maturity of the people, on concord among the citizens, on their spirit of self-sacrifice in regard to anything that might be harmful to the State. We cannot deny that within legal limits the Governments during the war period should have adequate means to safeguard the people against sudden shocks, facile discouragement and failure in powers of resistance. But we cannot approve of the suppression of all free voices, though these should express themselves with the restraint necessary at such a time. The right of the citizen remains entire, even though his means for its manifestation may be limited when this might be harmful either to the fighting forces or to the conduct of the war.

In regard to peace negotiations with the enemy, either directly or through intermediaries, and whether in the case of victory or of final defeat or of compromise, the chief

right pertains to the Government or to the military authority, as the case may be. The citizen may express his own views in the most opportune and prudent manner ; Parliament can indicate its policy to the Government, and, if the laws of the country allow, can turn the Government out of office. But the right of proposing peace-terms always remains with the plenipotentiaries, subject to ratification by Parliament or other competent organs of popular representation.

All this seems to me not unreasonable. Only, I believe that every people should find suitable means for reconciling the rights of the State to direct a war for which its organs of government are primarily and principally responsible, with the rights of the citizen to a certain moral and political control over both the conduct of the war and the timeliness and conditions of the peace. The history of all countries and all ages teaches us that not only must the political power be backed by the people, especially in a war in which it is deeply involved, but also that the people either in organic form or by popular manifestations claims its right to a share, not only in the risks but also in the responsibilities of war and peace.

In short, it seems we can establish the two following points as necessary elements in a clear politico-legal theory of the right of citizens in case of war :

(a) That the citizen has a fundamental right, which may be called a natural right, springing from his human personality and his character as *civis*, to play his part in the preparation, declaration, and execution of a war and of the ensuing peace.

(b) That this part normally corresponds to the type of the politico-juridical régime of the State ; and, though this régime may be authoritarian, the right of the citizen, from the moral aspect, remains entire, even though it may not be expressible in established political and legal forms.

From 1919 onwards, with the foundation of the League of Nations, and later, from 1928, with the Pact of Paris, known as the Kellogg Pact, a new juridical situation has been

created for the whole world, impinging on the sovereign right of States in regard to war, and, by repercussion, also on the right of the citizens, as we have defined it. The States that are members of the League are obliged to abstain from recourse to arms in given cases, and to submit to a determined procedure established by the Covenant. By the Kellogg Pact they undertook not to have recourse to war for reasons of national policy. From the combination of the two undertakings, the only war permissible is a defensive war in the event of aggression. It would be possible to foresee a second case (to-day highly hypothetical, and which, juridically, would not be a war but international police action), the war that would follow the application of military sanctions by the League against a State violating the Covenant, if this State rebelled or sought to resist by armed force.

The Covenant of the League obliges the State that has a dispute with another State either to settle it amicably or through arbitration, or else to bring it before the Council of the League and set in course the procedure provided for. It is clear that under the League system no State may arbitrarily begin a war except when it is a case of repelling a sudden aggression. Citizens cannot therefore legitimately be constrained to the burdens and sacrifices of a war, before the League procedure has run its course. This permits a State to have recourse to war if the vote of the Council recommending the terms of a settlement has not been unanimous (the contending parties excluded) and if three months have passed from the date of the vote ; or else if one of the two parties, violating the Covenant and refusing to accept the proposed settlement, has recourse to arms. In this case the State that is the victim of aggression has the right to resist and can be aided by the other States of the League. Whether the citizens of a State are or are not in a position to assert themselves against their own Government which wishes to make war in violation of the Covenant is a question of fact and does not affect their rights ; in the same way that any violation of the Covenant does not affect the rights of the Member States. Citizens who dissent can

choose between two paths, either submission to the injunctions of their Government, or else to resist and to refuse co-operation.

This second hypothesis, the refusal of a part of the people, or even of a single citizen (here it is not the number that matters, but the recognition of a right), is a very delicate question, and deserves to be examined from both the moral and juridical standpoints. The old theologians asked themselves what was the duty of 'subjects' and especially of soldiers in the event of an unjust war. They considered the problem from the standpoint of the individual conscience; the juridical and political standpoint interested them only in a secondary manner, yet they could not wholly abstract themselves from the conditions under which they lived. In referring to the most famous Spanish theologians of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (among whom are Vittoria, Suarez, Vasquez), it must be remembered that their time was that of royal absolutism tempered only by a certain intervention on the part of the aristocracy, and that conscription did not then exist.

Apart from differences of detail or moralistic subtleties their theory was :

(a) that the war decided upon by the Sovereign (after hearing the *grandees* of the kingdom, though this was not essential) should be presumed to be just. Therefore subjects were obliged to obey the Sovereign and soldiers were obliged to fight.

(b) None the less, if the war was evidently or notoriously unjust, subjects could not obey nor soldiers fight and kill the enemy.

(c) Since a war could not be just for both sides, it was necessary that the rulers and those morally responsible (such as the ecclesiastical authorities and the *grandees* of the realm) should have ascertained the justice of the war and sought to prevent it if it was unjust. But this, according to Suarez, was a duty of charity, which could not be transmuted into a right limiting that of the sovereign.

This moral theory remained as a guidance for the consciences of rulers, but from the eighteenth century onwards it

was never translated into a public guidance for the consciences of subjects and soldiers. The ecclesiastics who should have preached it and asserted it, nearly always tolerated or accepted the thesis of a presumption of the justice of a war for both sides, and, since it was almost impossible to judge of wars that had complex causes and secret motives, they preferred to leave subjects and soldiers in their good faith as to the morality and legitimacy of their action. Yet, by the inward law of the empire of conscience over our acts, if in the event of war there are some (few or many, no matter, even a single man) who are convinced, in whatever way, of the injustice of a war, they can never favour it, nor vote credits for it, nor go to fight and kill the adversary. So long as their conviction remains, they are bound by an obligation of conscience, and no one can unloose it. This is the command of Christian morality and the sacrifice that it demands. In such a case the duty of the Christian is transformed into an inalienable personal right in the face of the State.

If this moral law of conscience holds good for all time, without distinction of juridical systems, there may, however, be periods and systems that make it easy for it to be put into effect, and others that render its very enunciation difficult. To-day, with the development of an international juridical structure, such as has come about with the formation of the League of Nations, and with the spread of the conviction that only a war of defence can be held legitimate and moral, a suitable atmosphere is being created for public discussion of the causes and justice of war. What the theologians of the seventeenth century believed to be impenetrable to the public—the reasons for a war—is to-day publicly discussed. What might remain doubtful even in the opinion of the jurists and grandees of the State—whether a war was just on both sides, or only on one side—is to-day a theory that has been translated into a pact, the Kellogg Pact, which clearly establishes all motives of national policy as unjust causes of war. To-day, too, a complicated procedure, such as that of the League of Nations, removes the possibility of a sudden outburst of passion, by demanding three months'

delay between a non-unanimous proposal for settlement and the possible outbreak of hostilities.

The citizen (not only a ruling *élite*), if he wishes, and if he has been trained to listen to the voice of conscience before that of passion, can thus take stock of the justice of a war. He is to-day in a very different state of mind from that of the 'subject' of the monarchs of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Then the theologians presumed all wars to be just, save when their injustice was evident or notorious. To-day every war is to be presumed unjust, save in the case of defence against unprovoked aggression. We cannot therefore assent to certain statements (however authoritative) in which mention is made of 'just wars' even when they are merely preventive. The reason is plain. The crucial condition for any just war is the case of necessity, a case which to-day, with the League organization of States and a juridical procedure fixed by treaty, cannot arise outside the hypothesis of aggression. The positions are therefore in process of being reversed and will be so completely as the League of Nations and international law cut more deeply into the right of States to have recourse to war. Thus it is plain that those who do not wish to conform to such rules abandon the League of Nations.

What are the practical consequences, at the present time, of the citizen's moral right to refuse his co-operation in a war he believes to be unjust? Can such a right ever be recognized and codified? To reply with accuracy, we must distinguish between the purely individual plane of conscience and the social plane, and consider the latter from two aspects, the political and the juridical. On the individual plane of conscience, the right of the citizen springing from his private conviction that a given war is unjust, can never be juridically defined. It remains within the domain of morals, where conflicts between two duties take place. When a citizen is involved in such a conflict by his conscience, he must listen to its voice. The State can strike at him by its laws, but in such case the State commits the same injustice, con-

sciously or unconsciously, as the Roman Empire committed against the Christians. From the sacrifice of such citizens may come a future law of toleration.

In England, during the war, the Quakers, through moral and religious conviction, could not assent to war or to military service. In a country where there is no conscription, in view of the limited number of Quakers the effect was not noticeable. But during the war, when it was felt to be necessary to oblige all able-bodied men to go to the Front, the British Government was not able to compel the Quakers, who put forward their conscientious objection, so that it ended by regulating their abstention from military service by law.

The principle of conscientious objection has to-day passed to the Continent and is making its way little by little, more as an individual moral repugnance to all war and all war preparations than as the result of a collective religious conviction. Under this aspect the thesis assumes an individualistic character and as such cannot lead to any form of legal toleration such as may be conceded to a community with a religious bond. And since the conscientious objectors do not distinguish between one war and another, on grounds of justice and legitimacy, at the present stage they may be considered as the idealist precursors of a future age, for the sake of which they are prepared to go to prison. No true sacrifice is ever in vain.

The second aspect of the question we have raised is the social aspect. Politically the position of the citizen who, convinced of the injustice of a war, can point to the verdict of the Council of the League of Nations, is becoming a strong one. It is his duty and his right to vindicate his conviction with the moral and legal means at his disposal in order to avert war, and if the war has already started, he has the right to assert the reasons why it should be suspended and the proposals of the League carried out. But if the exercise of this right is prevented by the means at the disposal of the State (and to-day the State is really omnipotent in its dealings with citizens), he will be unable to exercise his right politically and it remains merely as a support to his conscience.

From the juridical standpoint, it is not impossible that, as the conscientious objectors' movement spreads, democratic States may imitate the toleration shown in England towards the Quakers. But we cannot to-day anticipate that the conflict between the League of Nations and a State that has been declared a violator of the Covenant will give rise to legal measures guaranteeing the right of citizens who on these grounds would abstain from taking part in the war. Perhaps after a certain experience it will be possible to make provision for those citizens who may leave their country for this reason, enabling them to obtain passports of the Nansen type, to be received irrespective of immigration quotas in countries in which immigration is limited, with international measures implying indirect recognition of a right in process of formation, of which the value to-day is simply a moral one.

In the Middle Ages canonical penalties of the Church or the Ban of the Empire against a rebel country affected all its citizens. Yet then, since the citizen lived in corporate nuclei, it might happen that a guild or a city or an abbey would withdraw itself from the sway of the kingdom under interdict or ban and go over to the other side, to Emperor or Pope. To-day the citizen is either supported by a party, in a democratic régime, and can so exercise his ethico-political rights, or else he is isolated and can but take refuge in his own conscience and suffer for its sake. In a totalitarian régime even the rule of conscience is contested by the State, but in such a régime, politics are the monopoly of one or of a few, law is precarious and arbitrary, and public morals are violated by the pantheistic conception of the State.

XI

THE RIGHT TO REBEL

FROM the papal pronouncements of the last century it would seem, at first sight, that all right to rebel against tyranny is denied. Gregory XVI in his celebrated Encyclical *Mirari vos* (August 15, 1832) speaks with horror against the doctrines 'which undermine the loyalty, the submission due to princes and which kindle everywhere the torches of sedition,' and also against seditious men, where he says: 'human and divine rights rise up, therefore, against the men who, by the blackest machinations of revolt and sedition, seek to destroy the loyalty due to princes and to thrust them from their thrones.'

Gregory XVI goes on to quote the example of the early Christians who were faithful and valiant soldiers of the Empire and in all that was not contrary to religion were subject to the emperors 'in spite of the most violent persecutions.' In this he differed from Bellarmine (and from the view expressed by Leo XIII in his Encyclical *Diuturnum illud*, of June 29, 1881). Bellarmine in his Third Controversy, *De Romano Pontifice* (Bk. V, ch. 7), had written: 'If the Christians of those days did not depose Nero and Diocletian, Julian the Apostate and the Arian Valentius and their like, it was because they lacked temporal forces.' From the historical point of view we cannot agree with Bellarmine, but what he wanted was to prove in the abstract the right of citizens in such cases to depose a tyrant, and thus he sought, by an historical hypothesis, to put aside the objection to his thesis that might be drawn from the conduct of the early Christians.

Gregory XVI, on the contrary (and later Leo XIII), found in their conduct an argument for obedience to sovereigns even if these were tyrants and anti-Christian persecutors like many of the Roman emperors.

The Jesuit Father Luigi Taparelli, who in 1848 published his famous *Theoretical Essay on Natural Law*, in his note on the right to the propagation of religion (Vol. II, ch. iii), goes so far as to deny the possibility of revolt on the part of the early Christians as something *illicita per se*. Here are his words :

‘ Let us therefore hold firmly with Tertullian that the Christian under the Cæsars died because he *had to die*, and, though *able* to rebel and defend himself, detested a defence that was *unlawful in itself*, and not because of dangers that would not have daunted his armed constancy since they did not daunt him when he was unarmed.’

Pius IX, who succeeded Gregory XVI, maintained the same line of thought in his Allocution of November 9, 1846, and this view is reiterated in 1864, in the sixty-third proposition of the Syllabus, which condemns the contrary error, namely that ‘ it is permitted to *refuse obedience to lawful rulers and even to revolt against them*.’

Leo XIII on various occasions dealt with this problem, then a burning one. In his Encyclical *Quod apostolici* of December 28, 1878, in the first year of his pontificate, he not only confirmed the widest application of the precept of obedience to the legitimate authorities, but he faced the case of an abuse of authority and of oppression (in other words, of tyranny), which was not explicitly mentioned by either of his predecessors, Gregory or Pius. Leo XIII wrote then :

‘ If, however, it happens that princes rashly exceed in the exercise of their power, Catholic doctrine does not permit an insurrection against them, for fear lest the tranquillity of order be still further disturbed, and society suffer still greater harm. And, when the abuse reaches a point where there seems no longer any hope of salvation,

patience teaches to seek the remedy in merit and in instant prayers to God.'

To this rigid and uncompromising theory Leo remained faithful in his Encyclical *Diuturnum illud* (1881), and in the fundamental *Immortale Dei* of November 1, 1885, in which, while he reminds the heads of States of the divine punishment they will incur if they 'allow themselves to be drawn into an unjust domination,' he reminds their subjects that 'it is equally forbidden to despise the legitimate power, whatever the person in whom it resides,' and he ends the period by the well-known sentence: 'Thus, to shake off obedience and to revolutionize society by means of sedition is a crime of *lèse-majesté*, not only human but divine.'

Never did the popes of the last century approve of the revolts of Ireland, Poland, and Latin America; indeed, in particular instances they blamed and condemned them. There was a tendency towards this rigid attitude in Catholic moralists as early as the second half of the seventeenth century, with the ascendancy of the theory of the divine right of kings, maintained by Gallicans, Febronians, and regalists in general against the curialist theologians. But after the French Revolution and the Restoration, even the curialists banished from their theories all that remained of the popular origin of power, and tended to the negation or quasi-negation of all legitimacy of revolt. Faced with the national and liberal revolutions, their fear of making any concession to the spirit of the age led them, in the name of legitimate power, to cast doubt on even the right of the Greeks to throw off the yoke of the Turks. Taparelli, whom we have already quoted, wrote that Turkey, since Lepanto, had become 'a legitimate European Power,' and that thus '*for the Christian* the necessity of defence ceased.' He added that 'therefore it seems to us that it is with very doubtful right that in our own time the insurrection of the Greeks is proclaimed in the name of the Cross of Christ' (Vol. II, ch. iii, note).

Not only the moralists of the first half of the nineteenth century, but also those of the Leonine period maintained

the same rigid attitude towards the right of revolt. If the liberal revolutions were over, and if those for nationality concerned only certain Balkan peoples and oppressed minorities (apart from Ireland and Poland), the workers' unrest, exploited by Socialists, Anarchists, and Communists, even then led to a fear for the social order.

The Jesuit Victor Cathrein, in his well-known *Moral Philosophy*,¹ establishes the two following theses: (a) that it is never lawful for a private person for any motive to censure, punish, offend, or kill, on his own authority, the legitimate sovereign; (b) neither is it lawful for the people, as a collectivity, to declare war on its legitimate sovereign and dethrone him on the pretext of tyranny.

In regard to the case of 'truly excessive tyranny,' Father Cathrein admits, with Cardinal Zigliara, that the people may have recourse to *active defensive resistance*. Zigliara distinguishes between 'defensive' and 'offensive' forms of active resistance. The first *limits itself to defence against an actual aggression*. In this case, says Zigliara, 'resistance is made not to authority but to violence, not to right but to the abuse of right, not to the prince but to the unjust aggressor against another's right in the very act of aggression.' The limitation '*in actu aggressionis*' is substantial; in this case alone, according to Cathrein, is the theory of *active defensive resistance* not in contradiction to the Syllabus. He seems to make an immense effort to accept Zigliara's thesis, for he surrounds his text with guarded phrases. The sole case for him is that of a 'truly excessive' tyranny; resistance is lawful only 'in given circumstances,' or rather 'in the case of extreme necessity.' After which, Cathrein hastens to declare that such 'truly excessive' tyranny is to-day very rare, and that, moreover, if the tyranny is truly such, all resistance is doomed to fail. This means that by this very fact resistance would become unlawful *even in the case of extreme necessity*.

In regard to personal resistance to an aggression by a sovereign or other head of a State, the same author, while

¹ Published by Herdersche Verlagshandlung, Freiburg-im-Breisgau, 1911. Vol. II, Bk. II, VI.

admitting its legitimacy, denies that it can be lawful when such self-defence could give rise to scandal and 'a serious disturbance of order may be feared.' He bases himself on a statement by St. Thomas in the *Summa Theologica*, (Ia-IIa, q. 26, a. 4): '*nisi forte propter scandalum vitandum cum ex hoc aliqua gravis turbatio timeretur.*' That any private individual assaulted by a prince or dictator (we may take the example of Hitler, in the night of June 30, 1934) should in the moment of aggression consider whether by defending himself he may bring about a disturbance of public order, and, if so, prefer to be murdered without a struggle, is a hypothesis too remote from psychological reality to be probable. Only for a religious idea or a great humane ideal could a man, spiritually Christian, at such a moment conquer his natural impulses and sacrifice himself.

II

The position of the citizen to-day in relation to the authorities of the State is very different from what it was in the last century. All the absolute monarchies have disappeared, and all those that had preserved in any way the traditions of the *ancien régime*. The surviving monarchies are all constitutional, recognizing the right of the people to a share in power and to a control over the head of the State. The dictatorships that have arisen since the Great War, while basing themselves on a so-called *right of revolution* (as the Fascists of Italy often repeat), seek legitimation from plebiscites, no matter how these may be manipulated to produce the most striking results.

Unlike those of the past, the moralists of to-day find the ground cleared of the lumber of historic rights, absolute powers, unchallenged and uncontrolled monarchs, ownership of power, personal rights over foreign territories,¹ which, in

¹ Historic rights were those claimed by the kings of England over France, or those of Naples over Jerusalem, though such rights were purely nominal. When the power of the absolute monarch was based on the conception of the kingdom as patrimony of the royal house, such power was considered his by ownership. The union of the kingdoms of Austria, Hungary, and Bohemia was, on the other hand, based on the principle of personal rights of the Crown.—*Translator's Note.*

the past, led to a confusion of moral theories with political ones, and led many, for fear of violating a right, to do everything to favour the absolute régimes even when they were tyrannical.

When Pius VII crowned Napoleon as Emperor in Notre Dame, he struck a first great blow at the legitimist theory and gave solemn recognition to the *de facto* government as a *régime établi*. It was somewhat the same as what happened in 751, when the Pope, St. Zachary, authorized Pepin the Short to assume power as king without being considered a usurper.

Leo XIII in his famous Encyclical of February 14, 1892, *Au milieu des sollicitudes*, wrote :

‘ As for human societies, it is a fact engraven a hundred times in history that time, that great transformer of all things here below, brings about profound changes in historical institutions. . . . They sometimes follow violent and too often bloody crises, in the midst of which the pre-existent governments disappear ; anarchy reigns, and soon public order is overthrown to its foundations. Then a social necessity imposes itself upon the nation ; it must provide for itself without delay. How should it be denied the right and still more the duty of defending itself against a state of things that disturbs it so deeply, and of re-establishing peace in the tranquillity of order ? Now this social necessity justifies the creation and existence of new governments, whatever form they may assume.’

Leo XIII goes on to say that the new régimes (constitutional and democratic) may be new in the manner of exercise and transmission of power, but never in the substance of power in itself, which by its nature comes from God.

‘ As a result, when the new governments representing this immutable power are constituted, their acceptance is not only permitted but demanded, indeed imposed by the necessity of the social weal, which has made them and maintains them. All the more so, that insurrection

brings hatred between citizens, provokes civil wars, and may cast the nation into chaos and anarchy.'

The same theory was maintained by Benedict XV in his letter to the Bishops of Portugal on December 18, 1919, when the new republic, which had taken the place of the old Braganza monarchy, could in spite of everything, be considered as a *régime établi*.

During that first year after the Armistice (1918-19), the monarchies of the Central Empires had collapsed; new States were being formed, as democracies, and with the help of Catholics; the Holy See was already beginning negotiations with the new Governments for concordats and *modi vivendi*.

Towards the successive revolts and *coups d'état*, in Ireland (1916-21, ending with the constitution of the Free State), in Italy (the March on Rome of 1922), in Spain (Primo de Rivera's military dictatorship in 1923, and later the Republic in 1931), in Austria (Dollfuss's authoritarian régime, 1933), in Germany (Hitler's assumption of dictatorship, 1933-34), not to speak of other minor changes, the Church always maintained a prudent reserve, inspired now by a certain confidence towards the new authoritarian régimes, now by a distrust—without however offering any opposition—towards régimes of the Left. No episcopal voice was ever raised against such changes. Cardinal Segura, Primate of Spain, saw fit to resign because of his championship of Alphonso XIII and the Monarchy at the moment of the advent of the Republic.

The *de facto* government, even if established by a resolution or *coup d'état* or both together, is always regarded by the Church as one that by restoring order, or at least by fixing powers in responsible hands, can bring back calm, order, and peace to the country, these being goods that deserve all support, over and above the interests of fallen royal houses or vanquished political parties, for order and peace are inestimable goods, and create an environment favourable to religion and public worship. From this point of view, the attitude of the Holy See towards the Spanish Monarchy on

the advent of the Republic is the same as that maintained towards the Popular Party in Italy or the Centre in Germany on the advent of the two dictatorships, Fascist and Nazi. It is sufficient to recall that their disbanding removed an obstacle to direct understanding between the Holy See and the two Governments concerned.

Thus for some time past the established Government has assumed the aspect of a legitimate authority, once the revolutionary period has been left behind, during which the juridical concept of a usurpation of power held good. For this it is enough for there to be some form of legitimation, conferred either by the head of a State still in office (the King in Italy in 1922, the President in Germany and in Austria in 1933), or by a plebiscite or general election (as in Spain in 1931) or some kind of formal acceptance.

III

The Government of Germany has not only failed to observe the Concordat with the Holy See, but it has organized a persecution aiming at the destruction of Catholicism and the development of a racial mysticism wholly anti-Christian and of a tyranny knowing no bounds. Can Hitler's Government be defined as a *régime établi* where there are order and peace, as suggested by the papal pronouncements we have already quoted ?

In the letter of Leo XIII to the French Bishops on February 16, 1892, there is a passage to be pondered. After saying, as we have seen, that acceptance of new governments 'is not only permitted, but demanded, indeed even imposed, by the necessity of the social weal which has made them and maintains them,' he adds :

'And this great duty of respect and dependence will persist so long as the exigencies of the common good demand it, since in society this good is, after God, the first and last law.'

Here, then, is the problem of the right to rebel envisaged in its central aspect : in what cases and when will the *exigencies of the common good* cease to demand the support by citizens of the established government ?

In 1925 a discussion was opened in France on the right to resist what were deemed unjust laws, and even the system of government, deemed injurious to the community. These two hypotheses corresponded to two currents of thought and action, seeking the disintegration of the parliamentary State. They were led on the one hand by a certain section of Catholics working for the abolition of the *Lois Laïques*, which had become intolerable through the anti-clericalism of the *Cartel des Gauches*, victorious in the elections of 1924 ; and on the other by the *Action Française*, which sought to provoke a change of régime through a *coup d'état*. The discussion had considerable repercussions on public opinion, owing to the prosecution of Charles Maurras for his well-known letter to M. Schrameck, then Home Secretary, threatening to kill him. M. Jacques Maritain, called as expert witness, maintained the thesis that Maurras' threat could be considered as the extreme and legitimate means of a defence of public order.

An inquiry into the problem was promoted by *Etudes*, which received a remarkable number of replies from jurists, philosophers, and theologians. These were collected in a pamphlet by Père Michel Riquet, under the title : *Enquête sur les Droits du Droit et 'Sa Majesté la Loi.'* The interesting point for us in this inquiry is the following : ' If the law is unjust, and it is not possible to obtain its reform by legal paths, may it and ought it to be resisted ? Is rebellion lawful ? And up to what point ? ' Père Riquet, after a series of references and quotations, summed up as follows :

' Thus from Déguit to St. Thomas, from Locke to Bellarmine, philosophers, jurists, and theologians agree in affirming and proving that by strict right one may use violence to oppose the execution of an unjust law ; the restrictions and limitations of this principle are to be measured by the exigencies of the common good, the possibilities of disorder

or scandal, the gravity of the spiritual and temporal injury inflicted on the victims of the law, and, finally, by the happy results that may seriously be expected from a defensive resistance.'

Père Garrigou-Lagrange went still further ; he endorsed the theory put forward by M. Géný, Dean of the Faculty of Law at Nancy, and fortifying himself by the words of St. Thomas, he added :

' This does not mean that he [St. Thomas] considers the case in which the character of the oppression and the serious guarantees of success give legitimacy to resistance, that is, to insurrection, as unreal and chimerical ; on the contrary, he quotes as an example of a successful revolution that which overthrew the Tarquins.'

And towards the end of his contribution he wrote, with reference to the position of Catholics in France in 1925 :

' Assuredly, if Catholics are brought in spite of themselves to this resistance, not only passive but defensive, they must before all recollect themselves, pray, unite, in order that the Lord shall give them His strength to shake off the yoke of despotism. They will thus prevent many odious vexations. And if, for a time, they were to be crushed, they would be crushed for the energetic defence of the rights of God, and this resistance will always be supernaturally fruitful. . . . '

Looking back from a distance of twelve years on the position of French Catholics in 1925 and 1926, when this inquiry was in course and seemed the prelude to a *coup d'état* (it was the period when the *Action Française* was at its height, before the papal condemnation), we who have before our eyes the melancholy experience of persecutions in Germany may well think that those French Catholics exaggerated a little.

Père Riquet, concluding his summing-up of the inquiry, wrote :

‘ We can, we ought to know what our leaders, social authorities and religious authorities, may lawfully advise or forbid ; it is for them to take decisions and to give orders.’

At about the same time, Cardinal Gasparri (on November 25, 1926) declared that the obligation of loyal support of the established government, as indicated by Leo XIII in 1892, had not altered ; that Pius X had never (as some Frenchmen said) deviated from the lines laid down by his predecessor :

‘ And, in fact, he [Pius X] nowhere suggested the idea that the defence of religion should be made on any other field than that of existing institutions, as Leo XIII had already declared : there should be an acceptance without *arrière pensée*, with that perfect loyalty that becomes a Christian, of the civil authority in the form in which in fact it exists.’¹

This norm of the Church—reiterated in France in the period of growing agitation when religious motives were exploited by the *Action Française* for political purposes, and which ended with the papal condemnation of the latter—has been followed by the German bishops up till now in the face of a far graver persecution. The same norm led Spanish Catholics, after the advent of the Republic, to found the *Acción Popular*, taking its stand on legal and constitutional grounds. Would to God that the acceptance of the civil authority ‘ in the form in which in fact it exists ’ had been, as Leo XIII said, ‘ without *arrière pensée*, with that perfect loyalty that becomes a Christian ’ ! Perhaps then the revolts of 1934 and 1936 and the consequent civil war might have been avoided.

In Mexico the phases of Catholic resistance to the anti-religious laws and persecutions which have been going on, now openly, now disguised, for the last twenty years, have been various, and neither uniform nor always clear. There

¹ *Documentation Catholique*, XVII, p. 142.

were attempts at revolt. That on the economic plane, with the withdrawal of money from the banks and trade boycotts, soon failed. The armed resistance promoted by Catholic laymen, supported by a fraction of the regular and secular clergy, did not receive the support of the whole Episcopate, which was divided and, in view of the dangers entailed by a revolt of such nature, and after hearing the views of the Holy See, ended by advising against it. Indeed, it repudiated more or less publicly according to case and place a movement that was assuming the guise of offensive resistance or mountain brigandry. Rome in the meantime reached a *modus vivendi* (1931) with the Mexican Government ; this, though unfavourable to the Church, was not respected. The Encyclical of Pius XI of September 29, 1932, marks the beginning of the present phase, which, having come afresh to conditions of extreme difficulty, has led to a new and stronger Encyclical, *Nos es mui*, of March 28, 1937.

IV

For the purposes of our study we must dwell on a very significant passage from this last Encyclical, where it deals with the character and limits of resistance to the constituted authorities. The passage is a long one, but we must have it before us if we are to extract the full sense of its teachings.

‘ You have reminded your sons more than once that the Church extols peace and order, even at the price of heavy sacrifices, and that she condemns all unjust insurrection or violence against the constituted authorities. On the other hand, you have also asserted that if the case arises in which these constituted authorities rise up against justice and truth, to the point of destroying the very foundations of authority, it is hard to see how one could then condemn the fact of citizens’ uniting to defend the nation and to defend themselves, by lawful and appropriate means, against those who use the public power to drag the country to its ruin.

‘ If it is true that the practical solution depends on concrete circumstances, we have none the less the duty to remind you of certain general principles which must always be borne in mind. They are as follows :

(1) That these revendications must have the character of means, of relative ends, not of final and absolute ends ;

(2) That their character as a means justifies only lawful actions and not actions that are intrinsically bad ;

(3) That if the means must be proportionate to the end, they must be used only in the measure in which they serve to achieve it or to render it possible in whole or in part, and in such a way that they do not cause the community greater injury than those that it is sought to remedy ;

(4) That the use of these means and the exercise of civic and political rights in their full extension, embracing also problems of a purely material and technical order, or of violent defence, can in nowise be counted among the tasks of the clergy, and of Catholic Action as such, though it is the duty of the clergy and of Catholic Action to prepare laymen to make good use of their rights and to defend them by all lawful means, as the common good may demand ;

(5) The Clergy and Catholic Action, since in virtue of their mission of peace and love they are destined to unite all men *in vinculo pacis*, must contribute to the prosperity of the nation, principally by encouraging the union of citizens and of social classes and by collaborating in all social undertakings that are not opposed to dogma or to the laws of Christian morality.

‘ In any case, the civic activity of Mexican Catholics, performed in a noble and lofty spirit, will obtain the more effectual results the more Catholics uphold that supernatural vision of life, that religious and moral education, and that fervent zeal for the extension of the reign of Our Lord Jesus Christ, that Catholic Action seeks to give its members.’

It is the first time that a modern Pope draws a distinction between an unjust insurrection and one that is not unjust.

By adding the word 'unjust,' he excludes from condemnation those insurrections and those acts of violence that may have the character of justice. Indeed he goes on to say that should 'these constituted authorities rise up against justice and truth to the point of destroying the very foundations of authority,' it would be hard to condemn the citizens who unite 'to defend the nation and to defend themselves.' The Pope, however, limits the defence to one carried on *by lawful and appropriate means*, and further on he emphasizes the point, saying that the character of defence justifies only 'lawful actions and not actions intrinsically bad.' Finally, he demands that the means should be proportionate to the end and used in the measure in which they will serve the end so as to save the community from greater evils than those it is sought to remedy.

This precision springs from an anxiety to define and limit *legitimate resistance*, which according to the best theological formulation should be called *active defensive resistance*. It is indeed a case not of simple *defensive resistance* (as Père Garrigou-Lagrange called it in the passage quoted above), which may be either passive or active, but of *active defensive resistance*, that is of an armed rising against the constituted authorities, for a defensive purpose, using only lawful means, proportionate to the end, and used only to the extent required to achieve it, in part or in whole, without producing greater evils than those they would avert.

If in a revolt of this kind, carried out with the rules of Christian morality, means were used that were *intrinsically bad*, it would mean falling under the condemnation of those who do evil that good may come ('*non sunt facienda mala ut eveniant bona*'), and the other, that 'whoso keepeth the whole law and is guilty in one is guilty of all.' (If the means used are disproportionate to the end—such as civil war *à outrance*—the revolt loses its character of *active defensive resistance*, and becomes *active offensive resistance*, which the theologians unreservedly condemn.) If the evils caused by resistance would be greater than those that it is sought to remedy, then no theologian (and Pius XI repeats it with authority) can say that a resistance so qualified is lawful.

But who can foresee the future? The Irish when they rebelled during the Great War could not know that they would obtain autonomy and independence at a relatively small cost, so that the evils might (according to a worldly, not a spiritual, scale of values) be estimated as less than the advantages.

On the contrary there are grounds for believing that the Spanish generals who promoted the *pronunciamiento* of July 18, 1936, thought it would go through as on other similar occasions, with an exchange of volleys or even of cannonades. Instead it has led to the civil war, in which we see with horror the savage destruction of the country and the decimation of the people, with, moreover, the peril of an international war as its tragic conclusion.

To our mind (without to-day wishing to pass final judgement on events in Spain), there was a complete lack of what Pius XI set down as the first of his 'principles' when he wrote: 'These revendications must have the character of a means, of a relative end, not of a final and absolute end.'

If the Pope's words are to be fully understood, we must note above all a characteristic phrase, that is that active defensive resistance, with the limits and character it implies, may be undertaken in the case when '*the constituted authorities rise up against justice and truth to the point of destroying the very foundations of authority.*' This is the extreme case of what the moralists envisage as the loss of legitimacy on the part of the authorities; they admit two cases, *abuse* and *incapacity*.

In regard to abuse or tyranny, the Abbé Magnin¹ quotes from the Tiberghien ecclesiastical collection the five conditions for a legitimate revolt: (1) a tyranny habitual and not transitory; (2) grave tyranny endangering the essential goods of the nation; (3) tyranny plainly such in the general opinion of honest men; (4) impossibility of recourse to other means than revolt; (5) serious probability of success. We cannot but subscribe to these five conditions. And

¹ E. Magnin, *L'Etat : conception païenne—conception chrétienne* (Bloud & Gay), pp. 127-8.

therefore we cannot hold the armed revolt of Ireland in 1916-21 to have been legitimate, even though historically justified and though all our sympathies as Catholics and as free men supported her claims. The Bishops of Ireland themselves (unlike certain Irish bishops in America and Australia) were cautious and sought to further pacification, while the Holy See remained neutral. Similarly the Bishops of Belgium in 1925 declared that they would not recognize a right of revolt as claimed by the Flemish separatists.

The case of incapacity is more difficult to define. We do not know much of the *conditions* in which Pepin the Short carried out his palace plot, but he safeguarded his position through the approval of the Pope. In the case of the March on Rome, it was the King who yielded without resistance, assuming sole responsibility for the fact which was subsequently ratified by Parliament, though under pressure from the 30,000 Fascists encamped in Rome. I do not myself believe that the incapacity of a Cabinet like that of Luigi Facta was a proof of the incapacity of the parliamentary régime, an incapacity which the moralists hold must be duly noted, permanent, and irrevocable ;¹ the more so since the Fascists for two years had themselves been creating disorder in the country, with their armed bands which assaulted towns and country houses, killing and burning, and thus pretended to be restoring order. If the Popolari and Socialists had in their turn organized their armed bands, and if the Army had taken the field on either side, we should have had in the Italy of 1921-22 a first taste of civil war.

This is what happened in Spain, where the Frente Popular which came into power in February 1936 showed itself incapable of maintaining order, but where the other side was doing its utmost to destroy it. Thus two fronts were formed, and the civil war was the outcome.

What is to be noted as something new in both cases, the one hypothetical (Italy) and the other actual (Spain), is that the struggle did not present itself as between the people and a tyrant, or between a national or ethnical minority and a

¹ Abbé Leclercq, *Leçons de Droit Naturel*, II, p. 189.

foreign and oppressor State, but between two sections of one people, between two factions both animated by a bellicose spirit and by the firm will to resist to the last against the other. It is, then, no longer a case of a legitimate authority that has lost its title to authority, but of two parties which instead of competing with voting slips within the frame of civil organization face each other in the streets with armed bands and on the battlefields with machine-guns, tanks, and aeroplanes.

We have thus gone back to the mediæval factions, with the difference that then they were city factions goaded by family rivalry, armed with sword and lance, while to-day we have national factions, seeking the predominance of parties, régimes, and ideologies, armed with the most terrible weapons of destruction.

Faced with this prospect, to-day a tragic reality, the words of Pius XI have a special efficacy :

‘ . . . that if the means are to be proportionate to the end, they must be used only in the measure in which they serve to achieve it or to render it possible in whole or in part, and in such a way that they do not cause the community greater injuries than those it was sought to remedy.’

But who can remain so restrained, in an armed struggle, as to bear in mind the limits and measure of means proportionate to an end ? And who can foresee what means will be adopted by the adversary (hypothetically in the wrong), so as to be able to meet him ? And who can hold in the human beast once it is unchained ?

Père Garrigou-Lagrange seems inclined, in the case of religious oppression, to face the risks of a revolt even if the Catholics are to be crushed. ‘ They would be crushed for the energetic defence of the rights of God, and this resistance will be always supernaturally fruitful.’

To us it seems that even in this case, which would be the case to-day of Russia, Germany, and Mexico (leaving aside that of Spain), the armed revolt of the faithful (whether

Catholic or Orthodox) would mean either that they would be *totally* crushed, or a civil war. In either case, I prefer the conduct of the early Christians ; their holocaust, *super-naturally fruitful*, was pure and unstained by their brothers' blood.

XII

ROME AND ANTI-ROME

ON the publication of the Lateran Treaty, which closed the Roman Question, it was said that Rome would henceforth be a mere capital and that the role of *caput mundi* would devolve on the Vatican City. The quip expressed a certain vague feeling that Rome and the Vatican City were two different things, and might, under certain aspects, hold a latent antithesis. Henceforth Rome would no longer mean the Christian tradition, but, earthly and powerful, would be linked up with the idea of the classical empire ; while all Christian significance would pass over to the Pope's new City-State.

The Liberal period, from the breach of the Porta Pia onwards, had spoken of the Third Rome. The first Rome was republican and imperial, the second Christian and papal, the third Italian and Liberal. Even before the seizure of Rome, in common speech the Vatican meant the power and administration of the Church, while the civil power of the Pope-King was designated by the names of other palaces, Quirinal, Cancelleria, or Montecitorio, as the case might be. After 1870, the Quirinal meant the royal power in Rome, the capital of Italy ; the Vatican the papal power, in Rome, over the Catholic Church. None the less, Rome was still indicated as the centre of the Catholic world, whether capital of Italy or not, and whether under ecclesiastical or secular government.

The political and juridical separation of the Vatican from Italian territory, to form a City-State *sui generis* giving the Pope a manifest form of territorial sovereignty in support of his inherent and inalienable independence, has brought a fresh impulse to restrict Rome to an earthly role. This

impression is enhanced by the ambition, already apparent under the Liberal governments, to give a new, specific stamp to the architectural development of the city, by bringing into greater prominence the ancient ruins, forums, and basilicas, and by the empty, pretentious style of palaces and monuments, like that of Victor Emmanuel II, the Palace of Justice, the new Montecitorio, and others of less note. This ambition is still greater under the present government, which seeks to mould Rome to an expression of its ideals of force and dominion. The *bourgeois* Rome of the Liberals is to-day put in the shade by Fascist Rome, imbued with imperial rhetoric.

In the tradition of ancient Rome, the superb buildings, triumphal arches, stadiums, basilicas, gave an idea of the greatness and glory of world dominion. The Renaissance Popes did not escape this earthly stamp when they transformed Rome from the old, mediæval city of towers, walls, and fortresses into the first modern city and the first museum of the world, when the new Basilica of St. Peter's might be said to symbolize worldly magnificence in the service of religion. Time has purged away the worldliness, and the ever-increasing devotion of the peoples has isolated St. Peter's from Rome, to make of it the symbol of faith, as tomb of the Apostle, overshadowing the tradition of the Lateran as Cathedral church of Rome. Michelangelo's dome towers not over Rome only, but over the world, a symbol of the catholicity of the Church.

The detachment of the Vatican, first from the Papal States (originally 'St. Peter's Patrimony'), then from Rome itself (an increasingly populous and exacting city, become the capital of a great kingdom), must, in the design of Providence, mark the beginning of a new era, in which the support of wealth and power to the Papacy is reduced to a minimum, its territory, once a reality, has become symbolic, its earthly kingdom purely juridical. At the same time the spiritual power, from the definition of Papal Infallibility onwards, has increased in intensity and extension, both in the consciousness of the whole world and in the mystical reality of the visible Church.

In the thought of the Fathers, as in the Christian tradition, Rome was prepared by Providence to become the centre of the Church and to pave the way, by the political unification of the known world, for the preaching of the Gospel—a lower mission, from the spiritual standpoint, than that of the Jews, a higher one from the earthly standpoint. It is true that religion, as man's communion with God, can exist without specific earthly aids (*sed venit hora, et nunc est, quando veri adoratores adorabunt Patrem in spiritu et veritate*), but it is also true that the Temple of Jerusalem was for centuries the symbol and centre of monotheism, drawing to itself peoples and nations in preparation for the Messiah.

The earthly supports of religion vary with time and space, as the manners of thought, clothing, and social life, as the facts of the historical process vary and the modes of God's communications to men. But, whether it be the Cave at Bethlehem, or Solomon's Porch, or the Cenacle, or Calvary, or the Mount of Olives, it was needful that Jesus should manifest Himself and speak and die and rise again and ascend to heaven in the forms of temporal life, in a given historical setting, in a given manner, striking the senses and the imagination, so as to reach the mind and the heart.

God could have chosen another time, other centres, other peoples, for the epiphany of His Son Jesus and for the propagation of the Gospel. Who was ever His counsellor? Jerusalem and Rome were chosen; can it be denied that they were prepared, even historically, for so lofty a mission? Can it be doubted that they fulfilled this function, willing or unwilling, doing good and doing evil, crying hosannah and crucifying Jesus, putting Peter and Paul to death and exalting Sylvester or Leo, now driving out the Popes, now receiving them with joy and honour?

History, regarded from the human standpoint, is the resultant of free and voluntary acts, conditioned by physical, historical, and social factors which they presuppose, and conditioning in their turn the free and voluntary acts that will ensue. A mixture of free and conditioned, of individual and social, in a continuous process—so we see history. But from the providential standpoint, beneath this human ant-

hill, enclosed in its cycle of conditioning factors and volitions, of thoughts and acts, are hidden higher ends, whether known or not, which reveal themselves, in their objective ripeness and in our subjective ripeness to perceive them, as willed by God. Then history becomes streaked with rays of light, which make plain the mysteries hidden within it, and which, by contrast, seem to cast a more impenetrable darkness over other mysteries left in shadow till the day, to us unknown, when they will be made clear.

When it was understood that Rome, over and above her earthly glory, had a loftier mission, and that this glory was being transmuted for the sake of its very purpose, then the past was seen as a contrast, a negation, to be obliterated in order that the lower should perish and the higher come into being. '*Roma quae eras magistra erroris facta es discipula veritatis*,' said St. Leo the Great in a sermon for the feast of SS. Peter and Paul, and added: 'It was wholly fitting for the work divinely planned that many kingdoms should be confederated in a single government and that a general preaching should swiftly reach the accessible peoples, held together by the rule of a single city. But this city, ignorant of the true Author of salvation, when it dominated nearly all peoples served the errors of all peoples, and believed it had attained great religion because it rejected no falsehood. Hence, the more straitly it was bound by the devil, the more miraculously has it been set free by Christ.'

Transformed from pagan to Christian, ennobled by its end, Rome had a new and permanent task to fulfil, almost natural to her, to be the centre of catholicity, the seat of the Papacy. Men act for their own ends; history fulfils the ends of God. Constantine goes to Byzantium, the Empire is split in two, Rome is no longer the seat of the emperors who prefer Milan or Ravenna, the Western Empire ceases to exist, the Eastern detaches itself more and more, Rome seems about to crumble and perish. Her old imperial destiny, her function as mistress of the world, was ending, with the end of the spiritual function such power was meant to serve. Christianity could not be bound up with an earthly conception, nor with a human support such as the Empire

(which sought to turn it to its own ends) ; nor, therefore, was it to be considered by other non-Christian peoples as a product of imperial Rome.

This unfolding of the providential plan could not be understood by the Roman and Romanized men of the time, for it lay within the mystery of human events, which conflicted with the common conception of a union of the Church with the Empire. They were mistaken : *et sicut opertorium mutabis eos et mutabuntur, tu autem idem ipse es*. Mediæval Rome, papal Rome, the creator of a new Empire and an historical Christendom, was coming into being, from Gregory the Great onwards ; it grew stronger with Leo III, it culminated with Gregory VII, with Alexander III, with Innocent III and Innocent IV.

Too much power, too much wealth, too much turmoil of wars and earthly interests which were interlocked with the great interests of religion, and the time comes when Rome and the Romans are thus described by St. Bernard in his *De Consideratione*, written for his disciple Paganelli, who had been elected Pope :

‘What shall I say of the people? It is the Roman people. I could not say more briefly nor more expressively what I feel about your parishioners. Is there anything better known to the ages than the arrogance and pomp of the Romans? A people unused to peace, used to turbulence ; an obstinate and intractable people up till now, incapable of subjection save when unable to resist. Here is the sore ; this care falls upon you, and it would be wrong to hide it. Perhaps you will laugh at me, persuaded as I am that it is incurable. Do not lose confidence ; you will need to give treatment, not a cure. Therefore you heard : *curam illius habe* (Luke x, 35) ; care for it, not cure it. Truly was it said : “It is not always in the doctor’s power that the sick shall be healed”.’ (Ovid, *De Ponto*, El. 10).

Even the Holy Roman Empire falls to pieces. The mediæval Papacy suffers the sacrilegious outrage of Agnani. Christendom is undermined from without by Islam, from

within by nascent nationalities. Avignon supplants Rome, the Church is torn by schism, Rome grows pagan, heresy invades the world. It is then that the old system collapses and a new arises. Rome ceases to be imperial, for there is no longer an Empire, a united Christendom ; but it becomes more strictly Catholic and papal, the Rome of the Counter-Reformation Orders, of the Roman Congregations, of the College of the Propaganda Fide, of the Holy Office, of the visible papal monarchy.

This monarchy rests on a State in the modern meaning of the term, autonomous, independent, absolute, self-sufficing, politically and economically self-contained. The smallness of the State is compensated by magnificence of art and science, of modern buildings ; authoritarianism is combined with paternalism. This Rome has a special function, to surround the Pope with his own world of culture, international and universal in spirit, in the face of the religious particularism not only of the dissident Churches but of the Churches of the various Catholic countries, and of the national and dynastic particularism of the various Courts. In a divided Europe it rendered visible a moral and potential centre of the Christian world. To allow formation of a specialized clergy, independent of other political powers and national interests ; to temper the conflicting currents among Catholics of the different States ; and to create a centre of resistance to the disintegration of Catholicism into the Gallicanism, Regalism, Febronianism, Episcopatism of all the rest of Catholic Europe—such was the great function of Rome, reduced as she was to a tiny State, and regarded as an international museum and picture-gallery.

Even this mantle of the Papacy must be considered worn out or at least ill-suited to the new period opening with the Bull *Dominus ac Redemptor* of Clement XIV, which suppressed the Jesuits, and leading a century later to the breach of the Porta Pia. All the phases—from the French occupation of Rome, the restoration of the Papal State in 1814, the subsequent wars, revolts, seizures of provinces, up to the fall of the Temporal Power—synchronize

with the transformation of the political power of the European States from dynastic to popular, from absolute to democratic, from legitimate to revolutionary. For the Pope the temporal State would have become either an absolute power to be defended at home by tyranny and abroad by foreign armies, or else a constitutional and nominal power necessitating a toleration of the modern experiments based on freedom of conscience, speech, and association. Providence, by allowing the fall of the Temporal Power, the régime of guarantees, the Lateran solution, has freed the Papacy from the last remnants of political and earthly defences, characterized by a succession of historical events from the time of the Roman Empire to the temporal power of the nineteenth century.

The pro-synodal project of the Vatican Council on the Pope's temporal power clearly defined the *raison d'être* of this and other earthly defences. 'In order that the Roman Pontiff should duly fulfil the office of primacy divinely attributed to him, he required the supports suited to the condition and necessity of the times.' The Lateran solution complies with the same theological criterion, just as, each in its time, the other forms of moral, feudal, political dominion possessed by the Popes over Rome and through Rome complied with it more or less effectively, that is they were supports suited to the conditions and necessities of the age. This is confirmed by the declaration made by the Holy See in Article 26 of the Lateran Treaty.

What will be Rome's function to-day in respect of the Papacy, now that she is freed from her classical and traditional role of earthly bulwark to the exercise of the office of pontifical primacy inherent in the Pope? Undoubtedly, there are still ties between the Vatican and Rome, religious ties and civil ties, but Rome's function—in the domain of power—is now that of capital of the kingdom of Italy. Little by little the Roman Congregations and the centres of the religious Orders are being installed in the Vatican City. In Rome there are still pontifical palaces and churches,

such as the Lateran and the Cancellaria, which are extra-territorial, but these may be considered (from a political though not from a strictly juridical standpoint) as on the same plane as foreign embassies or international institutes.

Article 1 of the Concordat that completes the Lateran Treaty contains a clause running as follows : ' In consideration of the sacred character of the Eternal City, episcopal see of the Supreme Pontiff, centre of the Catholic world and goal of pilgrimage, the Italian Government will take care to prevent anything in Rome that may conflict with this character.' The whole Concordat aims not only, as others of the same type, at safeguarding the rights of the Catholic Church, but at keeping Italy and especially Rome, in so far as possible, morally and religiously bound up with the Holy See, in a higher harmony of co-operation.

It would be against history to believe that everything always works as if in the best of all possible worlds, and that difficulties of coexistence, motives of conflict, possibilities of antagonism, and periods of persecution have been ended once for all. Never has the Church Militant, and particularly the Papacy, had such earthly security, neither in antiquity, nor in the Middle Ages, nor in modern times ; why should it expect it to-day ? St. Peter's ship sails the sea, which may to-day be calm, to-morrow in storm.

What should be noted—in order to understand by what ways Providence is leading us—is that, no matter how much good will the Government may apply to preventing in Rome ' anything that may conflict ' with its sacred character as centre of the Catholic world, Rome is under a secular power, which pursues its temporal ends, whether moral or no, with moral or immoral means, as the case may be. The Papacy has no means of intervention on the plane of temporal activity, save as head of the Catholic world, in the same way as in any other Catholic country, by advice, admonition, teaching, condemnation, in the name of Catholic faith and morals and through the authority with which it is invested, even in those matters that are of themselves mainly civil.

A modern case of the exercise of such power was that of the *non expedit* concerning the participation of Catholics

in the parliamentary elections of the new kingdom of Italy. The measure had the form of a *direction*, a counsel given by the *Penitenzeria* at the request of the Bishops, declaring such participation inopportune ('*non expedit*'). Subsequently (1895) Leo XIII publicly and authoritatively declared that '*Non expedit prohibitionem importat.*' Pius X restricted its range (1905), reserving the right of dispensation case by case. Benedict XV ordered the *Penitenzeria* to withdraw it (1919).

This case, under its political aspect, has great historical significance. Although the system of public law to-day gives the Pope no possibility of exercising a recognized power in civil questions connected with religion (as he had in the past), to-day such power, still the same in its ethical and religious nature, expresses itself in a manner suited to the new political conception. Therefore such power, if backed neither by civil nor international sanctions, without the secular arm to carry out its decisions, appeals to the consciences of the faithful. Thus, in the case of the *Action Française*, the prohibition of membership of a political association maintains its efficacy in the court of conscience, though the days have passed when, as under the *ancien régime*, it would have become a law of the State, by the publication, in traditional form and by royal command, of the papal Bull of condemnation.

What was termed, and was in reality, the *direct* power of the Popes *in temporalibus*, and which as such was resisted—what was attenuated in its theological formulation into *indirect* power, and even so was resisted, to-day presents itself as *directive* power, still *in temporalibus*, still *ratione peccati*. And even so it is still resisted, as in the case of the *non expedit* and in that of the *Action Française*, but it is the same identical power to-day as yesterday. Only the outward conditions, civil, judicial, political, and international, of the exercise and effectuation of such power have changed; not its nature, not its *raison d'être*, not its moral and religious scope.

The loss of the Papal State of Rome and hence of all real civil power inasmuch as it was bound up with a society that was of the past and a form of state that had been

outgrown, was an ineluctable historical fact. The recognition of this historical fact, which is implicit in the Lateran Treaty, marked the passage from one historical situation to another. The Pope gave no assent to a loss of his right to liberty and sovereign independence, nor to a decrease in his power *in temporalibus*, but a recognition that the conditions for the guaranteeing of his freedom and for the exercise of such power had changed. Rome, therefore, will henceforth, from the civil point of view, belong to a secular authority, recognized by the Holy See as legitimate and no longer usurped. At the same time, in so far as possible, Rome in its civil and moral decorum will conform to 'the character of the Eternal City, centre of Catholicism, goal of pilgrimage,' but this will be the exclusive concern of the Italian Government, and, in the language of Boniface VIII, no longer *ad nutum et patientiam sacerdotis*.

The epithet Anti-Rome may be applied to those centres antagonistic to Catholicism and the Papacy, for the most part headed by governments or kings or emperors. In modern times, the Paris of Napoleon in the days of his struggle with Pius VII might be called Anti-Rome. The St. Petersburg of the Czars of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries might give the idea, up to a point, of being also an Anti-Rome. It is not well to lay too much stress on ill-defined, rhetorical, and confusing figures of speech. To-day two Anti-Romes are pointed out, Moscow and Geneva. It is no longer a case of a personality like Napoleon, nor of the secular head of a dissident Church, like the Czar of the Russias, or the Kaiser of a German Empire such as William II, but of two symbols of the struggle against Catholicism : Bolshevik Communism, under the materialistic and impious aspect of those 'without God' ; and the League of Nations, presented as a product of masonic secularism and humanitarian pacifism. It is plain that here is nothing but a more or less far-fetched metaphor, arbitrarily constructed with rhetorical images. From the religious standpoint, all that is not orthodox is counter to Catholicism. Moscow

Communism, Berlin Nazism, Paris Secularism, or Rome Fascism, and so on, in so far as they are opposed practically or theoretically to Catholic dogma and morals, are, if you wish to call them so, Anti-Rome, Anti-Vatican, in substance Anti-Christianity.

This is not the usual conception of an Anti-Rome ; it becomes a concrete image when what is contrary to Catholicism is transported, as such, into the field of international organization of Christian countries. Rome is thus the symbol of that outward structure of Christian society, or Christendom, which has served and serves the assertion and progress of the Catholic Church, because Rome has served the designs of Providence as centre and see of the Papacy, through the historical vicissitudes of its existence, grandeur, decadence, transformation. All, therefore, that may seem and is opposed to the providential design for Rome can be reputed anti-Roman, contrary to the mission of Catholic and papal Rome. We are here dealing with an historical concept, not symbolical or generic but specific, which touches us nearly, inasmuch as to-day, as we have seen, the role of Catholic and papal Rome has been lessened through its assumption of the role of capital of the kingdom of Italy.

Let us at once deny that, from this standpoint, Geneva is an Anti-Rome. It does not matter if in Wilson's mind and in the choice of Calvin's city there was such intention, nor need we consider the failure to invite the Pope as a deliberate insult, in view of the famous letter of Benedict XV on peace (August 1, 1917). Among the promoters of the League were Freemasons and non-Freemasons ; there were also Catholics, among whom, outstanding in character and nobility, was the King of the Belgians. If the Papacy to-day played the international part it played in the Middle Ages, Geneva without the Pope would certainly be heretical and excommunicated, and would be indeed an Anti-Rome. Did not Gregory IX reproach Bishop Giacomo of Capua for his share in drawing up the *Liber Augustalis* of Frederick II, a collection of laws that seemed then to create an antagonism (an Anti-Rome) as against the Collection of Canons and

Decretals? Perhaps in a Christendom of the future the Papacy will be summoned to fulfil an even greater juridical and political international role than in the Middle Ages. We know nothing of what will happen in a hundred or a thousand or two thousand years' time; we know only that the Papacy will survive all possible human cataclysms.

To-day the League of Nations—the present one or another no matter—has its *raison d'être* as a society of States, based on an international law in process of formation, of a natural-ethical character. The Papacy may co-operate with it and be represented officially or semi-officially, as the case may be, just as it co-operates with any modern State with which it is in occasional or permanent relations. No one will say that the United States of America are an Anti-Rome because they have no ambassador at the Vatican and there is no nuncio at Washington, or because they are a secular State in the non-religious sense of the word, or because the President or a part of the Senators may be Freemasons. So long as the League of Nations has no immoral principles in its constitution and does not pursue anti-religious ends (and this applies to the League of Nations, or the Pan-American Union, or any other society of States, general or particular), the Papacy has no reason to see in it an antagonist, nor to reject its good undertakings, nor to hamper its development, nor to undermine its existence secretly or openly. Such has been the policy of Benedict XV and Pius XI.

An important manifesto, which it is well to recall in order to silence those who would make out that the Vatican is contrary to Geneva and Geneva an Anti-Rome—and there are such persons, even in England—is a message sent by Mgr Besson, Bishop of Geneva, Lausanne, and Fribourg, on September 20, 1936, when Pontifical High Mass was celebrated in the church of Our Lady of Geneva, on the eve of the assembly of the League of Nations. This message was reproduced in the *Osservatore Romano* of September 28-29. Speaking after the Italo-Abyssinian War and during the civil war in Spain, he said:

‘ On November 14, 1920, on the occasion of the opening of the first session of the League of Nations, we expressed, with an enthusiasm that events have perhaps failed to justify, the hopes with which our heart was filled. “ Let us salute the League of Nations,” we said then, “ we are happy and proud that it should have its seat in our country. Perhaps the future will prove that we have sinned by optimism ; we should be more afraid of sinning against hope.

“ We believe we are following the spirit of the Divine Master in loyally giving our hand to those who work for peace. It is from Him alone, in the last instance, that we take our order, and we are not afraid that He will ever reproach us for doing all we could so that the gulfs separating the peoples may be filled and obstacles removed.”

‘ That is what we said sixteen years ago. We have, therefore, on the one hand, shown confidence in the League of Nations, from the first hour, and, on the other, clearly declared our firm will to collaborate in the great work of Peace.

‘ This two-fold feeling we have never repudiated. We persist in believing that the League of Nations, in spite of its need for serious reform, preserves its full *raison d'être*, and we shall never refuse our collaboration, not with the saboteurs of peace, more or less camouflaged, but with all men of good faith who are resolved to unite sincerely to prevent the horrible scourge of war, placed by the Catholic Church on the same footing as pestilence and famine. *A peste, fame et bello libera nos, Domine.*

‘ We therefore remain entirely consistent with ourselves in asking those of our diocesans or co-religionaries who are directly or indirectly concerned in the work of the League of Nations not to lose courage and not to shrink from any effort to avert war and stabilize peace.’

This does not prevent there being Catholics who dislike the present League of Nations and others who applaud it ; so long as their personal feelings are not made to appear as Catholic or papal policy, there is something to be said on

either side. But it is wrong to speak of Geneva as an Anti-Rome, even though the Pope is not officially recognized (as Leo XIII was at the meetings of the Hague, in spite of the opposition of the Italian Government), for the Popes have never subordinated their religious activities to the incorrect behaviour of governments and kings, even those of the past, like the Catholic Kings of Spain, the Most Christian Kings of France, and the Apostolic rulers of Austria. If there was good to be done at Geneva, both Benedict XV and Pius XI have not failed to be, in a certain manner, present, through their documents, their nuncios, or Catholic enterprises they have blessed or encouraged. When there is need for correction, guidance, blame, or encouragement, they will intervene in Geneva, as in Paris or Rome in the most suitable, most evangelical forms, on doctrinal and moral grounds, *opportune, importune*.

In order fully to understand a certain psychology in Italy and elsewhere, among Catholics of conviction or Catholics of occasion, it would seem that at the back of their minds there is the idea, not yet fully worked out, of a new Holy Alliance, into which the Vatican would enter through the order, discipline, and hierarchic spirit which Catholicism brings, to reorganize Europe on an authoritarian and corporative basis. This idea springs from the political theories of the *Action Française*, in its early phase before it was condemned, with its preference for a Catholicism *à la Auguste Comte*, its special second-grade Thomism, its adoption, without conviction, of the Syllabus of Pius IX, and its paternalist corporativism. But the *Action Française* was international only in terms of French predominance, and Catholic only in its political exploitation of religion. The condemnation stopped it from creating a mysticism among French Catholics that would have allured those of other countries ; and through its failure to win power it could not be whitewashed, like Hitler's Nazism, which, before he became Chancellor, in various dioceses of Germany suffered the same canonical rigours as befell the *Action Française*.

Hitler's appeal for a crusade against Russian Communism ; events in Spain, which, although special to that particular historical and social setting, have undoubtedly been strongly influenced by Moscow ; the French Popular Front, in which the Communists play an important part—have provided the motives for the idea of an anti-Communist *bloc*, in the political field, with the support of the Papacy, it too concerned for the evil that Communism would bring to a bolshevized Europe. This plan suffers, above all, from the same defect as the appeal of the Holy Alliance. Then Pius VII refused, though in a document that bases itself on the Gospel, justice, and charity, to set his signature side by side with that of the heads of Protestant and Orthodox Churches, such as the King of Prussia and the Czar ; while Great Britain, on the other hand, refused, because she thought that the governments of States should defend interests and not proclaim crusades of principle. To-day, while England would again refuse to give her policy the character of a warfare of principles (as Mr. Eden declared at Geneva in 1936, almost in reply to the Nuremberg speeches), Pius XI in the religious struggle against Communism could not join in the political and Germanic struggle started by Hitler to fight the Franco-Russian Pact. The two planes cannot be confused.

Moreover, in the period of the Holy Alliance, the Popes as heads of the Italian State were bound to the political policy of Vienna and the interests of the Restoration ; to-day the Pope, freed from a determined policy as king of a State, is concerned only with giving the religious problem its full weight, without political entanglements or anxieties. To-day not even the ill-intentioned could identify the anti-Russian policy of Berlin or Warsaw or Fascist Rome or Portugal with that of the Vatican. The Pope's aims may run parallel to the political policies of the various dictatorships, but they can never be identified or confused or the one subordinated to the other. In this sense a Holy Alliance is not possible to-day. Papal Rome cannot be made the symbol of the anti-Russian policy of European States and parties, adopted in certain countries for particular ends.

Of this the Encyclical of March 19, 1937, *Divini Redemptoris*, is the best proof.

To perceive the *arrière pensée* of Hitler's campaign, it is enough to note that at first he was eager for close co-operation between Germany and Russia. It will be remembered that he signed various treaties with the U.S.S.R., of which the last was in April 1935. Is it possible that Hitler became aware of the Russian Peril only after a treaty had been drawn up between Russia and France?

Fascist Italy has been still more faithful to Moscow. From the beginning, when she took the lead in recognizing the Bolshevik Government, up till quite recently, her relations with Russia have been fundamentally friendly. The European chessboard changes so quickly that we should not be surprised if States change their positions according to the development and displacement of political and economic interests. If into a seething Europe, armed to the teeth, ready for explosion, the dictatorial ideologies, red, black, or brown, are to be transported, whether in the interior of each country (as in Spain) or in an international struggle, all that will happen will be a hastening of the catastrophe that is feared, an unprecedented moral and material catastrophe that would be the end of poor Europe.

All that we have said about a hypothetical and impracticable Holy Alliance should render those Catholics more cautious who to-day seek to identify the interests of the Church with a given political régime. This was the mistake, about forty years ago, of a small section of Christian Democrats; the Clerico-Fascists on either side of the Alps would to-day repeat it. They are drawn to an authoritarian régime; corporatism, in name, though not in substance, echoes the social theories of *Rerum Novarum*. Austria and Portugal have been represented as models of Catholic States; it is hoped that Poland will imitate them. Italy presents the type of a compromise between Fascism and Catholicism. It would be possible, think the Catholic Fascists, to obtain a permeation of Catholicism by Fascist ideas, or—think the

Fascist Catholics—a permeation of Fascism by Catholicism. Then Rome the capital of Italy would become Rome the centre of Catholic Fascism and the political organ of Catholicism in the world. A new Christendom would be formed, crystallized in a Mediterranean empire, Fascist and Catholic, radiating beyond the Latin world, a strong nucleus for a new and authoritarian League of Nations.

Those who think thus have the idea that democracies are bound to crumble ; that the dilemma, Communism or Fascism, faces all ; that against Communism the Church will have to play the part it did against Islam, which it will be able to do effectively only by means of Fascism, as a worldly and military extension of the organism of the Church. In such a conception an essential element is wanting, the Christian faith that animated all historical institutions of the Middle Ages. Then the secular authority was not outside the Church but in the Church, for it was Christian ; the Church was not outside the social structure, but, though unifying it on a higher plane, herself participated in the same economico-feudal structure.

To-day the State is essentially secular, on an original basis of popular sovereignty, totalitarian in tendency, irresponsible in character, conceived as an end unto itself. Not only is it not within the Church, but it seeks to absorb the Church for its own end and in its own immanence. Fascism has made the totalitarianism and immanentism of the State more evident, it has accentuated its character as the end of man, it has eliminated, suppressed, trodden down the rights of human personality. It therefore lacks the necessary and intrinsic titles to be the temporal amplification of the spiritual power of the Papacy, and to give to Rome, capital of Italy, the role it held under the Carolingian and Romano-Germanic empire.

The Christian unification, cultural, ethical, social, which was at the basis of the great historical experience of the West in the Middle Ages, is lacking in modern Europe. The division between Fascism and Anti-Fascism which is driving the masses towards a social struggle must not be transported from the political and economic domain into the religious,

into the bosom of the Church. Every country has its experiences and attitudes ; the religious unity of Europe, like the political unity, is not to-day humanly possible.

God prepares the future. If He has permitted that the Church should no longer have any civil authority, that her historical safeguards, or those so reputed like the Austrian empire and the Spanish monarchy, should have fallen, that Rome herself should have become politically detached from the Vatican, it cannot and should not be without a providential reason. Neither political nationalisms and particularisms, nor class divisions and struggles, nor secular democracies, nor totalitarian dictatorships will be able to unify Europe and prepare a new Christendom. Only a renewal of the Christian spirit can do so, spreading from faithful and disciplined groups to the social and political life of to-morrow. Then, many events of to-day will be clear and comprehensible to men of faith, who will know better than we how to appraise what were, in our time, the true Rome and the true Anti-Rome.

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